DISSENT

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AUTUMN 1957 75c

DISSENT

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With this issue of DISSENT we reach our fourth birthday. There may have been those who, if they didn't expect our immediate demise, at least looked forward to it. We are not sorry to disappoint them. DISSENT, at age four, is going strong. By all the evidence we have increased our audience and widened our group of contributors. We have even "won over" some of those who cast a skeptical eye on the very idea of such a magazine as ours.

In the past four years we have on several occasions published "special issues" devoted in whole or in largest part to a single subject. In some others we have addressed a section of the magazine to an examination of a particular subject—like East Europe. We would like to suggest that our readers will find the emphasis of this issue on POLITICAL FREEDOM —intellectual and political. For that in essence is what the articles on the Supreme Court decisions, East Germany, "our peculiar hell," Franz Neumann, etc. are concerned with.

As we have grown we have felt the need to symbolize our growth by drawing into closer association some of the writers who have helped us. We have also felt that our audience would benefit if representative men of the radical and socialist left, not previously associated with DISSENT, were drawn into collaboration through participation on our board of Contributing Editors.

Accordingly, we are happy to announce that NORMAN THOMAS, distinguished leader of American socialism, has kindly consented to help us in our work by joining the board of Contributing Editors as has HERMAN SINGER, long known among socialist writers, and at present the editor of the Socialist Call. The following, whose articles in DISSENT and many other periodicals have been highly esteemed, have also agreed to serve as Contributing Editors: MICHAEL HARRINGTON, a young socialist writer; E. V. WALTER, a political scientist; MURRAY HAUSKNECHT, a sociologist. Since they have undertaken to share our burdens we think we can safely promise our readers that the coming issues of DISSENT will reflect the advantages of their collaboration in articles and in editorial advice. Later, we may announce other additions. In the meantime, we welcome these newest members of our board.—THE EDITORS.

DISSENT, issued October 1, 1957, is published quarterly by Dissent Publishing Association, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N.Y. Subscriptions: $3.00 for one year, $5.00 for two years; $2.50 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, $3.50 for one year, $5.50 for two years. All payments from foreign countries must be made by U. S. money orders or checks payable in U. S. currency. Single copy: $.75. For information on newsstand and store distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 306 West 11th St., New York City. Bundle orders of three or more copies: 40¢ each.

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DISSENT

VOLUME IV
NUMBER 4

Autumn 1957

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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MISCELLANY ..... 3rd Cover

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1. THE COLONIAL COLONEL BLIMP

East Africa and Rhodesia, *in its issue dated May 30, 1957, commented editorially, in a column headed "Notes by the Way," upon the special Africa issue of* DISSENT *(copies are still available!) published in the summer of 1956. We print below the complete editorial contained in this British colonial journal, together with a reply by William J. Newman, one of the contributors to the African issue.*—EDITORS

Dissent

An American Quarterly Magazine called DISSENT has published a special number about Africa. I dissent emphatically from almost all its judgments about the East and Central African territories, and I should be astonished if that were not the attitude of anyone who really knows the territories between Southern Rhodesia and the Sudan inclusive. Quite a number of the writers have only a very superficial knowledge. The first article, entitled "Africa finds its Voice," is by a Mr. Stanley Plastrik, of whom I have never heard in connection with any aspect of African affairs. He has some strange notions. For example, he is of the opinion that the West has for two centuries treated Africa as "an object of derision." I was unaware of it. There have been some derisory books about Africa—more often than not from the U.S.A.—but I should have said that the overwhelming majority of Europeans who have lived in East, Central, or West Africa have quickly acquired a real affection for the African.

The Sudan

Mr. Plastrik asserts that the Colonial Powers have "painfully and fanatically resisted each step" in the emergence of Africa as an historical reality. What records of the past three-quarters of a century he has read, if any, I cannot imagine; and if he has kept even the most superficial touch with events in the past decade he will scarcely deny that Great Britain, at any rate, has been engaged in rapidly, many people think much too rapidly, accelerating the advancement of Africans, not in resisting it. He is rash enough to write that the Sudan obtained its independence by "conquest!" That will be news to the British forces then in the country, including the admirable and loyal Sudan Defence Force. Independence was not wrested from Great Britain by force, but granted prematurely by Mr. (now Sir Anthony) Eden in an absurd attempt to appease the Egyptian dictator Nasser, who imagined that this southerly neighbour would promptly accept his sway.

The Drive for Power

A Mr. William J. Newman seems to think that Mau Mau is the name of a tribe, for he writes: "The African is amazing in his adaptability and the Mau Mau is indeed the exception to the rule that the African can in fact adjust to town life." He sees the African on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia as "facing the Marxist stance." I doubt whether a dozen Africans in that area could define the last two words. As an example of wrapping up harsh fact in cotton wool, consider this statement: "Africa is well supplied

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Journal of the Quarter

THE COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTY

"They'se wan thing about th' supreme coort, if ye lave annything to thim, ye lave it to thim. Ye don't get a check that entitles ye to call f'r it in an hour. The supreme coort iv th' United States ain't in anny hurry about catchin' th' mails. It don't have to make th' las' car. I'd back th' Aujitoroom again it anny day f'r a foot race. If ye're looking f'r a game iv quick decisions an' base hits, ye've got to hire another empire. It niver gives a decision till th' crowd has dispersed an' th' players have packed their bats in th' bags an' started f'r home."—MR. DOOLEY IN NOW & FOREVER.

The June decisions of the Supreme Court were major decisions; this is so even if those to whom the decisions applied directly, or who had initiated the actions that led through the federal courts, have already left the scene. The Communists, reeling under the blow they had received from Mr. Khrushchev, and Joseph McCarthy are no longer members of the American audience. This may have helped the Supreme Court to speak up finally; more important, however, is the fact that the Court in a series of decisions reasserted the Constitution as the foundation of civil liberties.

The Civil Liberties Union calls them "spectacular"; the Supreme Court, it says, "has placed itself squarely on the side of the individual citizen's rights of free speech and association and warned legislative investigating committees that their powers of inquiry were not unlimited." Writing in the *New Republic,* David Riesman calls the decisions "the best news the friends of freedom in this country have had for a long time." And the *Nation* writer states that "... political inquisition has received a blow from which it may never fully recover"; the Court held that "the very concept, purpose and *raison d'être* of the political inquiry committees are in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens."

All this is, by and large, true, but more needs to be done than to fling one's hat in the air jubilantly. What, first of all, do the three decisions say precisely—and what don't they say?

IN THE SOMEWHAT related cases of two union officials, Jencks of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union and labor organizer John T. Watkins, now of the United Auto Workers, it was decided (*U.S.* v. *Jencks*) that the defendant was entitled to see statements about his alleged Communist affiliations made to the FBI by testifying witnesses; it was further decided that a witness cannot be held in contempt

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if the questions put to him by an investigating body transgress the range of properly defined relevance (*U.S.* v. *Watkins*). Judging from the howl that went up ("... what this country needs most today is a Supreme Court of lawyers with a reasonable amount of common sense and who will apply it in deliberations rather than follow untenable detours into a strange philosophy and unsound logic to make the wrong decisions"—Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Investigations Subcommittee and, lately, a top TV personality), it is the Watkins decision that certain quarters find most obnoxious. Taking their lead from the President himself ("I don't get it," he remarked at a press conference), the attack has centered upon this decision. Congress, Chief Justice Warren wrote, has extremely broad but "not unlimited" powers to conduct investigations. Its hearings must be confined to gathering information for legislative purposes and not to expose witnesses' beliefs or associations. In pulling up so sharply the reins of congressional investigating power, the Court compels such bodies to state clearly the subject under inquiry and the pertinency of the questions about to be asked. In a word, there should be no more performances such as we have been subjected to for the past ten years.

To be sure, in the Jencks case the Court did *not* say that the entire FBI, or other, dossier relating to the accused must be disclosed; rather, what it does is to compel the government to make available those reports made privately by a witness now testifying in court for the government. Strenuous efforts to hamstring and nullify the effects of this decision have already succeeded in part with the passage by Congress—and with Eisenhower's backing—of a hastily-drawn bill whose intent is to restrict the defense by revealing only selected materials.

In the case of Paul Sweezy, held in contempt by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court (*Sweezy* v. *New Hampshire*) held that questions put to him by the State Attorney-General violated his academic freedom and his political rights as exercised under the First Amendment. Although the Court's decision turned upon a technicality, it stated that, "Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."

Finally, in the most elaborate and technical decision of all, involving the conviction of 14 West Coast Communist leaders under the Smith Act (*U.S.* v. *Yates et al.*) the Court dismissed the cases against five on the grounds that advocacy of force and violence had not been proved and ordered a retrial for the remaining nine. In a clear, if incomplete, return to the former Holmes "immediate danger" doctrine, the Court held that even Communist Party membership or the "philosophical advocacy" of violent overthrow of the government could not be held illegal. People must be urged to *do* something, rather than merely believe in something. There must be proof that "the conspiracy is the work." Unfortunately, the Court drew back before the indicated conclusion that the Smith Act itself is unconstitutional.

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THIS GROUP OF DECISIONS is clearly intended to fit together. Do they form a significant pattern if considered that way? To the layman, unqualified to judge the decisions from a legal standpoint, it would appear so. The language of the decisions is weighty; the substance concerns basic principles; the whole has an air of solemn warning about it. True, as the *Nation* writer has stated, "there is nothing new in principle in all of this. It is merely the reassertion of traditional principles against a type of attack to which they have only recently been subjected." But the very emphasis of reassertion leads to the conclusion that the Court intended an appeal both to the American government and the public for a return to constitutional fundamentals which have largely disappeared in recent years. In effect, the Court has sounded an alarm over the deterioration of the democratic process in the country. It is an appeal to the elements of democratic tolerance in our heritage and thus aimed against ideological conformity.

Further, the highly important factor of governmental power is involved. This is no place to analyze our constitutional system of "checks and balances" with particular reference to the modern world, but it is incontestable that the Constitution was drawn up so that such power would never be left unchecked and uncontrolled. Historians who have approached our history from the viewpoint of examining the constant tug-of-war between the three governmental branches for more power at the expense of each other have always found that such an analysis yields fruitful results. The abuse of executive power has been, of course, the most startling development since the time of FDR. Precisely this has been the most difficult to curb, or for the courts to get at. In that sense, the Supreme Court—in attempting to redress the balance somewhat—aimed its principal blow at the executive through the legislative (Congress). Power run amuck, it has said, must be checked.

If we accept this general interpretation of the Court's actions, then other conclusions follow. First, the Court is not attempting anything startling or novel—"usurpation" is the term employed by its critics—in its reassertion of traditional liberal values. Radical constitutional critics have always challenged the concept of a non-elective federal court system; and traditional Jeffersonian and Populist rhetoric has always found a popular target in the "nine old men." Have times changed now so that the Court has become a a bulwark of civil liberties? Is it true, as Alan F. Westin writes in the *New Leader* of August 5, 1957, that conservative and reactionary groups in the population are leading the anti-Court crusade, whereas the liberals have become its supporters? Has such an "ideological reverse" taken place?

APART FROM THE FACT that the Court by its very nature, as Mr. Dooley so well understood, never permits itself to become the center of ideological clashes, the insights of Mr. Westin seem only partly correct. The decisions do represent, as he suggests, an alliance between the active, more political-minded members of the court (Black, Douglas, Warren) and what may be called the classic or tradition-based liberals (Frankfurter, Harlan); tradition-based in the sense that they accept the fundamental philosophy of

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"constitutional equilibrium" as expressed by the "founding fathers." This is a tenuous alliance, of course, and contradicts the idea that any clear-cut ideological reversal of positions has taken place.

Further, what credit can organized liberals claim in recent years so far as civil liberties issues are concerned? David Riesman acknowledges they have achieved "only a modicum of solidarity" and greater disagreement in principle over the problem; ". . . the question of the constitutionality and good sense of the Smith Act," he adds, "can be argued either way." As a matter of taste, or of principle? And where lies the responsibility for the widespread apathy and lack of public mobilization over freedom of speech and expression?

The Supreme Court, then, appears to have raised its voice largely in the wilderness; any resounding echo it may have expected has not yet been heard. That it could hardly have failed to make any other type of decisions without further weakening its own position in government is not the point. It is important that it did make these particular decisions in its own self-defense.

The struggle over civil liberties is, of course, an unending one whose ups-and-downs depend far more upon the activities of the whole American society than on any court, no matter how exalted. The concrete meaning of the recent decisions will be clearer within the next year or so, although so far the effect is definitely disappointing. If our condition of "institutionalized anxiety" goes on, the reinterpretation of the Court's fine print will leave little left beyond the fine rhetoric.

S. P.

THE MYTHOLOGY AND MECHANICS OF A COUP

I

Having found rather poor enlightenment in the hour-by-hour thrillers of Khrushchev's coup d'état, we must admit that we prefer historical novelists to Russia experts when it comes to relating who did whom in. But we have been fascinated by the experts nevertheless. Unwillingly, and unwittingly, they have provided an amazing story of their own —the story of their gyrations in evaluating and interpreting Russian history since Stalin's death. Their heroes have changed as often as the Kremlin's "line." In the beginning Beria was touted as the "reasonable man" who might agree even to give up the Russian post-war conquests; the hope-sheets let him come as close to being a benefactor of mankind as any Russian will ever be, but, alas!, he fell from grace, not only in Moscow but in Western capitals, too.

Fortunately, a new hero was revealed: Malenkov was the man to watch. He wished to give the Russian people a pause, to provide them with consumer goods after the Western fashion, and hence could not afford to be ag-

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gressive in foreign affairs. Of course, it did not turn out that way. The next Four Year Plan again was a Five Year Plan to be fulfilled in four years, and consumer goods again constituted a disappointingly small percentage of total output. Malenkov himself publicly admitted that he did not quite understand the job, and went to the rear of the collective-leadership coach.

Undismayed, the Russia experts trusted that Malenkovism would survive Malenkov. There was *Kollektivnost* in the Kremlin; they were even taking votes in Presidium meetings! It was encouraging; surely not government by the people yet, but the beginning of democracy at the top. Where, after all, should it begin if not at the top? At the bottom perhaps? Hungary showed where such fooling around was likely to end. Better trust the "thaw" among the intelligentsia. A critic actually could say in Moscow that socialist realism was not the only possible form of art. It even was possible to write a novel in which a Party secretary was shown up for inefficiency and loose morals. To be sure, at the end he was properly rebuked and repentant; nevertheless—these intellectual stirrings were presumed to show that other groups were raising their heads and their sights: not the Party alone but the army, the cultural elite, and above all the industrial managers were running the country. They were not of one mind, but they all were united against the police and personal dictatorship. A return to Stalin, so we were told, would be particularly obnoxious to the Army and to the managers; and these were the people that counted. Russia was on its way to democratization. If the "proletarian" state was not yet withering away, the dictatorship was. Marx himself had proved it: the growing economic substructure would force changes in Russia's political superstructure. The managers could not help doing away with the dictatorship. Thus spoke Tito the old Stalinist and Isaac Deutscher, a former Trotzkyist, as also the Menshevik *New Leader* and such new converts to the economic interpretation of history as Alan Dulles, his pious brother, and the Washington *Post*.

They also expected the managers to conduct foreign policy more reasonably than the old-guard Stalinists. Indeed, stoney Molotov was retired from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (how did the man of the Ribbentrop Pact ever earn the reputation of being inflexible?); his successor Shepilov was an intellectual! The army, on its part, was supposed to fear nothing but war; its beloved leader Zhukov, Ike's pen pal and his better in philosophical debate, was the very image of pure, if Spartan, idealism. Meanwhile, the intellectual engineered the Egyptian mess, and the philosopher personally brought his fist down on Hungary.

Now, most of the honorable men in whom we put our trust have been overthrown, demoted, degraded, banished, disgraced. Do we, for that, interpret the demise of reasonableness as the victory of its opposite? By no means! We firmly stand on the proposition that whatever happens, Russia is moving toward more freedom and more reasonableness. Wake any Secretary of the State up, in the middle of the night or in the middle of a press conference, and he will recite three reasons why the Soviet Union is inevitably doomed to liberty. Which, of course, proves that the satellites are as good as liberated and that with

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Eisenhower we are living in the best of all possible worlds, whereas the Russians live in the best of all co-existing (or cold-war) worlds. The nice managers had been overthrown by a peace-loving Red Army, the centralist dictators of Soviet efficiency by an almost-Jeffersonian republican.

II

It is the consensus of the various experts that Khrushchev's leadership had been challenged in the Presidium. This body is nominally a successor of the old Politburo, Stalin's terror instrument; though it had become a cabinet council with departmental representation, it still wielded dictatorial powers. What is more democratic than an appeal from this autocratic body to a larger authority, such as the Central Committee, which is truly representative of the regions and districts and brings the Voice of the People to Moscow? The bureaucrats in the Presidium only know what their respective departments report. Managers are centralistic; they debate their plan among themselves, then impose it on the country. But here is Khrushchev with his district secretaries come to Moscow in force so that the autocrats may hear from the grass roots. Speaking of grass roots, there are districts represented where the grass still needs to be uprooted. Delegates come from the virgin soil which Khrushchev is going to turn as soon as he finds enough people who will go there. This may take some persuasion (remember, the GPU no longer can do that) by the Party. Meanwhile, the commissars whom Khrushchev sent speak for the flock which is still to come—a future Gogol will write "The Unborn Souls."

Other *apparatchiks* also owe their jobs to Khrushchev; like God, he made as many of them as possible. Breaking up the big departments and splitting them into districts, he created the need for more commissars. Lashing out against "bureaucrats" and central planners, he gave his Party secretaries this assignment: take their jobs, acquire their skills, exercise their powers. Penetrating all state and economic organizations on the local level, they maneuvered with the industrial managers, the officers of the army and the administrators of state governments. Forcing the administration to "decentralize" Khrushchev loosened the ties between the local managers and their superiors, the central planners, undermined the central power-position of his rivals in Moscow, disrupted their apparatus or dislodged it from the local power positions. Only the Party, instrument of decentralization, remained centralized—and in Khrushchev's hands. Looking back at Khrushchev's actions during the last four years, one cannot but admire their consistency—they all now fall into a pattern.

III

To understand why success was inevitable, we need to remember some Soviet semantics. The Party always stands for "democracy," the state and economic authorities for "bureaucracy." The Party practices "democratic centralism," the bureaucracy just authoritarianism. Khrushchev's decentralized commissars, coming back to Moscow as representatives of the provinces, dominated the Central Committee as spokesmen of "the people." The reader who has had some experience with union meetings or party conventions, and has

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lived through the agonizing, frustrating experience of resolutions rammed through and committeemen pushed up by an organized apparatus able and willing to terrorize the delegates, will know then why Molotov, Malenkov and Shepilov knew they were licked. He will also know why Marshal Zhukov felt moved to make the switch that seemed to tip the scales; like Harold Stassen nominating Nixon, the noble Marshal just made it in time to get a ticket for the victory ball. The Army even was forced, the day after, to adopt a resolution of its own, vowing loyalty to the new regime and accusing the outgoing members of—what? —an anti-Party attitude!

Those who believe that the Army's attitude was decisive in the power struggle must answer two questions: if Zhukov represented the Army's position, why not Bulganin or Voroshilov? They were members of the Presidium and, it appears, they sided with Malenkov. While we do not know how this question can be answered, we shall answer the other ourselves: Why did Zhukov—if his voice was decisive —favor Khrushchev over Malenkov? The answer suggests itself: not because Zhukov prefers cows to steel mills, but because Khrushchev and the commissars already had won the day and had proved that the authority which holds the Soviet Union together is not the administration or the economists, but the Party. "The Army" did not charge that the conspirators endangered national defense; it charged, through the mouth of Zhukov, that they had broken the unity of the Party.

The only charge that so far has been preferred against Molotov, Shepilov, Malenkov and the other managers, is "anti-Party activity." The discharged managers had conspired, we are told, to assassinate Zhdanov, a Stalinist hero if there ever was one, or to exonerate his murderers. The implied rehabilitation of Zhdanov and of his avengers —the inventors of the "doctors' plot" frame-up—fits the return to their inner-Party, non-judicial methods of meting out "justice": the defendants have not been heard from; there is no need for a trial. Either the dissidents will abjectly submit, or the Party will liquidate them because they were against the Party. Punishment fits the crime which the charge names: they thought conflict is a procedure of management; they found out it is insubordination. The managers were deposed because they tried to be managers.

Malenkov, Pervukhin, Shepilov, Kaganovich and even Molotov apparently were operating under the delusion that Stalin's death had removed the obstacle to Socialism. Molotov, it will be remembered, held the un-Leninistic view that Communism was as good as perfect in the Soviet Union. Would it not follow that the dictatorship of the Party no longer was necessary? The State was working properly—dictatorially and centralistically, of course. Malenkov, once given the choice between the position of Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Party, chose the former. He may have flattered himself with the idea that he had reached the decisive command position in the new, post-Stalin Soviet state. Pervukhin—like Dulles—thought that economic power is power *tout court*. Like Eisenhower he found out that industrialists make poor politicians. Shepilov thought that his transfer from Pravda to Foreign Affairs

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was a promotion. But he should have been warned when he was assigned to be drillmaster of the young technocrats. Instead of aligning them firmly behind the Party, he sympathised with their desire to express themselves more freely; he even tolerated subversive research: staffers on the magazine *History Problems* cast irreverent doubt on the canonical version of Party history. They may have forgotten that this still was a Party state; in a totalitarian government, the administration is a tool, the Party is its user.

IV

Unless we go back to ancient Egypt and China, no country has ever been ruled by a civil service exclusively. Balkan or Latin American dictatorships, on the other hand, are run by a military junta which directs the civil service but is aloof from the people. Modern dictatorships are based on the active participation of the people. When Marx analyzed the system, he gave it the name of its inventor, "Bonapartism." He described this regime as one compelled to seek popularity through glory, acquiescence through benefits, and legitimacy through periodic plebiscites. With certain modifications its pattern also applied to Hitler and Mussolini, to Peron and to Nasser. Fascism was not dictatorship pure and simple, but pseudo-participation of the nation in the ruling party. The Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia also used the totalitarian method of organizing the people into a mass movement with a savior ideology. In all these cases the state was not directed by an aristocracy, a usurping clique or bureaucracy, but by a party. Its pseudo-democratic ambition is the cause of the constant purges.

The need for national roots generates a dialectical process which undermines the Party's independence vis-a-vis the masses. Functionaries who had been delegated to fulfill technical functions, or to take charge of certain population groups, would get interested in their jobs and in the people under them. Forgetful of their mission, at all times to represent the overriding future of the Party, they might become representatives of those people or be guided by objective considerations of technology and proper method. Since it wants to be all, the Party becomes State and opposition; its factions crystalize first around certain policies, but then may develop into "lines" which represent the interests of groups and classes. These deviations often are dubbed "rightist" or "leftist"; but such labels are misleading. For what matters is something else: they are partial views of a whole which always is represented by the Party.

Oppositions are anti-Party almost by definition. Tolerating a number of them means to risk that they will take root and eventually develop all the characteristics of a pluralistic state. One deviation not only justifies another, but actually engenders and needs it. A totalitarian party will not arbitrate between organized pressure groups; it must suppress them and ostracize their spokesmen. Nor will it be conquered permanently by its right or by its left wing which then would suppress the other; it is the center that suppresses both in order to freely follow either course. Hitler liquidated Schleicher and the Conservatives along with Roehm and the S.A. revolt. Mus-

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solini ordered a "change of guard" from time to time. Pilsudki staged a coup d'état whenever his colonels grew too fond of playing state. Stalin, of course, killed right and left, imitating Robespierre who also had been careful to place an "aristocrat" on the same *charrette* with a radical. The device was called "amalgam" during the Jacobin *terreur*. The *Directoire* continued the practice, beating down the Babouvistes and the jeunesse dorée. Strangely, or not so strangely, the word "amalgam" reappeared under Stalin when he sent to the isolator old revolutionary comrades along with "bourgeois" industrial managers.

V

Khrushchev's "amalgam" is as typically indiscriminate. He banished industrial managers like Pervukhin and "liberals" like Malenkov on the one hand, old-guard Stalinists like Molotov and Kaganovich on the other hand. Neither of these extremes represents a "line" that is irreconcilably or unforgivably different from the one Khrushchev holds best for the Soviet Union. He took Malenkov's view in some matters, Molotov's in others. Nor is Khrushchev's own line anywhere in the middle between the two extremes. He does not appear as a "moderate" from either's viewpoint, but is fanatically devoted to any line, today right and left tomorrow, which strengthens the Party and its hold on the country. He once had devised the "agro-towns," which might have liquidated all private plots, but now he gives the peasants more freedom to use the fruit of these plots. He is not concerned with principles (or, for that matter, with Leninism, as Molotov correctly remarked) but with organization. He remains the center and relies on such old Stalinists as Aristov, Suslov, Shvernik, Kuusinen, who had been members of Stalin's Politburo. He maintains in power the arch-Stalinist leaders in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; he promotes old GPU agents like Serov and Ignatiev, and, of all people, who would stage a comeback but Lysenko!

Centrifugal forces are cut off whenever an amalgam is sent to the guillotine. Some people, maybe whole groups, must remain dissatisfied, their hopes for more "liberal" treatment frustrated. Every such crisis, therefore, narrows the popular basis of consent for the regime, at least temporarily. If the centrist organization then relies too much on its terror machinery, the danger of utter isolation raises its deadly head. The totalitarian party then must seek new ties with the people. In a democracy, the next election corrects such a situation. If one party looses touch with the people, the opposition will win the majority. The political pendulum, therefore, oscillates between right and left policies as the parties alternate in power. In a totalitarian state, the pendulum swings beween measures reflecting administrative interest in sectional problems or people, and restrictions of such liberalism. When the opposition has been liquidated, the scope of popular consent contracts, and is in danger of contracting further and further in spirals, as every opposition which represents some group or section is cut off. The Party then will try to grow new tentacles, renew its hold on the imagination and loyalty of the people, and the cycle of deviations and purges can begin anew.

HENRY PACHTER

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OUR PECULIAR HELL

Richard Lowenthal

If I had to select items of twentieth-century evidence to be found one day by future historians and archaeologists, the gas chambers of Auschwitz and the protocols of the Moscow trials would be high on my list. Twentieth-century man has brought forth his own peculiar hell—the modern one-party dictatorship, inhibited by no law or moral consideration in the exercise of its power, recognizing no private refuge of the individual in its effort to penetrate every sphere of life and to make every subject serve its purpose. Ours is the century in which novels about the future ceased to be Utopias and became nightmares—and not without reason.

There are still historians and other educated people who would deny the originality and uniqueness of what, for want of a shorter name, we call totalitarianism. They point to the age-old tradition of Asiatic despotism, to the Pharaohs who had their pyramids built by state slaves, or—more pertinently—to the pattern of plebeian revolution ending in *tyrannis* in ancient Greece or in the Italian Renaissance. They recall the link-up between an expanding empire and a fanatical faith during the conquering period of Islam or the European wars of religion, and they conclude that our contemporary horrors are just another instalment in the recurrent story of unrestrained power and blind intolerance. The most they are willing to concede is that modern communications technique, by creating more efficient media of mass propaganda, has placed an additional weapon into the hands of the despot; but this by itself would hardly entitle us to speak of a basically new political and social phenomenon. In that view, a passionate concern with the phenomenon of totalitarianism appears merely as proof of a parochial time-horizon—a deplorable lack of historical detachment.

In fact, however, twentieth-century totalitarianism shows essential features which are not to be found in any slave state, theocracy or revolutionary *tyrannis* of the past. It contains elements of all three, but combines them in a new context: the slave state is not static, but commands a modern industrial economy with rapidly changing technique; the official religion is secular; the *tyrannis* continues the revolutionary transformation of society. For one thing, totalitarian dictatorship is the product of the age of mass democracy; it does not aim at keeping its subjects politically quiet, but at forcing them into active support of

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its ever-new campaigns. For another, it aims at controlling *all* spheres of life of a highly complex and differentiated society, at extinguishing any remnant of independent forces, every germ of pluralism. To quote the closing words of Trotsky's unfinished biography of Stalin:

> 'L'Etat, c'est moi' is almost a liberal formula by comparison with the actualities of Stalin's totalitarian régime. Louis XIV identified himself only with the State. The Popes of Rome identified themselves with both the State and the Church—but only during the epoch of temporal power. The totalitarian state goes far beyond Caesaro-Papism, for it has encompassed the entire economy of the country as well. Stalin can justly say, unlike the Sun King, 'La Société, c'est moi!'

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IN RECENT YEARS, this unique nature of modern totalitarianism in its various forms—nationalist-fascist and communist—has come to be recognized by a growing number of students of political science, particularly in the United States. They have studied the centralized structure of the totalitarian party, which enables its leaders to change their "social basis" at need and to rely on a shifting balance of classes, and the manner in which this party merges with the state machine after the seizure of power. They have described the institutional tools of the totalitarian state, such as its monopoly of mass organization and of information, which enable it to mobilize all social energies for its purposes, and have pointed out the contrast to the merely negative controls employed by traditional authoritarianism. They have discussed the dynamic nature of the totalitarian power-drive and of the ideologies in which it finds expression, and the resulting tendency both to limitless outward expansion and to the limitless internal transformation of the conquered society according to a preconceived pattern.

But both the political scientists and the historians who have studied the rise and fall of this or that particular dictatorship have been somewhat reluctant to ask the basic historical question about twentieth-century totalitarianism—the question of what are the fundamental forces that have brought it into being at this particular stage in the development of humanity. By contrast, attempts at such a general and fundamental interpretation have come from political philosophers and religious thinkers: totalitarianism, when it has been recognized at all as one of the crucial problems of our time, has been largely "explained" as an error of thought—as a spiritual heresy or a fallacious political doctrine.

The most widespread among these interpretations centers around the concept of "secular religion." Modern man, we are told, having lost his faith in God, has found the human condition intolerable. Taught by the humanists that he is master of his own fate, he has readily fallen for the Utopian belief that the state can abolish evil and suffering by creating a perfect society, if only the right people are given absolute power; or for the satanic belief that he can overcome his sense of guilt

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by proving in action that he belongs to the chosen élite who may commit any crime without fear of retaliation. In either case, man's attempt to rebel against God ends in his total enslavement to the state—his effort to create heaven on earth in the creation of hell on earth.

A separate, but related, explanation traces the origin of totalitarianism to the fallacy of revolutionary democracy—in fact, to Rousseau. Belief in the rule of "the people," in the abstraction of the *volonté générale*, is shown to rest on the illusion of the natural "goodness" of the common people and the harmony of their interests; and this doctrine implies that only a limited number of wicked oppressors stands between the people and the attainment of universal happiness by political means. Moreover, as the actual people are normally unwilling to sacrifice their actual, limited and conflicting interests to the single-minded pursuit of this ideal, the doctrine logically leads a self-appointed élite of doctrinaires to substitute their own will for the theoretically deduced will of "the people"—i.e., to establish a revolutionary dictatorship of the Jacobin type. A belief which identifies the will of the ruling minority with that of "the people," its aims with universal happiness and its opponents with Evil incarnate, naturally justifies the elimination of all safeguards for dissenting groups and individuals and finally leads to the rule of a single leader—a rule as absolute as ever that of any king, but free from the restraints imposed by tradition on the hereditary monarch. The modern one-party state is thus seen as but a successful development of the "totalitarian democracy" of the Jacobins.

There is some truth in both these interpretations; certainly the relation of our twentieth-century party dictatorships to such phenomena as the Anabaptist republic of Jan van Leyden on one side, to the rule of the Jacobins on the other, is more genuine and throws more light on their nature than the alleged "precedents" we have mentioned before. In every case, the dictatorial élite derives its sense of mission, its self-sacrificing energy and its utter ruthlessness against all opponents from a conviction that it is the chosen bearer of revealed truth, that its victory will usher in the millennium, and that its opponents are by definition the representatives of Evil who must be annihilated so that the state of universal harmony and happiness may be attained. In every case, whether consciously religious or not, these ideas derive from the isolation of the element of chiliastic prophecy in the Judaeo-Christian tradition of our civilization, which is appropriated by the self-appointed élite for its own purposes; in every case, the resulting distortion of the élite's vision of society and its own role in it amounts to a collective paranoid phantasy, as Prof. Norman Cohn in his recent study of the chiliastic medieval sects* has brilliantly shown.

The uncovering of this "spiritual" factor in totalitarian movements —or, if one prefers, of the paranoid element in them—is thus as legiti-

* *The Pursuit of the Millennium.* Essential Books Ltd. New York. 1957.

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mate a part of the study of this phenomenon as is the analysis of totalitarian political institutions. Yet it still fails to answer the historical question why this recurrent heresy, or recurrent paranoia, should have attained such enormous destructive power just in our century. For far from confirming the view that these aberrations are the consequence of the widespread loss of religious faith, the evidence shows that they arose again and again within the religious universe of the Middle Ages and have undergone no essential change by assuming a secular form in modern times. The real problem remains why, while the terroristic rules of earlier messianic movements remained ephemeral and isolated —that of the Jacobins no less than those of the Bohemian Taborites and the Muenster Anabaptists—totalitarianism has become one of the dominating forces of our age. That fact cannot be adequately explained merely by uncovering the spiritual and intellectual roots of the ideas which animate the active totalitarian minorities; it calls for an understanding of the special conditions which have made it possible to found powerful empires on these ideas.

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I BELIEVE THAT THE KEY to the role of totalitarianism in our century is that contemporary civilization has to cope with an unprecedented pace of social change. I am thus proposing to reverse the problem; instead of looking for the origin of totalitarian deviltry, I suggest that we should consider the precariousness of a free society in present-day conditions.

The first thing to note here is that any free society is bound to produce spontaneous, manifold and uncoordinated change. By "free society" I do not mean in this context a particular political system, such as modern parliamentary democracy; still less do I mean a society which would guarantee an optimium of all-round freedom. I simply mean any society which is "pluralistic" in the widest possible sense—any society, that is, where political, economic and spiritual power are not concentrated at a single point, where the social structure is not frozen in caste-like rigidity, and where the individual enjoys a minimum of security under the rule of law. Such a "minimum-definition" of a free society serves merely to distinguish it from totalitarian despotism on one side and from a traditional authoritarian society bound by rigid rules on the other, but leaves room for a wide variety of institutions.

"Free societies" in this sense have clearly existed during the main periods of the classical, Greco-Roman civilization, and—with the exception of certain periods of crisis—during most of the history of our own "Western Christian" civilization, and have to some extent spread with the latter over large portions of the globe. It would be far more debatable if the concept were applied to the later centuries of Roman Caesarism or to the Eastern Christian empires of Byzantium and Muscovy, and certainly wrong to use it for any of the great indigenous civilizations of Asia. And it is striking at first sight that the Greco-Roman

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and Western societies have also been the great seedbeds of spontaneous social change—culminating in the modern era of worldwide technological and economic transformation.

It is, of course, no accident that this "acceleration of history" has started from the "free" west. A society which contains a multitude of autonomous units, feeling relatively secure in the pursuit of their particular goals, is apt to produce more innovation of all kinds than one that is governed by an all-powerful despot with a vested interest in keeping things as they are; and that will be doubly true if the citizens of a free society have as much chance to better their position by their independent efforts as the subjects of the despot might get by carrying out his will. But beyond this, we must bear in mind that the most dynamic free societies we have known have belonged to civilizations which *believed* in a social order founded on freedom and in the value of the effort of the individual; and that belief in itself has been a powerful agent of social change. The individual in a free society may always feel that he could in some sense do better than he is doing—by improving his personality in accordance with classical or purifying his soul in accordance with Christian ideals, by extending his knowledge or adapting his conduct to stricter moral demands, by bettering his station, increasing his power, accumulating wealth or making a greater contribution to the common good. And whenever a number of individuals are engaged in such endeavors, whether idealistic or material, altruistic or self-seeking, the aggregate result is spontaneous social change: changes in population, in production techniques, in tastes and needs and in social stratification.

Now the functioning of any society depends on a set of common beliefs and institutions which together characterize a civilization. As social change occurs, the institutions have to be adapted and the beliefs reformulated; but there must be continuity in the fundamental values underlying all the changing formulations and institutional forms if the civilization is to survive. A belief in representative government and individual rights might in the Middle Ages have been interpreted as a belief in corporative institutions—the Estates—and in the rights of each according to his station; by the end of the 18th century, it could be interpreted without absurdity only as a belief in parliamentary government and equal political and legal rights for all citizens; in our time, it has increasingly come to include the demand for democratic control over economic life and for equality of economic opportunity. It is obvious that these changes in popular beliefs and accepted institutions have been necessitated by the changes in the social structure of our Western civilization brought about by spontaneous economic growth, by the spread of universal literacy and by the new problems posed by capitalist industry; it is equally obvious that they are changes within a continuity of fundamental values.

But there is no guarantee that the necessary ideological and in-

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stitutional adjustments will always be made in good time. For it is implied in the definition of a free society that there is no single center responsible for making these adjustments—that its overall development is not "planned." Instead, the adjustments occur as a result of political and social struggles between different groups, and their outcome is not predetermined; according to the particular constellation of forces in a particular place and time, they may take different forms or may altogether fail to be accomplished.

It is in that sense that the survival of a free society is always precarious. For where the necessary adjustments fail to be made, the official institutions and beliefs cease to correspond to the evident facts of social life and thus lose their binding force—their hold over the minds of men. In that case, the continuity of civilization is broken, and the door is opened to barbarism—to political and spiritual chaos.

This danger to the continuity of a civilization is clearly greatest when the spontaneous social changes are of a kind that is in flagrant contradiction with the traditional view of what the social order ought to be and hence with the moral norms of behavior of large groups, or that destroys the functional status and material security and hence the self-esteem of such groups. This may occur most easily when a society which only recently seemed to vegetate quietly in the shelter of a traditional way of life, where changes were slow and imperceptible, is suddenly awakened by outside intrusion and exposed to the unwonted air of freedom and drastic change.

To this phenomenon, so familiar from the consequences of the recent worldwide spread of Western influence, the most nearly analogous event in earlier Western history is the great crisis of the Renaissance—a crisis which started in the 14th century and did not end until Reformation and Counter-reformation had done their work. At that time, the medieval forms of social and political organization broke down in all the most advanced areas of Europe; the medieval moral norms proved grossly inadequate to the new commercial economy; while the Church, the authoritative guardian of these norms, visibly shared in the general demoralization. It is surely significant that it was only during this period that the chiliastic heresies, which had occurred for centuries before, acquired the form of political mass movements and thus became true precursors of modern totalitarianism; for as Prof. Cohn has pointed out, it was only then that large masses of people found themselves in a situation of helpless disorientation and material and spiritual insecurity which offered a fertile soil for paranoiac reactions. We may add that the same period also saw the outbreak of a non-chiliastic form of mass paranoia—the hunting of witches—and that both forms rapidly lost importance after Reformation and Counter-Reformation had succeeded in bringing moral norms into line with the new social realities, thus restoring the continuity of Western Christian civilization. The paranoiac reactions, including the precursors of mod-

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ern totalitarianism, had been part of a profound crisis of that civilization—due to a failure of its beliefs and institutions to keep pace with the realities of spontaneous social change.

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LET US NOW RETURN to the special conditions of our century. The pace of technical change has constantly accelerated during the last 150 years, and has been even quicker in the latecomer countries than among the pioneers of industrialization. Population change, stimulated by the early stages of industrial growth and sustained by the development of modern medicine, has been equally stupendous. Whole social strata have been destroyed and new ones created in country after country. Entire continents of traditional societies have been "opened up" by the expanding West and forced into a lop-sided international division of labor, only to react within a few generations with a political and economic counter-movement of autonomous modernization which expelled the intruders and forced them in turn to readjust their channels of trade.

It seems natural enough that in the face of such a total upheaval, the mechanism of self-adjustment of some of the younger industrial countries on the fringe of Western civilization and of some of the hitherto traditional societies now sucked into the whirlpool should have broken down. But such a breakdown in the continuity of development of a civilization inevitably gives a chance to the totalitarians—the spiritually disaffected minorities who are prepared to sacrifice the basic values of that civilization to the cult of absolute power for the sake of the accomplishment of a preconceived "perfect" social order. For it is only under the impact of catastrophic social change, and of the apparent impossibility to regain their lost personal dignity and material security within an order based on the old values, that millions of people are prepared to entrust their fate to the advocates of "total" revolution, to take flight from freedom and to seek salvation in the arms of the omnipotent state. (We are speaking, of course, of genuinely "homegrown" totalitarian revolutions, not of totalitarian Quisling regimes imposed by conquest, which are a secondary phenomenon.)

In other words, the spiritual or ideological "heresy" of the true totalitarians will only become historically effective when it merges with the material and psychological despair of the masses, owing to the failure of a social order to solve, in accordance with its own fundamental values, the concrete and urgent problems imposed on it by the uncontrolled processes of change. Bolshevism, for all its spiritual antecedents which the historians of the Russian intelligentsia have traced, would not have won power in 1917 if its opponents had been willing and able to end the war immediately and to distribute the land. Nazism, for all its roots in German history, would not have been victorious in 1933 if Keynesian full-employment policies had been developed and accepted at that time by the ruling parties of the Weimar Republic.

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Northern Viet-Nam would not be Communist to-day if France had granted independence to the Indo-China states at the same time and on similar terms as Britain did in India, Burma and Ceylon. An analysis which stresses the crucial importance of these humdrum political, economic and social problems for the victory or defeat of totalitarianism in a given situation may seem less profound than one that emphasizes man's loss of faith and his subsequent rebellion against the human condition as the ultimate cause; but in contrast to the latter it has the merit of focusing attention on those elements in the situation which it may be in our power to change.

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MODERN TOTALITARIAN PARTIES, then, get the chance to win power owing to the failure of free—or of newly freed traditional—societies to respond adequately to the problems created by accelerated or even catastrophic social change, and to their consequent breakdown. Once in power, they benefit in comparison with their precursors from all the modern advances in the technique of centralized administration and of communications as well as in the applied psychology of propaganda and terror. Yet these technical advances in the apparatus of oppression and mass manipulation are not the decisive reason for the comparative durability of modern totalitarian regimes. That reason must be found in the fact that, in contrast to the more naive utopianism of their predecessors, the totalitarian movements of our time are armed with "scientific" doctrines for the transformation of the actual societies on which they operate—doctrines which claim to point the way to some kind of national or social Utopia, but which lead in their practical application to the concentration of ever-increasing power in the hands of the totalitarian élite.

The totalitarian regimes are thus not only the result of the problems created by accelerated social change—they are the creators of an alternative method of coping with these problems. If traditional societies are characterized by built-in resistance to change, and free societies by the production of spontaneous and uncoordinated change, totalitarianism may be described as an engine of centrally manipulated change.

This, precisely, is the strength of totalitarianism as an established system, and the justification it proffers for all its horrors. It extinguishes freedom and individual security; it denies the very ideas of truth and justice; it seeks to eliminate every vestige of independent development not in order to keep things static in the manner of traditional despotism, but in order to replace the risks of "anarchic" and unforeseeable change by the certainties of "orderly" change according to a preconceived pattern, based on the values of the totalitarian movement and its concept of the future and purpose of society. The state must be all-powerful, because the state has become the demiurgus of society; the party tends to perpetuate its rule by the very fact that it continues to distort the development of society into an artificial pat-

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tern by what we have called a "permanent revolution from above," so that the resulting structure would collapse without the support of the dictatorial power. In the history of Soviet Communism—the most long-lived totalitarianism within our experience—the forced collectivization of 1929-32 and the forced incorporation of the new industrial bureaucracy into the ruling party as a result of the blood purge of 1936-38 have been such artificial transformations of society in the interest of the preservation of totalitarian power; the ultimate removal of the right of the kolkhozes to dispose of their produce, envisaged in Stalin's last pamphlet as an essential feature of the transition to the higher stage of "Communism," would have been another similar "revolution from above"; Mr. Khrushchev's present reorganization of the Soviet government and its economic planning machinery, aimed at establishing more direct administrative control by the party machine and breaking the independence of the economic and administrative experts which has tended to reassert itself even inside the party, looks like an attempt at yet another turn of the same screw.

Yet there are two limits to this self-perpetuating hell. One is given by the fact that even the most efficient totalitarian state is unable to foresee, prevent or canalize all the spontaneous changes that may arise in the lives and minds of its members; the other is that spontaneous social development continues outside its territorial boundaries, and may for all its groping nature prove in the long run superior to the preconceived pattern. Both ultimately reduce themselves to the limits of human foresight or, to put it positively, to the infinite productivity of history. In the short run, the demiurgus armed with an all-embracing theory of society is apt to prove more effective in his chosen direction —the concentration of power—than the uncoordinated efforts of free men; in the long run, his doctrine is likely to hamper his objective by its inevitable one-sidedness. The resources of the Nazi empire, however completely geared to war, proved insufficient to secure world domination; the Communist system fails to promote productivity at the required rate. If the ever-new revolutions imposed on Soviet society by its rulers bear witness to the ingenuity of the latter, they also prove their need to improvize in response to changes and pressures not foreseen in the doctrine: Stalin's plan for the "transition to Communism" has had to be shelved, while Khrushchev's reorganization, suddenly conceived as an act of self-preservation of the party regime, was as unforeshadowed by Communist theory as Stalin's blood purge itself. Nor is there any inherent guarantee that such improvisations must always fulfill their purpose of preserving the regime rather than undermining it; for the very need for them proves that something in the theoretical expectations about the direction of economic and social change has gone wrong. The saving grace remains that even the most perfect man-made hell is based on the necessarily imperfect calculations of men.

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IT MAY APPEAR that in this article I have been mouthing the Platitudes of Progress. In fact, however, I have made no assumptions about progress towards a given ideal of perfection. I have merely stated the obvious fact that free societies tend to produce "material progress" in the sense of spontaneous technical and social change; and I have suggested that "political and ideological progress"—the adaptation of ideas and institutions to that spontaneous change—is required not in order to assure an approach to perfection, but to prevent a breakdown of civilization. Progress, in that view, becomes a necessary object of endeavor not in order to achieve heaven on earth, but simply in order to avoid hell on earth. It seems to me that its rehabilitation in that modest but vital role is long overdue.

In attempting that rehabilitation, I have sought to offer a corrective for a certain bias which seems to be implicit in the one-sided spiritual and ideological explanation of totalitarianism: a bias in favor of traditional authority and revealed religion. By deriving the Utopianism or satanism of the totalitarian movements from man's attempt to rely on himself alone, and the belief in revolutionary dictatorship from the illusions of revolutionary democracy, these interpretations tend to place the "guilt" for essentially anti-humanistic and anti-democratic movements on the humanistic and democratic ideas of the Enlightenment.

In our context, on the other hand, both the ideas of the Enlightenment and their totalitarian perversions appear as so many different attempts by members of our free society to adjust their beliefs to the facts of a changing world. From that angle, it seems plainly futile to say that the attempt ought not to have been made at all. The important difference is that the men of the Enlightenment tried to make their adjustment by a continuous development of the basic Western beliefs in the value of reason and the freedom of the human person, while the totalitarians have rejected one or both of these fundamental values.

Moreover, our analysis has tended to show that the victories of totalitarianism so far have been due to the failures of free societies to move forward in timely adjustment to the spontaneous changes they have produced. The danger of totalitarian revolution is greatest where the resistance of the ruling groups to ideological and institutional change is most rigid. Our peculiar hell is not, after all, simply the penalty of human hubris trying to achieve the impossible—it is at least as much the penalty of human failure to move forward as far as possible in a changing world. It is not simply the consequence of a refusal to accept the human condition, but at least as much the price of a complacent readiness to accept inhuman but man-made conditions as if they were unalterable and god-given.

The answer to the totalitarian challenge is not the acceptance of things as they are; it is a sober, non-Utopian, but active faith in our power and duty to preserve our free civilization in the only way it can be preserved—by the unending labor of progress.

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Our readers are very likely familiar with the work of Richard Wright, the author of "Native Son" and other novels. During the years 1950-1956 Richard Wright delivered a series of lectures in universities and on other platforms, in various countries of Europe. Though prepared and delivered independently of each other, the lectures had a theme that was common to them all. At the suggestion of a Danish publisher, the lectures were assembled into book form. The book—"White Man Listen!"—will be published in the United States this October by Doubleday & Co., with whose permission we present the opening part of a chapter that comes mid-way in the book, and is titled "Tradition and Industrialization." In presenting this section of Richard Wright's new book, we hope it will be only the first of other contributions to come from him for DISSENT.—THE EDITORS.

WHITE MAN—LISTEN!

Richard Wright

So great a legion of ideological interests is choking the media of communication of the world today that I deem it advisable to define the terms in which I speak and for whom. In the heated, charged, and violently partisan atmosphere in which we live at this moment, all public utterances are dragged willy-nilly into the service of something or somebody. Even the most rigorously determined attitudes of objectivity and the most passionate avowals of good faith have come to be suspect. And especially is this true of the expressions of those of us who have been doomed to live and act in a tight web of racial and economic facts, facts viewed by many through eyes of political or religious interest, facts examined by millions with anxiety and even hysteria.

Knowing the suspicious, uneasy climate in which our 20th century lives are couched, I, as a Western man of color, strive to be as objective as I can when I seek to communicate. But, at once, you have the right to demand of me: What does being objective mean? Is it possible to speak at all today and not have the meaning of one's words construed in six different ways?

For example, he who advocates the use of mass educational tech-

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niques today can be, and usually is, accused of harboring secret Soviet sympathies, despite the fact that his advocacy of the means of mass education aims at a quick spreading of literacy so that Communism cannot take root, so that vast populations trapped in tribal or religious loyalties cannot be easily duped by self-seeking demagogues ... He who urgently counsels the establishment of strong, central governments in the so-called underdeveloped countries, in the hope that those countries can quickly pull themselves out of the mire and become swiftly modernized and industrialized and thereby set upon the road to democracy, free speech, a secular state, universal suffrage, etc., can be and commonly is stigmatized as: "Well, he's no Communist, *but* ..." He who would invoke, as sanction for experimental political action, a desire to seek the realization of the basic ideals of the Western world in terms of unorthodox and as yet untried institutional structures—instrumentalities for short-cutting long, drawn-out historical processes—as a means of constructing conditions for the creation of individual freedom, can be branded as being "emotionally unstable and having tendencies that *could* lead, therefore, to Communism ..." He who would question, with all the good faith in the world, whether the philosophical ideas and assumptions of John Stuart Mill and John Locke are valid for all times, for all peoples, and for all countries with their vastly differing traditions and backgrounds, with the motive of psychologically freeing men's minds so that they can seek new conditions and instrumentalities for freedom, can be indicted as an enemy of democracy ...

CONFRONTED with a range of negative hostility of this sort, knowing that the society of the Western world is so frantically defensive that it would seek to impose conformity at any price, what is an honest man to do? Should he keep silent and thereby try to win a degree of dubious safety for himself? Should he endorse static defensiveness as the price of achieving his own personal security? The game isn't worth the candle, for, in doing so, he buttresses that which would eventually crush not only him, but that which would negate the very conditions of life out of which freedom can spring. In such a situation one's silence implies that one has surrendered one's intellectual faculties to fear, that one has voluntarily abdicated life itself, and that one has gratuitously paralyzed one's possibilities of action. Since any and all events can be lifted by men of bad faith out of their normal contexts and projected into others and thus consequently condemned, since one's thoughts can be interpreted in terms of such extreme implications as to reduce them to absurdity or subversion, obviously a mere declaration of one's good intentions is not enough. In an all-pervading climate of intellectual evasion or dishonesty, everything becomes dishonest; suspicion subverts events and distorts their meaning; mental reservations alter the character of facts and rob them of validity and utility ... In short, if good will is lacking, everything is lost and a dialogue between

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men becomes not only useless, but dangerous, and sometimes even incriminating.

To imagine that straight communication is no longer possible is to declare that the world we seek to defend is no longer worth defending, that the battle for human freedom is already lost. I'm assuming, however naively, that such is not quite yet the case. I cannot, of course, assume that universal good will reigns, but I have the elementary right, the bounden duty even, to assume that man, when he has the chance to speak and act without fear, still wishes to be man, that is, he harbors the dream of being a free and creative agent . . .

THEN, FIRST OF ALL, let us honestly admit that there is no such thing as objectivity, no such objective fact as objectivity. Objectivity is a fabricated concept, a synthetic intellectual construction devised to enable others to know the general conditions under which one has done something, observed the world or an event in that world.

So, before proceeding to give my opinions concerning Tradition and Industrialization, I shall try to state as clearly as possible where I stand, the mental climate about me, the historic period in which I speak, and some of the elements in my environment and my own personality which propel me to communicate. The basic assumption behind all so-called objective attitudes is this: If others care to assume my mental stance and, through empathy, duplicate the atmosphere in which I speak, if they can imaginatively grasp the factors in my environment and a sense of the impulses motivating me, they will, if they are of a mind to, be able to see, more or less, what I've seen, will be capable of apprehending the same general aspects and tones of reality that comprise my world, that world that I share daily with all other men. By revealing the assumptions behind my statements, I'm striving to convert you to my outlook, to its essential humaneness, to the generality and reasonableness of my arguments.

Obviously no striving for an objectivity of attitude is ever complete. Tomorrow, or the day after, someone will discover some fact, some element, or a nuance that I've forgotten to take into account, and, accordingly, my attitude will have to be revised, discarded, or extended, as the case may be. Hence, there is no such thing as an absolute objectivity of attitude. The most rigorously determined attitude of objectivity is, at best, relative. We are human; we are the slaves of our assumptions, of time and circumstance; we are the victims of our passions and illusions; and the most that our critics can ask of us is this: Have you taken your passions, your illusions, your time, and your circumstances into account? That is what I am attempting to do. More than that no reasonable man of good will could demand.

First of all, my position is a split one. I'm black. I'm a man of the West. These hard facts are bound to condition, to some degree, my outlook. I see and understand the West; but I also see and under-

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stand the non- or anti-Western point of view. How is this possible? This double vision of mine stems from my being a product of Western civilization and from my racial identity, long and deeply conditioned, which is organically born of my being a product of that civilization. Being a Negro living in a white western Christian society, I've never been allowed to blend, in a natural and healthy manner, with the culture and civilization of the West. This contradiction of being both Western and a man of color creates a psychological distance, so to speak, between me and my environment. I'm self-conscious. I admit it. Yet I feel no need to apologize for it. Hence, though Western, I'm inevitably critical of the West. Indeed, a vital element of my Westernness resides in this chronically sceptical, this irredeemably critical outlook. I'm restless. I question not only myself, but my environment. I'm eager, urgent. And to be so seems natural, human, and good to me. Life without these qualities is inconceivable, less than human. In spite of myself, my imagination is constantly leaping ahead and trying to reshape the world I see (basing itself strictly on the materials of the world in which I live each day) toward a form in which all men could share my creative restlessness ... Such an outlook breeds criticism. And my critical attitude and detachment are born of my position. Me and my environment are one, but that oneness has in it, at its very core, an abiding schism. Yet I regard my position as natural, as normal, though others, that is, Western whites, anchored in tradition and habit, would have to make a most strenuous effort of imagination to grasp it.

Yet, I'm not non-Western. I'm no enemy of the West. Neither am I an Easterner. When I look out upon those vast stretches of this earth inhabited by brown, black, and yellow men—sections of the earth in which religion dominates, to the exclusion of almost everything else, the emotional and mental landscape—my reactions and attitudes are those of the West. I see both worlds from another and third point of view. (This outlook has nothing to do with any so-called Third Force; I'm speaking largely in historical and psychological terms.)

I'm numbed and appalled when I know that millions of men in Asia and Africa assign more reality to their dead fathers than to the crying claims of their daily lives: poverty, political degradation, illness, ignorance, etc. I shiver when I learn that the infant mortality rate, say, in James Town (a slum section of Accra, the capital of the Gold Coast in British West Africa) is fifty per cent in the first year of life; and, further, I'm speechless when I learn that this inhuman condition is explained by the statement, "The children did not wish to stay. Their ghost-mothers called them home ..." And when I hear that explanation I know that there can be no altering of social conditions in those areas until such religious rationalizations have been swept from men's minds, no matter how devoutly they are believed in or defended. Indeed, the teeming religions gripping the minds and consciousness of Asians and Africans offend me. I can conceive of no identification with

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such mystical visions of life that freeze millions in static degradation, no matter how emotionally satisfying such degradation seems to those who wallow in it. But, because the swarming populations in those continents are two-time victims—victims of their own religious projections and victims of Western imperialism—my sympathies are unavoidably with, and unashamedly for, them. For this sympathy I offer no apology.

Yet, when I turn to face the environment that cradled and nurtured me, I experience a sense of dismaying shock, for that Western environment is soaked in and stained with the most blatant racism that the contemporary world knows ... It is a racism that has almost become another kind of religion, a religion of the materially dispossessed, of the culturally disinherited. Rooted in my own disinheritedness, I know instinctively that this clinging to, and defense of, racism by Western whites are born of their psychological nakedness, of their having, through historical accident, partially thrown off the mystic cauls of Asia and Africa that once too blinded and dazed them ... A deeply conscious victim of white racism could even be strangely moved to compassion for that white man who, having lost his mystic vision of a stern Father God, a dazzling Virgin, and a Dying Son Who promises to succor him after death, settles upon racism ...! What a poor substitute! What a shabby, vile, and cheap home the white heart finds when it seeks shelter in racism...! One would think that sheer pride would deter Western whites from such emotional debasement!

I stand, therefore, mentally and emotionally looking in both directions, being claimed by a negative identification on one side, and being excluded by a feeling of repulsion on the other.

SINCE I'M DETACHED, because of racial conditions, from the West, why do I bother to call myself Western at all? What is it that prompts me to make an identification with the West despite the contradiction involved? The fact is that I really have no choice in the matter. Historical forces more powerful than I am have shaped me as a Westerner. I have not consciously elected to be a Westerner; I have been made into a Westerner. Long before I had the freedom to choose, I was molded a Westerner. It began in childhood. And the process continues.

Hence, standing shoulder to shoulder with the Western white man, speaking his tongue, sharing his culture, participating in the common efforts of the Western community, I say frankly to that white man: "I'm Western, just as Western as you are, maybe more; but I don't completely agree with you."

What do I mean, then, when I say that I'm Western? I shall try to define what the terms means to me. I shan't here, now, try to define what being Western means to all Westerners. I shall confine my definition only to that aspect of the West with which I identify, that aspect that makes me feel, act, and live Western.

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The content of my Westernness resides fundamentally, I feel, in my secular outlook upon life. I believe in a separation of Church and State. I believe that the State possesses a value in and for itself. I feel that man—just sheer brute man just as he is— has a meaning and value over and above all sanctions or mandates from mystical powers, either on high or from below. I am convinced that the humble, fragile dignity of man, buttressed by a tough-souled pragmatism, implemented by methods of trial and error, can sufficiently sustain and nourish human life, can endow it with ample and durable meaning. I believe that all ideas have a right to circulate in the market place without restriction. I believe that all men should have the right to have their say without fear of the political "powers that be," without having to dread the punitive measures or the threat of invisible forces which some castes of men claim as their special domain—men such as priests and churchmen. (My own position compels me to grant those priests and churchmen the right to have their say, but not at the expense of having my right to be heard annulled.) I believe that art has its own autonomy, a self-sufficiency that extends beyond, and independent of, the spheres of political or priestly power or sanction. I feel that science exists without any *a priori* or metaphysical assumptions. I feel that human personality is an end in and for itself. In short, I believe that man, for good or ill, is his own ruler, his own sovereign, his own keeper. I hold human freedom as a supreme right and good for all men, my conception of freedom being the right of all men to exercise their natural and acquired powers as long as the exercise of those powers do not hinder others from doing the same.

THESE ARE MY ASSUMPTIONS, my values, my morality, if you insist upon that word. Yet I hold these values at a time in history when they are threatened. I stand in the middle of that most fateful of all the world's centuries: the 20th Century. Nuclear energy, the center of the sun, is in the hands of men. In most of the land-mass of Asia and Africa the traditional and customary class relations of feudal, capitalistic societies have been altered, frequently brutally shattered, by murder and terror. Most of the governments of the earth today rule, by one pretext or another, by open or concealed pressure upon the individual, by blacklists, intimidation, fiat, secret police, and machine guns. Among intellectual circles the globe over the desperate question has been raised: "What is man?" In the East as in the West, wealth and the means of production have been taken out of private hands, families, clans, and placed at the disposal of committees and state bureaucrats. The consciousness of most men on earth is filled with a sense of shame, of humiliation, of memories of past servitude and degradation—and a sense of fear that those periods of servitude and degradation will return. The future for most men is an apprehensive void which has created the feeling that it has to be impetuously, impulsively

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filled, given a new content at all costs. With the freeing of Asia and most of Africa from Western rule, more active and unbridled religion now foments and agitates the minds and emotions of men than at any time since 1453! Man's world today lies in the pythonlike coils of vast irrational forces which he cannot control. — This is the mental climate out of which I speak, a climate that tones my being and pitches consciousness on a certain plane of tension. These are the conditions under which I speak, conditions that condition me.

Now, the above assumptions and facts would and do color my view of history, that record of the rise and fall of traditions and religions. All of those past historical forces which have, accidentally or intentionally, helped to create the basis of freedom in human life, I extol, revere and count as my fervent allies. Those conditions of life and of history which thwart, threaten and degrade the values and assumptions I've listed, I reject and consider harmful, something to be doggedly resisted . . .

Footnote to "East German Marxism"

As a footnote to the article on "East German Marxism," which appears on page 393 of this issue, we should like to add a quote from Alfred Kantorowicz. Kantorowicz recently left East Berlin to take refuge in Western Germany. In East Berlin he had been Professor of Contemporary Literature at the University, and director of the Heinrich Mann Archives. He writes that the years since the uprising of June 17, 1953, and above all, the months since the Hungarian uprising, ended "the last hope, nay, the last illusion that from such moral decay a new and better world might be born." As reported in the press, he says:

"I can no longer refuse to recognise . . . that I myself have contributed my tiny part to bring about the very thing I meant to fight against—the lawlessness, the exploitation of the intelligentsia, the arbitrary rule of an unworthy clique who defile the concept of socialism as once the Nazis defiled the name of Germany.

"I could no longer close my eyes to the almost legendary lesson that while we believed we were fighting for freedom and right and against Fascist barbarism, Fascism and barbarism had arisen again behind us, in word and deed and spirit. We had aimed in our struggle at the rule of the people, and found ourselves enmeshed in the dictatorship of the party officials. . . ."

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THE REVOLT AGAINST SOCIAL EQUALITY

Arnold A. Rogow

I do not mean that there is any deficiency of wealthy individuals in the United States; I know of no country, indeed, where the love of money has taken stronger hold on the affections of men, and where a profounder contempt is expressed for the theory of the permanent equality of property.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, *Democracy in America*, 1835.

I

My thesis is that the United States is moving simultaneously toward and away from social equality, and that the tension between the two movements is to a large degree responsible for the present social and political mood. The movement *toward* equality is expressed in rising living standards, and it has been significantly accelerated in our time by broad trends in the economy, the New Deal, World War II, and the current mixture of defense spending and welfare programming that constitutes the Warfare-Welfare State. The movement *away* from equality is represented in certain types of conspicuous consumption, anti-civil rights sentiment, and political behavior. I will also argue that the latter movement has been partly responsible for the failure of radical politics in the United States, and the related demise in some intellectual circles of a radical and reforming spirit.

Viewed superficially, the movement toward social equality has deep roots in the ideological and institutional past. The egalitarian theme, so viewed, permeates Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy, the abolition of slavery, the rise of trade unionism, and modern reformist politics. The imperative claim that "all men are created equal" has seemingly provided premise and goal for efforts to extend the suffrage, emancipate the Negro, develop a system of mass education, and promote equal economic opportunity. The American Creed, according to Gunnar Myrdal, not merely espouses equality, but has lodged it firmly in the national conscience to such an extent, for example, that discriminatory treatment of Negroes gives rise to profound guilt feelings (which are assuaged by further ill-treatment). Interpreted in this fashion, the movement toward social equality would appear to be unambiguous, uninhibited, almost deterministic.

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The ambiguities and inhibitions exist, however, and they have become more pronounced in the last twenty years. They derive from the other themes which make up the ideological and institutional context: individualism and competition, the profit motive, and the importance in America of material success. Translated into personal aspiration, these themes have generated much less a desire for equality than a desire for economic gain, advancement, and higher social status and position. From the earliest days of the Republic, the business ethic has been the dominant ethic. The typical American, therefore, has never regarded the possession of wealth as inherently immoral, and even the poorest of Americans have never sought to reduce the wealthy to their own economic and social position. Depressions, financial panics, recessions, and the prevalence of poverty amidst plenty, have never undermined the faith in America as the land of *individual* opportunity.

By and large, the rich have been more imitated than envied, and more envied than disliked. But in essence, they have been imitated and envied not merely because they were rich, but because they were richer *than*. In America as an acquisitive society, the envy of the rich has been, at least in part, an envy of the select status and prestige of the rich, apart from envy of their material possessions. And in seeking wealth for himself, the American has sought the status and prestige that go with wealth. Put another way, he has tended to think in terms of advancement not as part of an advancing group or class, but of individual advancement *relative to the condition of the mass of citizens.*

In an important sense, however, a continuing general improvement of condition is an imperative of a viable capitalist system (as it is also an imperative of other viable systems). Such a system is dependent upon rising levels of mass consumption which increasingly transform the so-called luxury goods into mass produced and consumed commodities. It is not merely that full employment and higher wages create demand for higher-priced goods, although these are important factors in the transformation. The producers of such goods are both tempted and forced to increase their output, both as a way of making maximum use of capital investment (and re-investment), and as a way of maximizing profits. Furthermore, in certain cases (e.g., automobiles, boats, household furnishings, sporting goods, etc.), the "luxury market" is fairly easily and quickly supplied, and in such instances the market must be expanded if current output is to be maintained. Hence the "luxury market" must be steadily transformed into a mass market, through advertising, through the broadening of installment-buying plans and personal consumption loans, and, occasionally, through price reductions. In this fashion, the luxury goods of fifty years ago became the mass necessities of our time. Ultimately, if the economy is to continue to function at a high level (and leaving aside the relationship of the "expanding" economy to international developments), everything must be sold to everyone.

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II

Meanwhile, the relative prosperity of the last decade has made possible a substantial measure of economic equality. The living standards of American workers are closer to those of the middle class, and the living standards of Negroes closer to those of the white population, that was the case before World War II. The Irish, Italian, and Polish descendants of the later immigrants have decreased the economic distance between themselves and the older established Americans. Slum dwellers have moved in increasing numbers to the suburbs adjoining large cities. Paralleling these changes have been shifts in the class and ethnic composition of college students, business and the professions. Of course, there are millions of Americans whose economic position is still marginal, but it can hardly be denied that the majority of the population has made significant gains.

It may be suggested, however, that there is widespread dissatisfaction with these gains, not because they have been too limited but because they have not been limited enough. The discontent stems from the fact that in a society whose supreme value is individual success in terms of money, no one gains if everyone gains, because in that event no one is left behind. One's allegedly no-account neighbors in the slum become one's apparently equal neighbors in the suburb, reducing the sense of individual achievement and mastery. Some part of the satisfaction of Cadillac ownership is denied, when it is observed that Negroes are driving Cadillacs.* The anticipated pleasure in the "night out" evaporates rapidly when the favored restaurant no longer appears to cater to a "select" clientele.

The revolt against social equality finds expression in a variety of ways. In its most overt form it consists of coercive efforts to maintain a separation between economic and social equality. Thus Negroes and other minorities who can afford better housing are denied access to such housing in white neighborhoods through "restrictive covenants," despite the fact that such covenants are not enforceable by the courts. Similarly, the economic gains of certain minority groups are rarely reflected in their admission to the more costly, exclusive recreational facilities: hotels, restaurants, dining clubs, country clubs, college fraternities and sororities, etc.; in various parts of the country such social segregation applies to Negroes, Jews, Catholics, Orientals, Mexicans, Italians, Slavs, and Puerto Ricans.

There is evidence from public opinion polls and attitude studies that racial and ethnic tolerance increases with education and income, i.e., evidence that the middle class is more tolerant than the working

* Not long ago, for example, a Westchester auto salesman informed me that automobile dealers in Westchester were having difficulty selling Cadillacs. He attributed this to the fact that "Negroes drive Cadillacs," and that, therefore, the former Cadillac class of citizens is tending to buy the more exotic makes of foreign and domestic cars. He added that the dealers in these cars make it a rule not to sell to Negroes.

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class. It is possible, however, that the relative tolerance of the middle class is a function, in part, of its relative immunity so far from the consequences of demands for social equality. The claims of Negroes and others for equal housing, education, and recreational facilities have been directed mainly at the working class. In Montgomery, Alabama, for example, the principal users of bus transportation are lower income white people. The real test of middle class tolerance will come when Negroes and other racial and ethnic minorities are financially in a position to demand equality with the white middle class in respect to housing, education, and recreation. Thus far, the white working class has borne the brunt of egalitarian trends in racial and ethnic relations.

Within the white population the revolt against social equality is expressed, in one fashion, through indulgence in ever more conspicuous and initially confined consumption tastes. There is apparel snobbery, illustrated in *The New York Times* report of last Fall that there was greater demand for the more expensive types of clothing, including custom-tailored clothing, than for the cheaper ready-made varieties. There is gourmet snobbery, expressed in a quest for ever more exotic recipes and methods of cooking and serving food. There is decorator snobbery, in the preference for "high-brow" as opposed to "low-brow" modern furniture, and in the taste for original art, however mediocre, over the popular prints of the Masters. There is the "luxury cruise," the "red carpet" airline service, the "exclusive" island resort or remote vacation spot, the sofa trimmed with mink (in a recent *New York Times* advertisement), the $2,500 collection of pipes; the automobile "in the prestige price class" (Chrysler Imperial). In essence, the contemporary culture defines the non-conformist as the man who can *afford* to be different, and in a sense that definition of non-conformity has come to express the entire meaning of popular non-conformity in the Nineteen Fifties. But aside from the question of cost, such non-conformity is less an expression of individuality than a rejection at all income levels of social parity with peer income groups.

III

The revolt against social equality has been, in political terms, a revolt against the egalitarian politics of the New Deal. To be sure, few people vote for or against equality, but related issues have played a prominent role in recent campaigns. Thus the white collar group, which was significantly attracted to Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, is hostile to one of the main beneficiaries of egalitarian politics, the trade union movement. It is probable that the identification of part of the Democratic Party with civil rights had a good deal to do with the partial swing of *white* Americans North and South toward the Republicans (this is not to deny that many Negroes now identify the Republican Party with civil rights). In both 1952 and 1956, a favorable view of New Deal economic policies was correlated

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with Democratic voting, and a negative attitude with Republican. Despite the role of the New Deal as a curb on the depression and the beneficiary of all economic groups in the population, there is no general disposition to identify the Democratic Party with prosperity and economic well being. On the other hand, the Republican Party is widely regarded as the party of aspiration. It may at least be questioned whether it is not also recognized, at least intuitively, as the party of inequality.

Thus culture and politics both express a revolt against social equality, and at another level the consequences of such a revolt in historical perspective have been no less important. I refer to the impact of the anti-equality revolt and certain related phenomena upon intellectuals. Until fairly recently the American intellectual's view of the common man was essentially Jeffersonian. In this view (which through the writings of Beard, Parrington, and J. Allen Smith has had a marked effect on American historical interpretation) the common man and the the political movements he originated or supported were basically characterized by a faith in such values as tolerance, liberty, and equality. The popular spirit, from Jefferson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, was regarded as a liberal, humanist spirit, and the main political tradition of America was therefore thought to be—and in some circles still is thought to be—a liberal tradition.

More recently, however, there have been a number of studies in history and sociology muckraking the so-called liberal tradition. The historians have discovered, or are rapidly discovering, that the various common man movements of the past were heavily influenced by narrow self-interest, status considerations, nativism, isolation, anti-Semitism, and anti-Negro feeling. So far the "new history" has focused on Populism and Progressivism, but we may expect the approach to be carried back eventually to Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Democracy.* It will then be discovered that there were significant illiberal and anti-democratic elements in these social movements and in their political expressions.

At the same time, a number of sociologists have found that there is a considerable gap between normative democratic theory and concrete democratic practice, at least as reffected in voting behavior and public opinion formation. According to theory citizens in a democracy vote on issues, but issues, it has been found, have relatively little to do with voting. Citizens are also supposed to seek information and enlightenment with respect to the problems of the day, but typically they do not seek to become informed, and most of them cannot identify the impor-

* The most recent example of the "new history," in the form of an attack on Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States,* attempts to show that there were no major ideological differences between the Founding Fathers and the yeoman farmers in 1787, that in a word, everyone at that time was interested in protecting property rights. Robert E. Brown, *Charles Beard and the Constitution* (Princeton, 1956).

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tant problems. American public opinion, according to various studies, is ignorant, irresponsible, and easily manipulated. Finally, there have been some recent books which suggest that the wealthy, educated, and formerly suspected "interests" are more civil libertarian, more internationalist, and less prejudiced than the poorer, less educated masses.

These studies are both cause and consequence of the collapse of intellectual radicalism in our time. On the one hand, they suggest that the liberal and radical approach has always lacked a popular base, that, in essence, the liberal tradition has been a confined minority, perhaps elitist, tradition. On the other hand, they reflect a projection backward of the hopelessness and despair with which many intellectuals regard the contemporary American scene. The typical liberal intellectual is apt to experience a shocked betrayal with every report that the ordinary American is neither self-less nor idealistic. The materialism, conservatism, and indifference of the common man, both past and present, has tended to undermine the liberal intellectual's traditional faith in popular, democratic reform and change.

The betrayal to which the liberal intellectual responds, moreover, has not been immediate or sudden, but cumulative. For in large part the liberal and radical approach has been based on the assumption of a "hero class" which would act to implement the approach and provide it with a mass, or quasi-mass, base. But a "hero class" has never developed in America (or perhaps anywhere else), and successive rejections of the approach, by the farmers in the earlier period and the workers later on, have called into question the approach itself.

It is probable, in fact, that the current radical *malaise* owes much more to the failure of radicalism at home than the failure of radicalism abroad. The Soviet perversion of socialism and the puppet role of the American Communist Party have been important in framing the contemporary intellectual mood,* but less important, perhaps, than the long-standing failure of *all* types of radicalism to attract significant support in the United States. The failures of radicalism in twentieth century America have been particularly striking, whether in the form of rejection of radicalism at the polls even in periods of economic crisis, or rejection in the trade union movement. Nor has conventional liberalism proved much more viable or enduring. Just as little remained of Progressivism in the Nineteen Twenties, so little remains of New Dealism in the Nineteen Fifties. Hence the defeatism, pessimism, and fatalism of many radicals and liberals alike--excepting those who have abandoned the old faith for the "new conservatism" or, in Mills' phrase, "the American Celebration."

* The mood also reflects, in addition to disillusionment with Stalinism, the growing conviction that Soviet man does not behave much differently than his American counterpart, i.e., that he, too, is conformist, commodity-centered, and indifferent to values other than materialist values. There appears to be an increasing suspicion in intellectual circles that Socialist Man *everywhere in the world* is essentially Economic Man in a slightly different guise.

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Yet all this may be admitted with reference to the past and present, and it may even be assumed, with Norman Thomas and some of the "new conservatives," that socialism has become respectable, and perhaps even Republican. There are still the consequences of the revolt against social equality which, unless tempered or reduced, can prove fatal to the value of conservatives and radicals alike. Social equality, whatever form the economy takes in the future, must ultimately be accepted or rejected, but any rejection will almost certainly require an enforced, coercive stratification. If, on the other hand, social equality is ultimately to be accepted, it must be given more ideological and institutional support than it now receives. Without that support, each successive achievement in reducing economic inequality (whether deliberate or not) will aggravate the revolt against social equality, and, in the end, political democracy itself.

Among our contributors.... **Henry Pachter, in addition to many articles, is the author of "Paracelsus—Magic into Science"... Richard Lowenthal, a German socialist now living in England, writes frequently for the London "Observer," "Commentary," and other periodicals... Richard Wright is of course, the well-known novelist... Arnold Rogow, a sociologist, has written for the scholarly journals.... Ben Seligman is an economist whose work has appeared frequently in DISSENT and other magazines ... Otto Kirchheimer is Professor of Political Science, Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research... David Kettler, who was a student of Franz Neumann, and teaches political science makes his first appearance in DISSENT... As do Irving Louis Horowitz, who follows East European intellectual developments closely, and Edward Speyer, a scientist... Henri Rabasseire, whose essay on television appears in the Rosenberg-White "Mass Culture," has written for DISSENT previously.... And, Norman Thomas—needs no introduction.**

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AMERICAN NOTEBOOK Some Brief Comments On the Domestic Scene

IDEOLOGY AND BIG BUSINESS

Ben B. Seligman

Writers on the problem of ideology frequently describe it as an expression of a group or class view which gives the individual both an awareness and rationalization of his particular social role. Developing complex ideological systems along these lines was a favorite, often useful pastime in years gone by, but today, as C. Wright Mills tells us in *The Power Elite,* the recent attempts by dominant groups in American society to create an ideology have not really succeeded. The supposed beneficiaries of new ideological structures have preferred to drift along comfortably with a quasi-liberal rhetoric while the "new conservatism" of a Russell Kirk has been not so much rejected as ignored. The hallmark of excellence among the very rich has been, of course, money, while celebrities of the entertainment world are too unstable as a group to be especially receptive to ideology. It has been only among the *Fortune* readership, the acknowledged forum of management, that any interest has been shown in working up an ideology for Big Business.

How successful the managers have been in perfecting an ideology is illustrated by the interesting study* issued not too long ago by four Harvard social scientists. The authors went for their basic material to the public statements of business leaders, to institutional advertisements in *Fortune, Business Week* and similar places, as well as to the many pamphlets flowing out of the NAM, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the CED. From the numerous quotations compiled by them two major strands of ideology may be discerned; the classical and the managerial, which seem to be roughly equivalent to what C. Wright Mills has called "practical" and "sophisticated" conservatives. One might almost describe these as the Henry Ford-J. D. Rockefeller image versus the Henry Luce-Paul Hoffman conception.

The first, though somewhat old-fashioned, exhibits a certain ruggedness in its blunt approach to basic problems. It unambiguously claims lordship over all creation and extols the general beneficence of the profit mo-

* *The American Business Creed,* by Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kayser and James Tobin, Harvard. 1956. 414 pages. $6.75.

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tive. Material as well as non-material gains are explained by a relatively simple cause and effect sequence; what's good for business is good for all. Charles Wilson's otiose remark about General Motors a few years back varied this theme but slightly. The devotees of this view are not averse to repeating their litany in ritualistic fashion: The American Way of Life yields a high standard of living; there are 135 million radios; we can always out-produce the Russians; economic success is founded in efficiency; business is conducted in a spirit of service; and above all, these wonderful attainments come about because of the System.

We are sometimes so case-hardened to the blandishments of advertising that we tend to forget how dense the underlying ideas are. As one wanders through this wonderful world put together by copywriters one would hardly know that the high level living the American promise has presumably given us has yet to be paid for; or that lots of people still haven't gotten that far, for they continue to live in what housing experts call "substandard homes"; or that some 22 million *families* have not broken through the lower middle income barrier of $4,000.

THE "MANAGERIAL" ideology is a good deal more subtle. The managers wish to obtain the enthusiastic consent of those whom they would control and manipulate. Theirs is the understanding nod rather than the brutal push. For them human relations is the central core of the managerial ideology: managers and workers must learn to get along with *people,* if not with each other. As William Whyte, Jr. has said, the eye must be calm, the manner attentive, the character well-rounded, the team work efficient, the handshake brisk. The discrete approach helps one to "get there," assuming that "there" is on top. Standardized routines to assure "performance" become substitutes for creative endeavor until conformity is hailed as the paradigm of morality. Thus, ideology celebrates the manipulation of behavior and the groundwork is laid for the enthusiasms of a total society.

The managers concede that the American economy has changed in the last 50 years, but what they see, after the fashion of Adolph Berle and David Lilienthal, is a growing homogeneity in which faceless automatons will be "professionally managed [by] socially oriented corporations." They see the American system as unique, (in the older classical version, it is the outcome of a special act of creation) based on fundamental laws of nature. And being natural it is stable. Only "outside" threats tend to upset the even tenor of American economic growth. It is thus a system of original purity completely devoid of history and origin.

In quite sober fashion the authors detail the miasmic output generated by Madison Ave. on behalf of corporate enterprise. Teamwork, competition, thrift and research are said to be the keys to our economic well-being. (That these slogans sometimes clash with one another does not perturb the ideologues, Sutton *et al* rightly suggest.) The ideal American enterprise is the small entrepreneur who is really nurtured by the few large corporations. Besides, the big fellows, the ads always imply, had humble beginnings. And the wonderful thing about large firms, say the institutional advertisements, is that each is

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a happy family. Relationships inside the enterprise are warm, close, personal and one would no more dare disapprove of than that of motherhood. It's like a football game: "management is the quarterback, and for the good of the whole team, labor should not try to call the signals." (This, from a *Business Week* editorial.)

The authors then go on to review the ideology's concepts of profit, ownership, authority, competition and other economic and social notions that keep cropping up in the businessman's lexicon. Nothing in this recitation is really unexpected. Profits are not merely an income but ultimately a symbol of accountability and rational economic calculation. Efficient executive control rather than stockholder risk bearing is the quintessential aspect of the corporation. The good executive prefers common sense to science, shirtsleeve economics to academic jargon, purchasing agents to statisticians and the *status quo* above all.

BUT ENOUGH has been said to demonstrate the quality of thought implicit in the business ideology. What is of interest now is the *ideology of ideology* which forms the theoretical core of the Sutton book. The authors start with what they call the "unreflective character of thinking" which, while deeply rooted in social modes of behavior, has now become sufficiently hardened to be a matter of habit. The failure to meet sales expectations, the problems of controlling a production line, or the difficulties of dealing with trade unions are seen as merely imperfections in habitual behavior modes which inevitably give rise to psychological strains. Ideology, say our authors, is basically a reaction to such strain, for it is essentially nothing more than "... a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role." This is indeed a neat formula: ideology is nothing more than a symbolic outlet for strain. Where social roles involve conflict, ideology provides the necessary system of ideas and symbols which mitigates the rivalry, and it is in this way that it becomes both driving force and balance wheel in the American economy.

Against this theoretical backdrop it isn't hard to explain the content of the dominant economic ideology by the strains generated in the businessman's role. Anxieties and emotional conflict find release in justifications of managerial expertise. This approval converts ideology into a psychological instrument for helping the businessman to sustain his ability to meet the requirements of being a businessman. Madison Ave.'s clever ads are intended to assuage the *angst* of both the copywriter and his client.

Ideology as an instrument of control or as an expression of interest is rejected as a viable theory by the authors, for, they say, an ideology must be motivated and it is primarily in the stress and strain of role conflicts that motivation can be located. But it is rather odd that the desire to control supply, as the economist would put it, should not be a suitable basis for such motivation. The authors also speak of the need for plausibility and legitimation in terms of audience standards. At this point, however, they seem to have come a cropper, since the experience of totalitarian countries would suggest that criteria imposed by authority can almost always make an ideology appear palatable. It is precisely in these coun-

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tries that ideology as control was developed in more ways than were ever dreamed of in Western sociology. There was an opportunity here for working out a theoretical framework that our authors unfortunately missed. Certainly the historical approach, as employed, for example, by Reinhard Bendix in his *Work and Authority in Industry* (1956), seems a good deal more fruitful. Bendix recognizes that control is a significant factor, if not the major one, in the development of an ideology, and his careful study of 18th century Britain, present day America, Czarist Russia and the Soviet satellites supplies ample evidence of that.

IT IS DIFFICULT to understand the authors' reluctance to employ the idea that the legitimation of power is a major basis for ideology. Clearly, the businessman resorts to this mode of justification in order to counteract the claims of persons outside his enterprise. But, say the authors, he keeps telling himself that he is always subject to market forces beyond his control, that he is a single atomistic unit in a world he never made, and that the question of power in this context is not a relevant one. Consequently the entrepreneur cannot justify his role in terms of power, and is thereby unable really to establish his legitimacy. Hence, the resort to professionalization of the business role as an alternative way of attaining success.

Surprisingly enough, the three economists who helped the lone sociologist did not see through all this. To employ their own analytical concepts, price makers in a market are clearly more significant than price takers. The former are enterprises able to fix their own prices and to administer them in accordance with the needs of sales strategy, a quite important aspect of the economic order. Surely, this suggests some posture of control. Surely, it would have been relevant to relate the whole ideological apparatus of enterprise to the realities of market behavior rather than to the putative psychological motivation of Chamber of Commerce speech writers.

In fact, the curious thing about the theory of strain is that it is itself a part of ideology, for what it does is to raise the whole body of advertising gibberish to the level of useful behavior. Such an explanation offers a simple solution, since it provides an easy way out in distasteful situations. Whatever the businessman's reaction might be, he is assured an ample supply of aspirins by this ideology of ideology. There is really no other function for the system of business beliefs, according to our authors. This assumes, of course, that businessmen are really emotionally disturbed by economic rivalry or class tension. But until such can be conclusively demonstrated, it will still be more fruitful to see the problems of ideology in terms of power, interest and control.

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The following article forms a section of a lengthy discussion on the nature of Stalinism is a forthcoming "History of the American Communist Party," to be published by Beacon Press.—THE EDITORS.

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

Lewis Coser and Irving Howe

A political party, wrote Edmund Burke at the dawn of the nation-state, "is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed."*

This description no longer holds fully for any political party, but least of all for Stalinism. And not merely because the Communist parties have no genuine stake in the national interest, but more important, because they are not united upon "some particular principle." The totalitarian party is "unprincipled" in the root sense of the term. All parties may violate their principles, yet the act of violation implies a certain recognition of norms. By contrast, the totalitarian party cannot, in any precise sense, be said to violate its principles: it can be described by its structure, its characteristics, its power goals, but not by any stable ideology or group of ideas. *The movement exists far less for the ideology than the ideology for the movement.***

Though the ideological spokesmen of Stalinism advanced claims in regard to its ultimate ends that might seem similar to those of classical socialist thought, such pronouncements were manipulative, hortatory and self-deceptive—generally a mixture of the three. For these statements of ultimate ends had no controlling or restraining influence on the actual behavior of the Stalinist movement; the claim it made to the heritage of socialism could not in itself lead to a softening of the cruelties in the Siberian labor camps, though a shrewd political expediency might. In the life of the totalitarian movement, the instrumental swallows up the ideological.

Or almost. For if the above is a usable description of the objec-

* *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontent*, page 96.

** In Ignazio Silone's novel *The Seed Beneath the Snow* a fascist orator, true in his comic fashion to the totalitarian ethos, asks the rhetorical question, Is the handkerchief for the nose or the nose for the handkerchief?, and answers that every good fascist understands that the nose is for the handkerchief.

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tive workings of the Stalinist movement, it is not sufficient for grasping the subjective processes of Stalinist thought. Many individual Stalinists were obviously entangled with ideology as no one else in our time. They felt that their version of "Marxism" provided them with omniscient knowledge of the course of History—knowledge so complete as to constitute a *possession* of History; that it made possible a finished program and a final answer; and that the decisions of the party were the means for realizing the decrees of History. Yet it is no contradiction to say that in a movement for which ideology has become a device there were many people whose submission to ideology was total, fanatical and ruthless. On the contrary: the existence of such people was a precondition for such a movement.

BELIEFS CONCERNING THE NATURE of History are here important in so far as they support the Stalinist myth, yet they cannot in themselves serve as guides to political or moral courses of action. History as such cannot provide values, though it may help and permit valuation. Moral and political principles, however, are based on choices among opposing possibilities; hence, an acceptance of or identification with the supposed decrees of History, simply because they are supposed decrees of History, is an amoral act, leading more often than not to color-blindness in the choice of values. It is here, in its reliance upon History, that Stalinism came closest to being an ideology. If, however, we mean by a genuine ideology a pattern of ideal norms that guide policy, something very different controlled the Stalinist movement. In the Communist parties ideologies were conceived as instruments of power, manipulable according to the needs of a given moment and very seldom serving as either check or standard for behavior.*

Further qualifications are necessary, however, for in the relation between the Stalinist movement and the tradition of Marxism we face a highly complex and perhaps unprecedented problem. Stalinism, it is true, manipulated and exploited Marxist concepts and terms—but to say this is not yet fully to describe the relationship. Recognizing how deeply the Marxist mode of thought has seeped into the modern mind, the Stalinist movement stressed its claim to being the true receptacle of Marxism with a vigor second only to its claim to being true to the tradition of the October revolution. Particularly in so far as they were uncritically or even enthusiastically honored by most of its

* The notion that the Stalinist leaders were fanatical ideologists who could not take a political step without measuring it against their dogmas, seems to us an error. It is sometimes said, in defense of this notion, that in those countries where Stalinist parties have taken power they have shown their ideological rigidity by risking the most severe opposition from the peasants rather than relax their insistence upon nationalization of the land. In fact, however, the Stalinists have shown a capacity for making temporary compromises with peasant ownership; and their general drive toward the abolition of private farms seems based far less on dogma than on the correct insight that as a ruling group which derives its power from total control of a statified economy, they must regard *any* property-owning class as a potential threat.

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opponents, these claims constituted a major source of Stalinist power and prestige. Yet it would clearly have been impossible for the Stalinist movement to keep reiterating these claims without, in some way, coming to give them a certain credence itself.

STALINISM GREW OUT of, even as it destroyed, a movement that had been deeply attached to the letter of Marxism. The older leaders of the Stalinist movement, who had once known what it meant to live in a non-totalitarian atmosphere, were trained in a school of exegetics that sharpened wits through prolonged polemics over the meaning of Marxist doctrine. In the world of their youth, a ready capacity to cite Marxist classics, and to cite them with some relevance, could bring prestige and political preferment. But the new Stalinist functionaries, those who were themselves products of Stalinism and had never lived in any other milieu, showed very little interest in Marxist or any other form of speculative thought. They no longer needed to engage in debates with brilliant opposition leaders, as Stalin had once done.

Priding themselves on being practical men, they attached very little prestige to intellectual work and betrayed no desire to emulate Stalin's pretensions as a political theoretician. They looked upon Marxism as a vocabulary useful in controlling followers abroad, a group of symbols that helped cement social loyalty at home, and a body of dogmatics to be guarded by professional scholiasts, who in turn were themselves to be guarded. As Stalinism grew older, its relationship to Marxist doctrine became more manipulative, though seldom to the point of being entirely free of self-deception.

Fascinated as they now were by the mechanics of power, the Stalinist leaders, if they read Marxist works at all, were likely to turn to those dealing with political strategy and tactics rather than those concerned with ultimate goals or values. Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?* or *Left Wing Communism* might still be read by them with a certain interest, for while the topics of these pamphlets were not immediately relevant to the problems of Stalinism, they could be regarded as manuals of political warfare rich in suggestion to political strategists of almost any kind. By contrast, Marx's philosophical and economic studies were likely to be neglected by most Stalinist leaders—even though the need to validate their claim to the Marxist heritage, as well as to give themselves satisfactions akin to those felt by patrons of scholarship, prompted the Communist parties to publish these works.

Like one of the dark heretical cults of the Middle Ages which celebrated the devil through the ritual and imagery of Christ, Stalinism missed no occasion for proclaiming its Marxist orthodoxy. It defiled the intentions of Marx, his ethical passion and humanistic prophecy, but it clothed a rejection of his vision in the very language through which he had expressed it. Not for the first time in history, the vocab-

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ulary of a great thinker was turned against him, to corrupt his ideas and mock his values. Unlike other totalitarian and quasi-totalitarian movements, Stalinism was unable or unwilling to develop its own vocabulary, being an ideologically "dependent" system, an aftermath rather than a beginning.

YET IT WOULD BE AN ERROR to suppose that this dependence on the trappings of Marx's system was a mere useless survival. For many Stalinists it provided an indispensable means of reassurance: as long as the old words remained it was easier to evade the fact that new ideas had taken over. For the party, it facilitated the strategy of political access. The Stalinist claim to the Marxist tradition enabled it to compete for the allegiance of European workers who had been brought up in the socialist movements, particularly those who were taught to suspect the Social Democratic parties as reformist. To have surrendered the signs and symbols it had appropriated from Marxism would have meant to face the enormously difficult task of trying to establish itself in the labor movement through a new vocabulary and what it would have had to acknowledge as a new set of ideas. Strategically, it proved far more advantageous to appear as the defender of orthodox Marxism even while ruthlessly emasculating it. The humanist elements in Marxism were discarded, the passion for man that animates Marx's writing eliminated, and instead those aspects of Marx's thought were emphasized which might be said to be most tainted by the Hegelian *hubris* of claiming to know what the future *must* be.

So understood, Marxism could provide a feeling of having reached a "total view" which permits one to identify with History and act in accordance with its inner rhythm. The "essence" of History having been grasped, it then became possible to proclaim the primacy of *praxis*. From that point on, since there need be no further desire to question the underlying principle of social existence, strategy and tactics became all-important. The uncritical acceptance of a metaphysical assumption proved in practice to be a shield against any further assaults by metaphysical doubt or contemplative temptations. It was through works that the faith was to be manifested and tested. Theory, even while ritually celebrated, became an object of contempt.

This mixture of knowingness and a pragmatic rejection of abstract thought—a remarkable reflection, by the way, of the profoundly ambiguous feeling of the modern world toward the intellectual vocation —provided the Stalinist leaders and intellectuals with a sense of certainty in a time of doubt. And for the intellectuals it offered the sanction of doing, or seeming to do, something "real."

The elements in Marxism that have proved most attractive to the Stalinists were those most intimately tied to the 19th-century progressivism, a mode of thought still powerful in the life of the European "Left." Appearing before the world as fellow progressives—*fellow pro-*

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gressives in a hurry—the Stalinists were able to utilize many aspects of the liberal tradition and to claim that far from being enemies of Western humanism—as, by contrast, many Nazi ideologues openly declared themselves—they were actually its true heirs.

Precisely to the extent that the left tradition in the West did adhere indiscriminately to a simple optimistic theory of progress, it became most vulnerable to Stalinist infiltration. For if all change tends to be impelled by the Logic of History in a progressive direction, those who seemed to stand for the most change would also seem to be the greatest progressives. Put so crudely, the "progressivist" ideology comes close to intellectual caricature; but so, often enough, does political life itself. No Stalinoid intellectual in Paris would have been so unsophisticated as to accept the formula as we have reduced it here, but in the subtle writings of many a Stalinoid intellectual in Paris there was buried exactly this deification of "progress."

And precisely to the extent that modern progressivism committed itself to what might be called technological optimism—the notion that the growth of a society's productive forces automatically renders it "progressive"—did it, in turn, become most vulnerable to Stalinist influence. For the technological optimist, Dnieperstroy is an irrefutable argument.

IDEOLOGY IN THE STALINIST MOVEMENT was both exalted and degraded as in no other movement: exalted in that it was constantly put to work and accorded formal honor, degraded in that it was never allowed any status in its own right but came to be regarded as a weapon in the struggle for power.

This relationship between Stalinism and its ideology followed from a fundamental attitude of totalitarian movements toward social and personal reality. The most terrifying assumption of the totalitarian mind is that, given the control of terror, anything is possible. In Orwell's *1984* and Milosz's *The Captive Mind* this idea is reiterated again and again, out of a despairing conviction that almost anyone can say the words but almost no one can apprehend their full significance. Given modern technology, total state control, the means of terror and a rationalized contempt for moral values, you can do anything with men, anything with the past.

Reality is not something one recognizes or experiences; reality is something one manufactures, sometimes in anticipation, sometimes in retrospect. One day Beria is a hero of the Soviet Union, the next day a villain—which is neither bad nor unusual. What is new is that by the third day *he does not exist.* His past has been destroyed, his name removed from the records. Many political movements have claimed to control the present, and others the future; totalitarianism was the first, however, which systematically proceeded to remake the past.

To do this, it was necessary to regard words and ideas as instru-

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mentalities that could be put to any use. Nothing in thought or language need impose any limit. As Milosz wrote: *"What is not expressed does not exist.* Therefore if one forbids men to explore the depths of human nature, one destroys in them the urge to make such explorations; and the depths in themselves slowly become unreal."* And Orwell, in describing the totalitarian attitude to thought and language, pushed everything to an extreme which helped make the reality all the clearer:

> To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy, to forget whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again, and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself—this was the ultimate subtlety: consciously to induce unconsciousness and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word 'doublethink' involved the use of doublethink.

* *The Captive Mind,* page 215.

WAS ONLY FOOLIN'

"I maintain that the only way before the free world is to adopt a positive policy. I strongly feel that the only effective strategy against the Russian Communists' unlimited and protracted warfare is one of total war."—Chiang kai-shek in *Life* magazine, July 1, 1957, page 104.

"Despite the translator's use of such phrases as 'total war' here and elsewhere, the book (of Chiang kai-shek) as a whole constitutes an impassioned argument against nuclear warfare, total or otherwise.—ED."—*Life* magazine, *ibid,* same page.

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FRANZ NEUMANN: AN APPRECIATION

1. Power and Freedom

Otto Kirchheimer

Among professional political scientists the late Franz Neumann easily took a position *hors cadre*. In a drab trade he excelled in brilliance. Among circumspect searchers of validated facts he stood out as a man of ideas and an author of challenging, daring, sometimes paradoxical generalizations. In the long run it may be even more important that he was at all times poignantly aware of the fact that the subject matters he dealt with, power and freedom, were both basic and unavoidable phases of human existence.

Neumann had served his political apprenticeship with the inert unions and the hapless Social Democratic Party of the Weimar Republic. From this, his basic political experience, he had drawn a life-long sharp contempt for vacuities and make-believe and a burning interest in ever-renewed analysis of all relevant progressive and regressive factors of history. The choice of these terms—occurring ever so much more often in his later writings—indicates what in Neumann's view constituted the yardstick of legitimate value judgment in political science: a rationally ordered non-oppressive society in which all social and organizational forms were arranged so as to maximize freedom of the individual.

He moved with equal facility in contemporary and historical fields. If he inclined towards generalizations, he always tried to buttress them up from his rich store of historical knowledge. His London Ph.D. thesis of 1935, excerpts of which are included in a recent volume,* bears witness to that as much as do his later works. Yet, the bulk of articles and papers collected in this volume were written in the decade after the appearance of his main contribution to political science, *Behemoth*. This work, translated into many languages, though ironically enough not into German, still—a decade and a half after its first appearance and after a deluge of material on Nazi Germany—offers the most meaningful explanation of the German scene in the 1930's. The bulk of the papers now re-issued, while extending the scope of inquiry to a variety of present day institutions and problems pick up the themes treated in *Behemoth*—though at times with significant variations. The book had emphasized the economic causes for the rise of National Socialism and,

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* *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State, Essays in Political and Legal Theory*, by Franz Neumann. The Free Press and The Falcon's Wing Press, Glencoe, Ill. 1957. 303 pp.

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moreover, showed how capitalist relationships of production, either openly or subterraneously, continued to play a major part in the operations of the monopolistic German command economy. In terms of political theory it contended that the Nazi state, lacking a coherent government doctrine, was not an integrated state but rather an agglomeration of four separate totalitarian bodies, communicating with each other on an *ad hoc* basis.

IN HIS LATER YEARS Neumann's position on the interrelationship of political and economic factors became less affirmative, revealing shifts in emphasis and evaluation. Although many of the data not accessible in the Third Reich's lifetime might have been interpreted in support of *Behemoth's* thesis, Neumann no longer seemed to assign to them a like order or significance. Still regarding the economic development as a major genetic factor in the rise of power structures, he had become more and more preoccupied with the possibility and eventual effects of a divorce between socio-economic and political power, termed in one of his last addresses "domination of politics over economics." He called on history and—less effectively—on theory to emphasize the importance of this new approach. He made an illustrative case of the interventionist foreign policy of the 19th century liberal state, mistaken for a mere "nightwatchman." He re-interpreted and shoved aside—as a Procrustean bed—the Marxian doctrine on the interplay of state and society.* He now tended to separate legitimate sociological analysis of the class character of the state from theory and program of political action.

True, to some extent this gloss, as often with Neumann, has to be seen within the framework of his running criticism of the European and, more specifically, German Social Democrats' propensity to consider the political victory of the labor movement as a necessary consequence of its economic advance. But beyond this narrow point it highlights another facet of Neumann's thought, stressed particularly in his later writings. Where previously there had been an element of doctrinal certainty, the identical syndrome now—even if presented in some form of sociological generalization—appears as a cluster of so many empirical relationships reserved for further investigation. Never given to caution in formulating harsh political judgment, Neumann displayed ever-increasing reserve in subscribing to an all-embracing social and political theory.

Yet Neumann was not a mere *student* of politics. He remained a libertarian, and increasingly skeptical, socialist. He could not help being concerned with the implications of the shift in emphasis manifest in his teaching and writing: If there were no inherent societal laws charging the development of totalitarian societies, how could domination of totalitarian societies, how could domination of totalitarian politics ever be overthrown without conjuring the specter of foreign war and intervention? Neumann certainly did not expect totalitarian systems of domination—even though some appeared as loosely knit or lacking in basic features of an integrated state—to break down by the weight of

* The term occurs in a significant review of *The Law of the Soviet State,* by A. Y. Vishinsky. Political Quarterly, vol. 64, 1949, p. 127. Reviews are not listed in the bibliography appended to the volume under discussion.

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their own monstrosity. And his very last paper in which he examined the ways of affective identification of the mass-molded individual with the totalitarian leader, almost shut the door on any intrinsic transformation of totalitarian societies.

ASSEMBLED IN ONE VOLUME, Neumann's late contribution to the theory of dictatorship—often incisive but as often sketchy and tentative—leave many unresolved difficulties. In his unfinished essay, "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship," in which a typology is undertaken, he asserts that the individual today experiences democracy only vicariously. What does this mean other than that modern industrial societies may be reduced to some sort of common political denominator? There is more to this than the umbilical cord of the educational dictatorship, which Lenin's heirs cut when they perverted the initially envisaged goals of their society. But what this common structural element is Neumann has left unexplored.

He has noted the ambivalent influences of modern industrialism and the differential effects of various patterns of work discipline. But he has not probed into what this may entail for the development of totalitarian dictatorship, confining himself to the observation that atomization perpetrated via compulsory membership in totalitarian mass organizations constitutes an effective technique of domination. But does escape into the superficially controlled anonymity of these mass organizations not have the same effect which privatization has in Western democracies? If anxiety starts the process of identification, what then makes the difference between "regressive" and "non-affective" identification? The former Neumann assigns to a totalitarian leader cult, the latter to the salutary integration into the institutions of a pluralist society. While the individual's specific historical experience may vary from country to country, the social processes as determinants of his atttitude are increasingly uniform.

Neumann's typology of dictatorship, in which the Nazi dictatorship is linked with the regime of Sparta by the common element of fear, does not seem sufficiently geared to social structures to encompass differentiations rooted in modern industrial society. The road that leads from mass democracy to totalitarian dictatorship is not necessarily a one-way street precluding every reverse development but the one unleashed by war and military occupation.

In contrast to the theory of dictatorship Neumann's picture of what would constitute a desirable political system suffered but slight retouch throughout the years. While substantive rationality remained its *piece de resistance* and fundamental yardstick, a new element was added later in that heightened awareness of the responsibility of executive leadership was stipulated as a necessary counterpart to legitimate and called for rank-and-file pressure. In his late writings Neumann seemed to reject the identity theory of democracy—ultra-democratic in the realm of concepts but anarchistic in its pragmatic effects—in favor of devices which would keep at arm's length special pressures, notably those attired in semi-corporate dress. Still refusing to endorse guarantees for acquired positions, he insisted that broad channels be kept open for institutional changes aimed at maximizing freedom. In this endeavor inevitable conflicts arise

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from the accelerated process of political alienation and what Neumann chides as the "Epicurean" attitude, i.e., bastardization of political patterns due to a purely externalized concept of the function of public order.

Neumann's skepticism as to the effectiveness of institutional devices—such as separation of powers, establishment of specific institutions under occupational rule, constitutional safeguards of the right of the individual, or the supposedly decentralizing effect of federalism—clearly increased over the last years. His views, developed at an early date and consistently upheld, as to the urgency of protecting individual rights and the problematic chances of resistance, became more pertinent and symptomatic. He was certain that natural law was not enough to concretize the right to resist power; and he clearly stated that judicial institutions were not sufficient by themselves effectively to guarantee the exercise of this right even there where it was based on hallowed constitutional principle. From his own assumptions on the rationality of man, Neumann derived an irreducible minimum of rights: equality of man, general scope of the law, exclusion of retroactive laws and some sort of independence of judicial organs. Beyond this he did not extend the sphere of man's inalienable rights. The remainder he assigned to the twilight zone between conscience and social order where everybody acts at his own risk.

THIS DIM VIEW of the individual's protection in present-day society is part and parcel of Neumann's quest for a rational organization of the state. There is an inherent logic in his position. Having drawn, in *Behemoth,* the frightening picture of unlimited and unstructured power, he was intent on reestablishing the chance of a rational exercise of power—by both pruning down the realistic individual's justifiable expectations, and shifting the emphasis towards the image of a reconstructed individual, an individual living an ordered and creative rather than a synthetic existence.

In both thought and construction Neumann's late writings show a certain unevenness. In spite of the vast vistas it offered on numberless intellectual and social landscapes *Behemoth* had a clearcut focus. It had an underlying integrated set of coordinated presuppositions with respect to both the impact of the prevailing social structure and the character of political institutions, and the inner contradiction between the rational nature of man and the prevailing social structure. By the late 1940's Neumann had grown critical of his previous assumptions on the nature of social relations; in consequence, they were—at least in part—discarded as conclusive explanations of political movement. However, rationality of man and society was retained as a postulate even though dethroned as a key to man's present behavior. It is in the last year of his life that psychological categories derived from Freud and Kierkegaard, which before he had not deemed meaningful in the study of social processes, came to the fore. Had he lived, would Neumann have succeeded in integrating the various strands and phases of his thinking? An answer could not be but conjectural. Some novel accents in the latest of Neumann's writings disclose a strong intellectual urge to reunite scholarly analysis with an appeal to political action.

Despite repeated methodological shifts and the inconclusiveness of his

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last intellectual endeavors, there remains in Neumann's work a unity of design and purpose. Essentially Neumann was a critical thinker. He felt most at home there where he had a chance to dissolve and demolish traditional concepts by confronting them with the structure of political reality. That it was the magistral *Behemoth* in which he succeeded best was due to the critical quality of his mind and the unique opportunity furnished by a momentous subject.

As a political thinker Neumann was not an innovator. In the theorist's peregrinations between Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Marx—with Montesquieu assigned a less conspicuous place—his own experience on two continents increased his penchant for Hobbesian skepticism. The effective combination of the facts of a pluralist society, of which he was keenly aware, with the requirements of sovereignty baffled his ingenuity and resources.

Deepening pessimism in regard to all societal institutions did not, however, stifle the utopian's inquisitively optimistic outlook, eloquent testimonial to Neumann's lifelong avocation as a critical socialist. His late writings no less than his early ones are impregnated with the belief in the rational propensities of man, implying the feasibility and urgency of a cooperative society to replace the one predicated on competition, but only superficially competitive and easily yielding to totalitarian regimentation. His all-pervasive conviction that critical analysis of established social structures and political institutions is the political scientist's only worthwhile job, endows even fragmentary and contradictory elements of his work with a provocative fascination to the searching mind.

2. Dilemmas of Radicalism

David Kettler

The posthumous collection of Franz Neumann's essays (*The Democratic and Authoritarian State,* The Free Press, 1957) underlines the tragedy of his death. Some of the essays are diffuse and obscure, others unfinished; and the collection as a whole does not form a coherent unit, despite its somewhat misleading title, and it abounds in repetitions. More extensive editing and introductions to the essays relating them to the development of Neumann's thought would have added clarity to both style and content. After all, they were written for a great variety of purposes over a period of seventeen years. Yet I can understand Herbert Marcuse's decision to let Neumann's work speak for itself because that work is of great significance. Amid the welter of erudition, repetition, and occasional obscurity there emerges a picture of a brilliant mind working its way through the decisive problems of our time. If reading these essays requires patience and effort, the labor is well rewarded; if this is not a very good book, it is a most important one—particularly for those who, in some sense, regard themselves as radicals.

As political theorist, Neumann at-

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tempted "to pierce the layers of symbols, statements, ideologies, and thus to come to the core of truth ... The truth of political theory is political freedom. From this follows one basic postulate: Since no political system can realize political freedom fully, political theory must by necessity be critical.... A conformist political theory is not theory." The political theorist seeks to understand and evaluate concrete historical situations so as to uncover the potentialities for human freedom and he must study doctrines to discover what help they can be. "The truth of a doctrine will depend upon ... its ability to provide for the fullest development of all human potentialities. It is thus in the historical development and the concrete setting of the ... doctrines that their truth must be determined."

ONLY ONE PRINCIPLE must be asserted as the premise of rational inquiry: man is potentially rational and capable of choosing—i.e., man is potentially free. Application of this principle depends on understanding the historical situation, and leads to rational action.

> The cognitive formula ... [i.e., that freedom depends on an understanding of the situation] is wrong if it is conceived as obedience to an abstract and fatalistic law of history. The historical process includes man's aspiration to secure more effective control of his environment, so that historical insight is critical and programmatic. The real function of the cognitive element is to expose the possibilities for realizing the human potentialities latent in different social situations. On the one hand it prevents us from repeating empty time-honored formulae. What is progressive today and conducive to freedom may be false tomorrow and a hindrance to freedom. On the other hand, it curbs Utopian radicalism. Since what man can achieve is bound to the stage of social development, the realization of freedom is not at the disposal of man's free will.

Political theory therefore means rational radicalism.

But many radicals would deny the possibility of a *political* theory aimed at freedom. If political theory asks about the condition under which the state may be justified, and if the state, by definition, rests on coercion and power, then a true theory of freedom would reject politics and the state. This rejection, Neumann believed, rests on the false assumption that political power is dispensable and the state inherently evil. But this is not true. Political power is a necessary fact of human life—man can only affect its form, distribution and purposes. Precisely the emergence of the modern state opened up the possibility for rational utilization and control of political power: the state is an indispensable condition for the realization of freedom. Political theory seeks criteria for maximizing the freedom of men subject to political power.

The liberal tradition contributes the first element of political freedom: a rational legal system.

> The state must not completely swallow up the individual; the individual cannot be understood merely as a political animal. A political theory based upon an individualistic philosophy must necessarily operate with the negative-juridical concept of freedom, freedom as the absence of restraints.

Maximizing this element demands limitations on the forms of political power made possible by the centralization and rationalization uniquely characteristic of the modern state.

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> From the simple proposition that there exists a presumption in favor of the individual's freedom there follows every element of the liberal legal system: the permissibility of every act not expressly forbidden by law; the closed and self-consistent nature of the legal system; the inadmissibility of retroactive legislation; the separation of the judicial from the legislative function.

For Neumann, then, forms which assure equality of all men before general laws are a necessary condition for freedom.

They are not, however, a sufficient condition, because they do not determine who will wield political power and to what ends—a point obscured in classic liberal doctrine because of its origin in special historical circumstances and for special purposes. Economically, it was decisive for competitive capitalism, assuring calculability and equal treatment for competitors.

Ideologically, it disguised the fact that *somebody's* law was ruling, that men were exercising power through law. Locke clearly indicates that the law which rules is made in a parliament controlled by the middle class. Furthermore, the state retains sufficient power (regardless of the laws) to safeguard this situation. The historical tie of the rule of law doctrine to the rule of the bourgeoisie calls attention to extraneous elements and unwarranted deductions in liberal theory. That the rule of law implies the supremacy of parliament or any other form of government, or that it implies a minimum of governmental interference or anything else about the content of the laws—these ideas arise from the special situation within which the doctrine was developed. Questions about the distribution and the ends of political power lead beyond the negative conception of freedom to the theory of democracy.

POLITICAL FREEDOM requires participation in direction of political power and minimal political alienation; it requires democracy.

> Man can actually attain freedom only through his own efforts. Neither God nor history grants freedom to him. In this insight rests the theoretical formulation of democracy as that political system which permits the maximization of political freedom. The volitional or activist element is . . . indispensable to the constitution of political freedom.

Political power decisively affects the life of man. If it is an alien force, in no sense an instrument of his will, man is not free. Nor is he free unless political power is used to actualize the potentialities for freedom discovered by a true understanding of the historical situation. Democracy, with its responsiveness to changing conditions and its competing political parties, institutionalizes peaceful change. "The task of political theory is . . . the determination of the degree to which a power group transcends its particular interest and advocates—in Hegelian terms—universal interests." Only in a democracy does rational political action become a real possibility.

The first and continuing task is the struggle for liberal democracy, and therefore, at the present time, against totalitarianism. This does not stem from an alien disease, but from contemporary tendencies which have produced a crisis for freedom:

> a trend towards conformism . . .
> . . . the growing complexity of government; the growth of bureaucracies in public and private life;

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> the concentration of private social power; the hardening of political parties into machines which, because of the high cost of politics, tends to exclude newcomers from the political market . . .
> . . . .the transformation of an open, pluralistically organized society into a corporate, closed society. That means concretely . . . that the individual is no longer estimated according to *what he is* but according to *what he belongs to*. Not performance but status seems to be decisive. Society seems to be composed of social corporations, each with a tendency toward monopoly, preferably protected in its monopoly position by public law in order to make access to it more difficult. . . .
> . . . Large-scale technology on the one hand may imply the total dependence of the industrial population upon a complex, integrated mechanism, which can be operated only in a highly organized, stratified, and hierarchic system. This system must instill the virtues of discipline, obedience, and subordination—no matter who owns the means of production. Thus modern industrialism preaches the very virtues which every authoritarian political system seeks to cultivate. . . . On the other hand, the very opposite virtues may also be strengthened by technology: self-reliance, awareness of one's power and, most particularly, the feeling of solidarity—that is, a spirit of cooperation as opposed to authoritarianism. . . .

Neumann scorned Utopian remedies, so, for example "if one refuses to take account of the inevitability of the division of labor and of the hierarchical ordering of the process of labor and attempts to 'spiritualize' labor instead of restricting it to a minimum, then social anxiety is deepened." There is no road back. Political theory must understand both the progressive and regressive characteristics of contemporary society and deal realistically with the problems raised.

The functions of general law have changed decisively and states claim ever wider exceptions to the rule. Laws of property and contracts no longer assure a minimum of predictability and equality to a large number of equal competitors; they bolster monopolies and other mighty agglomerations of economic power by treating them as equal to their infinitely inferior competitors. Where democratic pressure compels attention to these realities, legislatures concoct vaguely worded, ambiguous legal norms (general clauses) and argue that judges and administrators can now make equitable judgments while upholding the rule of general law. In fact, the enactment of general clauses simply transfers power from politically responsible representatives to protected judges and administrators, and makes meaningless the rule of law doctrine. Furthermore, "No political system will fully uphold the legal value of calculability and legal security if it deems its own security endangered by it. Power will thus strive to set aside the juristic notion of freedom." Fear of real and pretended threats to security has led all modern states to appeal increasingly to this law of necessity through the use of "escape clauses" like the "clear-and-present-danger" doctrine. Because these attacks on liberal legality arise from irreversible trends, democracy assumes a heightened importance. Only responsible representatives of the people can be entrusted with this power.

Modern conditions sap democratic institutions because corporatism eliminates opportunities for rational choice and neurotic anxiety incapacitates the individual will. Negotiations among the

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bureaucracies of functionally organized corporate bodies decide the important political questions and "Political life can . . . be exhausted in the competition of political parties which are purely machines without mass participation, but which monopolize politics to such an extent that a new party cannot make its way within the valid rules of the game." In this situation, "there is . . . no doubt that today the citizen's alienation from democratic political power is increasing—in Europe, at tremendous speed, more slowly but still discernibly in the United States." Such alienation generates anxiety easily manipulated by a demagogue and facilitates the emergence of totalitarianism.

Following Freud, Neumann believed that all civilized social life involves anxiety, and that some anxiety generated by the repression of instincts is the price for creativity and rational freedom. Even the anxiety produced by man's helplessness in a rationalized, industrialized society need not be regressive. But if men then lose all control over the combined strength of society—political power—helplessness gives way to terror. The mass can be manipulated, led to identify itself with a caesaristic leader, and transformed into a mob whose anxiety becomes neurotic and aggressive. First the demagogue must substitute a conspiracy theory for historical understanding, thereby providing an "enemy" as target which catalyzes the transformation of mass anxiety into hostility.

This abuse of reason, deeply rooted in contemporary problems, denies the possibility of rational theory. In the totalitarian scheme, ideological potency, not truth, determines the validity of political theory and much contemporary "political science" in America echoes this view. Transforming political theory into ideology, whether aggressive or defensive, strengthens the forces hostile to freedom.

Nor was Neumann immune to this trend. Confronted by conditions in the West, he retreated from the pursuit of freedom to a defense of established democratic institutions. From the radical implications of his position, he retreated into the academy: the demand for critical insight is reduced to a liberal plea for education, and the demand for capture of political power by the forces of freedom is reduced to a plea for political participation by men of good will. But participation must have a purpose; education a relationship to action; and democracy must be established to be defended. His analysis reveals the crucial issues, but his answers evade them. Neumann was no coward; the ambiguous outcome of his radicalism manifests a tragic dilemma.

Neumann held that political theory is inherently critical and programmatic, yet saw no real possibilities for advancing freedom in the present situation. In fact, he feared the destruction of past gains by advancing totalitarianism. Criticism of Western political institutions will weaken democracy and "if one is anti-democratic today one strengthens, consciously or unconsciously, Fascism, even when one does not have this aim oneself." The situation forces a choice between democracy and dictatorship.

This antithesis dominates and, at times, distorts Neumann's whole analysis of the Western democracies. Since these are clearly not totalitarian, he

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tended to identify them with his theoretical model of democracy. For example, after a detailed analysis of the specific historical weakening of juridical freedom in the United States today, he offers the rather strange consolation that "these problems may not appear so depressing if one considers political power not as an alien power (as expressed in the formula citizen versus state) but as one's own." That is certainly a very big 'if' especially in the light of his subsequent description of the rise of political alienation in the West. Similarly, in his frequent and cogent defenses of "big government" and bureaucracy, he treats as an empirical description the model of a responsible bureaucracy functioning as value-free technicians who simply apply general laws. This model no longer fits the actions or even the pretensions of contemporary American administrators who deny that they are mere "sausage machines" and speak of "creative administration" in "the public interest." Again, in the discussion of the intensification of anxiety in the Western democracies, he sees the sole threat in its manipulation into neurotic persecutory anxiety through caesaristic identification with a demagogic leader. He nowhere raises the question, which I believe far more urgent for an understanding of contemporary American society: the possibility of manipulating this condition into mindless acquiescence and positive thinking. Contemporary America does not offer a choice between democracy and totalitarianism; the relevant alternatives are rather corporate oligarchy (in its broadest sense) and some progressive alternative which we have yet to find.

NEUMANN, however, failed to heed his own warnings against hypostatizing some historically limited institution. Although liberal democracy represents the highest potentiality for freedom under certain conditions, new forms appropriate to the present situation may be required to express the negative and volitional elements of freedom, and the threatened or actual decline of democracy may open new possibilities. Reason must never become defensive; it must relentlessly criticize all existing forms. Neumann's dilemma results, in part, from an inconsistency between his basic conception of theory and his actual theorizing about freedom.

But he raised other doubts which preclude a simple solution to the radical dilemma. He denied that any class today is impelled by its interests and experiences consistently to seek greater freedom. No radical program can be actualized without the mass support of a radical class, but the Marxist faith in the proletariat has been antiquated by prosperity, industrial discipline, and the secure niche of unionized labor in the corporate hierarchy. Labor's interests, like those of any other group, may at times coincide with the "universal" interest of freedom, but radicalism cannot rely on seizure of power by the proletariat.

Today's discontented classes, the *Lumpenbourgeoisie* and peasantry, are politically immature and can be roused only by demagogic manipulation. Only counter-revolution and totalitarianism benefits from the activation of this discontent. The closest approximation to a progressive class Neumann found in the intelligentsia, which will become an active force for freedom if it truly understands its in-

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terests. This is reminiscent of Plato's philosopher-kings, but becomes less disquieting, if also a good deal less potent, inasmuch as these "knowers" are denied the Platonic weapons of the "noble lie" and "a little gentle violence." The brave urgings of good and wise men are notoriously ineffectual against the demands of power, as Neumann himself has often remarked, and political participation by the enlightened is a far cry from the capture of political power by the forces of freedom. Yet no sarcastic reproaches or radical cliches can spirit away the problem raised. Any attempt to resuscitate the radical implications of Neumann's theory must discover potentially progressive social energy in contemporary society.

BUT IF THE RADICAL dilemma extends only to action, and not to criticism as well, as Neumann had thought, perhaps it merely reflects the general human dilemma. Perhaps man cannot control the forces which govern his life, and each must save his own soul as best he can—through Epicurean withdrawal from politics or the silent sabotage of the Good Soldier Schweik. Throughout Neumann's essays runs the struggle against temptations to surrender; pessimism and Epicureanism were his personal devils.

As a tactic, withdrawal may sometimes be the only recourse, but as a principle it is supreme treachery. Man becomes truly human only in the fight for freedom, and, ultimately, freedom means the unhampered development and satisfaction of human needs and faculties. Admittedly, this ultimate can never be achieved. External nature sets inexorable limits, whose necessity men must recognize; and even in the social realm necessity rules. But domination and power are of a different order of necessity from the laws of nature because man can alter their forms and diminish their effects. No society has ever limited alienation to the minimum necessary for civilized life. Though knowledge of this minimum excludes Utopian panaceas, it does not authorize surrender. Man's responsibility is the struggle against alienation, and rejection of that responsibility betrays humanity. This is a Promethean conception and the Walter Lippmanns and Russell Kirks are certainly right in seeing human presumption at the root of radicalism. Yet the alternative is not submission to God or nature; it is submission to other men.

Whatever may become of this or that minor or major conclusion of Neumann's studies, their value is inestimable. He posed the vital problems, approached them with great erudition and insight, and gave us incisive analyses of ideas and institutions. In short, Neumann's work points the way for those who would supersede him. And this, I believe, is how Franz Neumann would want it. He was, if anything, an even greater teacher than theorist, and that which distinguishes a true teacher from a hack and propagandist is precisely the wish to be superseded in the name of truth.

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East German Marxism

RENAISSANCE AND REPRESSION

Irving Louis Horowitz

In the postwar era, philosophy in West Germany has mainly been considering the relative merits of Heidegger, Husserl and Kant. As in America, outside the polarity of existentialism and positivism, little has come along to excite either students or scholars.[1] In East Germany, the major emphasis has been on the place of Hegel in philosophic history, particularly as it relates to the Marxian tradition; the philosophic issues generated by modern physics and mathematics; and the relation of symbolic logic to dialectics.[2] This difference in emphasis clearly reflects the ideological conflicts of a divided Germany. Our concern, however, is not a comparative evaluation of philosophic tendencies in Germany. It is our aim to evaluate the consequences of even a circumscribed fermentation in East Germany, which most recently has led to a series of suppressions that points to the profanation of serious thought for some time to come. The events which transformed a fermentation into a repression are of general concern. They help illuminate the consequences of a too close relation of philosophic inquiry to political platitudes.

The ferment resulting from the close of the Stalin era, which culminated politically in the Khrushchev revelations before the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party, socially in the liberalization of Polish life, and militarily in the Hungarian uprising, had naturally enough spread to philosophy. Indeed, the philosophical, being highly attuned to even slight political shifts, reflected the liberalizing tendencies of the new Russian leaders even before the de-Stalinization policies were formalized. Re-evaluations were made of the history of ideas that were calculated to upset the propositions stated by Andrei Zhdanov in his critique of Alexandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy*.

Philosophers who had not been heard from for decades began contributing articles to *Voprosy filosofii*. Abram Deborin did a convincing piece on Jean Meslier, comparing his naturalist theory of religion most favorably with Voltaire's deism. Valentin Asmus wrote an essay on Kant, in which Kant was evaluated as one of the great representatives of German democracy and humanism.[3] We also know that an enormous interest in Kant developed between 1954-1956. Dissertations on every

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aspect of his thought were written.[4] Very careful studies of thinkers such as Mably, Gassendi and even Proudhon began to appear.[5] To the alert, it became clear that Stalinism and its philosophic alter-ego, Zhdanovism, was being replaced by more mature appraisals of philosophic history and the problems confronting Marxian theory generally.

I

While Soviet philosophy replaced empty epistles with formal analysis, it proceeded with caution lest a repetition of the thirties take place. At that time philosophers of such merit as Luppol, Axelrod, Hecker and Volfson were denigrated, dismissed and disgraced. Central European thought displayed more vigor and independence of judgment than Soviet appraisals. While the Marxian framework remained essentially unchallenged, it was sometimes filled with a highly novel content, by-passed altogether, or even criticized elliptically. Indeed, the Polish philosopher Adam Schaff recently had occasion to say that "we are witnessing a retrogression of the influence of Marxist ideology on a scale considerably exceeding the frontiers of Poland."[6] At the same time, Hungarian philosophy, led by the venerable dean of European Marxism, George Lukacs, began raising the concept of socialist humanism once more, implying thereby that Marxism needed to recapture its warm-blooded Enlightenment roots. The intellectual battle ground for Lukacs became rationalism versus irrationalism. Lukacs' "old habit" of conceiving Marxism as part of a larger democratic-realist tradition, his original sin, again emerged as paramount.

It is clear that Lukacs never completely reconciled himself to a duality of standards in judging "bourgeois" or "socialist" philosophy and literature. His position remained essentially framed by the degree to which realism overcomes naturalism and sentimentalism in the arts, and materialism and rationalism overcome idealism and irrationalism (particularly of the existentialist variety) in philosophy. He urged upon his colleagues similar objective criteria, rather than the capricious and tendentious canons of the politics of the moment.[7] Lukacs' activities in the revolutionary Potofi Circle of "Young Turks" (which incidentally was the bridge connecting the subversive activities of the German philosophers to the Hungarian revolution), and his subsequent acceptance of a ministerial position in the defunct Nagy government, reflected the mood of Hungarian intellectuals. The subsequent arrest and incarceration of Lukacs in Rumania is perhaps indicative of the importance the Russians attached to his thought no less than his activities.[8]

By far the most impressive philosophic development took place in Germany. Under the guidance of Wolfgang Harich, Manfred Hertwig and Herman Ley (basically the young philosophers) the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* became the focus of activity in the in-

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vestigation of fundamental theory. Within its pages the major tendencies of contemporary Marxism found expression. The chief editorial impetus came from Harich. He proved most enterprising in soliciting contributions from Marxian philosophers in other parts of the world on the basic issues of logic and scientific method. The *Zeitschrift* sought fairly if not always squarely to come to grips with such twentieth century revolutionary developments as relativity physics, quantum mechanics and logistics. This was clearly no repetition of such absurdities as were to be found in Soviet theory where the metaphysicians of materialism instructed the scientists not to take Einstein's principles of relativity seriously because they were untenable from a dialectical standpoint.[9] The editors of the *Zeitschrift* seemed to understand that, if Marxian theory were not to be consumed in the ashes of its original formulations, it would have to become responsive to changes in the physical as well as the social sciences. To facilitate this policy the *Zeitschrift* encouraged contributions from scholars versed in the latest findings of physics no less than in the dialectical categories.

In the post-Stalin period, the radicalism of German Marxism came into sharp conflict with the Ulbricht regime, which had been on an insecure footing since the riots in 1953 at Berlin. In a nation where twenty-three Soviet divisions buttressed the regime, it was inevitable that the type of analysis which found its way into the pages of the *Zeitschrift* would be greeted nervously. The re-evaluation of Hegelianism, for example, assumed ever sharper tones with the passage of time. Harich himself became increasingly critical of the mechanical appraisals offered by Stalinism. He characterized as "absolutely false the view that the theories of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were simply aristocratic reactions to the French Revolution." Harich also stood in opposition to the simplistic categorization of materialism and idealism. He denied that because a philosophy was idealist in content it was *eo ipso* socially reactionary.[10] The latitude of the discussions, no less than the freedom with which controversial issues were dealt with in the *Zeitschrift,* was convincing proof of the sincerity of avant-garde German philosophical materialism. In the brief period of existence, the *Zeitschrift* was acknowledged to be perhaps the most influential Marxian journal in Europe. Its influence on the younger philosophers, writers and scientists of Germany was unmistakable. It set standards of scholarship which were emulated by the intellectuals in every sphere of creativity. If only for this reason, it is not amiss to speak of a renaissance of Marxist theory in Germany.

II

The renaissance was short lived. The first rumblings of a a resurgent orthodoxy appeared, naturally enough, in the Soviet Union. In the wake of Hungary, an emerging theme was the criticism of those who "use the struggle against the cult of the individual to subvert

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principles of Party leadership in questions of Marxism."[11] To philosophers who extolled the virtues of "freedom of creative endeavour" and the "free competition of ideas"[12] officialdom countered with the partisan conception of philosophy. The theorists B. A. Nazarov and O. V. Gridneva were told in no uncertain terms that the Party alone was capable of "ensuring that ideological and artistic development goes in the right direction."[13] To physicists who insisted on the obvious: "that science does not require the philosophy of dialectical materialism to pursue its work," *Voprosy filosofii* responded with the claim that "some few scientists" have become "nihilistic" and "under the influence of positivist ideas of contemporary bourgeois philosophy."[14] That this reversion to Zhdanovism is related to the Central European crisis is made perfectly clear by the appeal of the editors of *Voprosy filosofii* to Russian philosophers "to foil the attempts of the imperialists" who would "seek to take advantage of the mistakes in relationships among individual countries of the socialist camp."[15] With the alacrity befitting their stations, the political moguls of the Central European satellites responded to the "appeal."

Accusing fingers were pointed at the intellectuals, the spark of the Hungarian revolt, the brains behind the guns. In a swift succession of events, seemingly calculated to foil scholarship rather than imperialism, Lukacs was arrested and sent into exile. Polish philosophers began calling for an "offensive" to restore Marxist orthodoxy to its leading place. Even in Yugoslavia the era of good feeling was abruptly halted with the imprisonment of Djilas for "bourgeois opinions" on the nature of democracy. But it was left to East Germany, the weakest economic prop of Central Europe, to reveal the total extent of orthodoxy's ambitions. German philosophers, taking their cue from the philosophy department at the University of Leipzig, began calling for an end to that "unrest which was betraying the interests of the workers and farmers who have made our State."[16] Social scientists were warned against the vices of objective scientific analysis. They were told by one official, Rudi Kirchner, that "the workers' class in the German Democratic Republic expects of the scientists not any kind of figures and any kind of conclusions but such material and such conclusions as are weapons in the fight against the capitalistic exploitations in West Germany and for the victory of socialism."[17] In such an atmosphere the continued existence of the *Zeitschrift* became increasingly tenuous. The suspension of publication (whether permanent or temporary is still not known), and the indictment and conviction of its editor and secretary, verified the view of those who foretold of a resurgence of intellectual vigilantism in the wake of events in Hungary.

THE DETAILS of Harich's arrest and conviction as revealed in the *Manchester Guardian* are blunt as they are sordid. He was indicted on the grounds of inciting an "ideological rebellion" and of or-

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ganizing groups of agents who were in contact with "Hungarian counter-revolutionaries" and Western "spies and provocateurs." A letter from Lukacs was cited as evidence because it called for a re-appraisal of basic issues in Marxism. Arrested along with Harich were three of his associates: Bernhard Steinberger, co-publisher of the *Zeitschrift,* Manfred Hertwig, secretary to the editorial board, and Irene Giersch, personal secretary to Harich. According to *Die Politische Meinung,* Harich's influence was spreading to all parts of Germany. His close friends were oftentimes associated with the editorial staffs of the leading periodicals in East Germany. Since the growth of Harich's personal influence seemed traceable to events following the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress, he became a natural target for the East German regime—which was being internally shaken by a hazardous raw materials shortage, and externally by the transformations in Polish and Hungarian communism.[18]

After being held incommunicado for three months, Harich and his colleagues were tried and convicted in three days. The charges to which all the philosophers pleaded guilty are part of the classic repertoire of European Communist juridical practice. In addition to being in contact with counter-revolutionary groups in Hungary—specifically the Potofi circle of intellectuals—they were charged with conspiring with the Eastern Bureau of the West German Social Democratic Party. Further, they were convicted of drawing up plans for restoring a capitalist economy in East Germany, and of working toward this goal by organizing underground resistance cells for the purpose of a possible coup-d'état. For pleading guilty on all counts, Harich was rewarded with a ten-year prison term, Steinberger to four years and Hertwig to two years.[19] The fate of *Zeitschrift* is a formal problem, since even if it resumes publication, it promises to become a pallid reflection of *Voprosy filosofii.* The ease with which a renaissance is replaced with repression deserves some attention lest the meaning of the tragic events be obfuscated.

But before exploring some general aspects of this problem, it is important to note that the repression has not been restricted to only a few scholars. As a postscript to the Harich affair there has been a steady purge of dissident elements. Gerhardt Zehm, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Jena has been expelled from his position for "confused conceptions of Marxism." If reports from *Neues Deutschland* are to be believed, this poor soul received his confusions from the most revered (formerly) East German philosopher, Ernst Bloch—who we may note was a member of the editorial board of the *Zeitschrift.* Bloch, who only last year received a *festschrift* in honor of his seventieth birthday from his colleagues, now finds himself condemned for being "ideologically and politically negative," and whose instruction had "dubious effects" on students. The mounting cases of the miscarriage of elementary rights of expression, make it clear that orthodoxy and officialdom have no intention of halting their campaign against free inquiry. To those who claim that the Harich affair was motivated by political rather than philo-

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sophical considerations, the dismissal and disgrace of Zehm and Bloch for their views alone is the best reply.

III

The failure of the post-Stalin regimes in Central Europe to establish in principle the free exchange and exercise of ideas as the only genuine path to knowledge must be considered a prime cause for recent events. It made the democratization of Marxian theory subject to the caprice of the vast bureaucratic machinery. As long as basic political interests were best served by the increase in academic responsibility over academic matters, the dissemination of novel views was tolerated if not furtively encouraged. When a new political situation developed in Central Europe in 1956, the marketplace of ideas was first to be closed down. In its place came a torrent of official pronunciamentos on the true tasks of socialist theory. This prompted Harich, in his somewhat schematic plan for the revitalization of European socialism and the democratizaton of the German Communist movement, to make the complete intellectual freedom of scholars a basic cornerstone. This was to be guaranteed through the granting of autonomy to universities and the insurance of security for the individual before the law.[20]

Repressive tendencies have undoubtedly been stimulated by the confused ideas of Khrushchev on the relation of economy to polity. Since he came to power as an advocate of greater industrial production as the solution of outstanding Soviet economic problems, as opposed to the consumer goods emphasis of Malenkov, political democratization became the only formidable avenue for Khrushchev to express the mass dissatisfaction with the Stalin period. However, a dangerous avenue was opened. The obvious fact that once political analysis was allowed a relatively free rein it would turn upon the economic problems of socialism with a vengeance, apparently escaped the attention of Soviet political leaders. Thus we find as a central core in Harich's heresy the advocacy of a Gomulka type of economy for a united Germany. "Production must be redirected toward raising the standard of living of the masses of people; the speedup system completely done away with; profit-sharing introduced in socialist factories and socialist trade; old-age pensions legally enacted for workers just as for the intelligentsia; bonuses for top functionaries abolished; workers' councils introduced in the factories on the Yugoslav model; small private business promoted and given equal status with nationalized industry; forced collectivization ended; agricultural producers' cooperatives dissolved in order to avert economic catastrophe; a sound small and medium peasantry developed."[21] As a consequence of this unexpected economic reaction to Khrushchev's political conception of democracy, procedures have been sharply reversed. Economic concessions have once more taken the lead position. But the price of this economic opening-up seems to be an intellectual

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closing-down. This ambivalence has become a primary factor in Central Europe and Russia alike.

The ambiguous character of modern-day Marxism has certainly contributed to the current crisis in East Germany. The Jamesian distinction between tough-minded empiricism and tender-minded metaphysics is certainly not inapplicable to the status of Marxism. Rather than resolve the distinctions between traditional philosophies, at least in the forms Marxism has taken in the Soviet Union, theorists have sought to dissolve such antinomies by declaring allegiance to a higher level of abstractions. The search for the concrete has found few adherents in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, scrutinization of Marxist philosophers indicates that they tend to be of two basic types. Those who stress the lofty moral ideals of Marxism will be found espousing a messianic socialism, in which the eternal march of men forward through the dialectical process, and the social control of the human situation, emerge as central considerations. Those who emphasize the actual scientific work of Marx are less likely to advocate metaphysical generalities. For this group the content of Marxism is economic and political science, while the form of Marxist philosophy is scientific methodology and historical fact. Thus in its own unique fashion contemporary Marxian philosophy reproduces the age-old conflict between empiricism and rationalism, method and metaphysics. When we recall that the so-called monolithic unity of medieval scholasticism also cleaved itself in similar fashion, the ambiguities present in contemporary Marxian scholarship become more understandable.

THE QUESTION IS: how does this dualism reveal itself in the present situation in German Marxism? The contents of the *Zeitschrift* afford no conclusive answer, but they do indicate tendencies. Broadly speaking, the renaissance of German Marxism rested upon a restatement of dialectical materialism in the light of latest developments in modern physical science and logic. It tended to view Marxism technically, i.e., as a tool of scientific analysis itself open to clarification and validation. Now this contrasts in the sharpest way with Soviet orthodoxy which tends to consider Marxism as a science standing over the sciences in the first place (i.e., as metaphysics), and as a faith to live by in the second place (i.e. as theology). *Voprosy filosofii* leaves no doubt that it considers the development of the sciences impossible without the knowledge derived from dialectical materialist philosophy. And it leaves even less doubt in the minds of its readers that it views Marxism-Leninism as the only sanctified guide to correct living. "Sentimental Marxism" (*Voprosy*) has won out temporarily over "scientific Marxism" (*Zeitschrift*) because it best represents the immediate needs of Soviet ideology. The basic fault, from a political vantage point, of scientific Marxism is that it tends to minimize the role and function of ideological emphasis in philosophy. Indeed, when Harich insists that "socialism is

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an objective process and is not tied to the name of a party which identifies itself with socialism"[22] he is undermining the basis of the "partisan concept of philosophy" so dear to metaphysical Marxism and to dogmatism in general.

With the end of the *Zeitschrift,* in its old form at any rate, one can expect the repetition of the pattern followed in other Central European nations. Problems in the philosophy of science and in logic will be introduced through the back door, so to speak. Mathematicians will alone be responsible for logical and statistical issues. Literary critics will handle problems in esthetics. Psychologists will be responsible for epistemological considerations. To the technical philosopher will be alloted the "science" of the history of philosophy. In this way orthodoxy will seek to avoid a recurrence of the Harich affair by, on the one hand, preserving the platitudes of metaphysical Marxism intact; and on the other, by maintaining the need for scientific theory. But beneath the calm imposed by this neat division of functions, the conflict between those who conceive of Marxism as a central tool of analysis, subject to continuous empirical validation and correction, and those who conceive of it as an ideological instrument of the entrenched Party, will continue with unabated fury. The current conflict between Polish and Russian literary figures on such matters as abstraction in the fine arts and tendentiousness in literature is the first indication of this.

It would be ludicrous to imagine that the conflict between democracy and coercion, science and metaphysics, ceases because of a general commitment to a broad world view. This conflict dates to antiquity and continues as a propelling force in philosophy. The imprisonment of the East German scholars is not the first time the philosophic enterprise has been under attack for overstepping orthodox grounds—and it doubtless will not be the last time. For if philosophy contains within itself the clarification of intellectual unrest, and urges the translation of that unrest into dynamic social activity, then neither reaction nor repression can possibly arrest its progress. The temporary demise of philosophic vitality in East Germany is a severe blow to scholarship everywhere. This is so whether or not one accepts the views of Harich on theoretical or practical questions. It has served to demonstrate the fact that "sentimental Marxism," just so long as it has official State support, is anything but sentimental in the way it shuts off the free expression of ideas. Whereof one speaks and does not know, we have stupidity. Whereof one knows and cannot speak, we have tyranny. Both elements are clearly present in the East German intellectual and political scene.

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1 Walter Cerf, "Existentialist Mannerism and Education," *The Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. LII, March 17, 1955; and Ludwig Landgrebe, "The Study of Philosophy in Germany," *ibid,* Vol. LIV. (February 28, 1957.)

2 The *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* has been conducting discussions on these themes for several years with no sign of a lessening of interest or shift in emphasis.

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Aside from Lukacs' work in esthetics, and occasional pieces in the history of ideas, logic and physics and Hegel held sway.

3 *Recherches Sovietiques,* Cahier I. Paris 1956, pp. 113-155.

4 A. F. Okulow, "Forschungsarbeit des Philosophischen Instituts der Akademie der Wissenschaften der UdSSR auf dem Gebiet der deutschen Philosophie," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,* Vol. IV, No. 5, pp. 603-04.

5 *Recherches Sovietiques,* Cahier IV. Paris 1956, pp. 33-87, 151-194.

6 Adam Schaff, quoted in *The New York Times,* March 18, 1957.

7 Lukacs' polarity of reason and unreason is reflected in his attitude toward existentialism, which in contrast to most Marxists, he believed would become the major theoretical expression of capitalist culture. In his view, socialism becomes fused with a new wave of rationalism, while capitalism capitulates in its dotage to irrationalist currents. For the philosophic expression of his critique of existentialist irrationalism see *Existentialisme ou Marxisme?* (Paris 1948.) Lukacs' technical concern with problems of literary form and content, an interest which pre-dates the First World War, tended to establish the belief that he had not been shaken in his concept of the scientific determination of literary and philosophic products; determinations over and above party concerns.* That he became in recent years cautious and tentative in the statement of his outlook is understandable in the light of the severe attacks upon his theories by Hungarian Zhdanovites. *Cf.* Joseph Revai, "Literature and People's Democracy," *Masses & Mainstream,* Vol. 3, Nos. 9/10. 1950.

8 Lukacs never fully accepted the concept of Soviet literature as the "vanguard literature" of the world. He continued, even after his return to Hungary from Russia, to espouse a theory of uneven development between the economic base and artistic superstructure. One can be sure that his arrest was greeted with a sigh of relief from the Soviet intellectual bureaucracy. Nonetheless, a sufficient concern over his fate has prompted Janos Kadar to indicate that Lukacs might possibly return to Hungary in the near future.

9 M. M. Karpov, "On The Philosophical Views of A. Einstein," *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 1, 1951.

10 W. Harich, "Uber das Verhaltnis des Marxismus zur Philosophie Hegels," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,* Vol. IV, No. 5, 1956, pp. 559-585.

11 "For the Leninist Principle of Adherence to the Party Spirit in Ideological Work," editorial in *Voprosy filosofii.* No. 6, 1956, pp. 3-10.

12 B. A. Nazarov/ O. V. Gridneva, "On The Problem of the Lag in Drama and Theater," *Voprosl filosofii,* No. 5, 1956, pp. 85-94.

13 *ibid.,* No. 6, 1956, p. 7.

14 *ibid.,* pp. 7-8.

15 *ibid.,* p. 9. (My thanks to A. L. for translating these pieces from the Russian.)

16 Terence Prittie, "East German Ferment," *The Manchester Guardian Weekly.* (February 28, 1957)

17 Rudi Kirchner, quoted in *The New York Times.* (March 20, 1957)

18 Prittie, *op. cit.* (February 21, 1957)

19 *The Manchester Guardian Weekly.* (March 14, 1957)

20 Harich's action program appeared in the form of a leaflet on the day of his arrest. It appears in English in *The New Leader,* Vol. XL, No. 13 (April 1, 1957). A more complete version of the same memorandum appears in *The Nation,* Vol. 184, No. 18 (May 4, 1957). Harich's proclamation appears to be an attempt to reconcile Leninism to traditional West European social democracy. This is indeed a quixotic innovation since so much of Lenin's energies were spent in ideological combat with the type of analysis offered by Kautsky and Fritz Sternberg—to name but two figures Harich considers would be a broadening influence upon Marxian thought.

21 Harich, *ibid.,* p. 4 (Hildebrandt's translation in *The New Leader*).

22 Harich, *ibid.,* p. 3.

* An analytical article on Lukacs will appear in a forthcoming issue of DISSENT.—Ed.

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SCIENTISTS IN THE BUREAUCRATIC AGE

Edward Speyer

A prime factor in the 20th Century Industrial Revolution and the reorganization of society that has accompanied it, science is today itself being reorganized. The rationalists are being rationalized. As science has become more important to industry and government, changes have been taking place in the spirit of science and of scientists. The most important changes are not, however, those which the liberal-radical tradition predicted on the basis of its belief that science, as a search for truth, is essentially incompatible with investigations designed to solve immediate practical problems (weapons or marketable products) and that its publications must be uncensored.

Contrary to most expectations, fundamental research has not been harmed by the "marriage" of government and scientists—the military have had enough sense and money to let scientists work pretty much on their own. It is the human, social consequences of this marriage, first to the scientists as men, and second to society as a whole, that are dangerous.

The Amazing Marriage

Scientists are today enjoying a new prestige and a new salary bracket. No longer considered harmless drudges (as in James Thurber's pre-war cartoon, "Capture of Three Physics Professors"), they have become material to be stockpiled for the defense program. It is through the patronage of the defense program that they have achieved both the prestige and the salary.

The "marriage" of the military machine with the research scientists has, despite initial trepidation on both sides, been unexpectedly happy. Both partners have gotten essentially what they bargained for, and both are satisfied. The military gets the weapons and counter-weapons it wants, and some of the intellectual respectability of the scientists rubs off onto military uniforms. It is largely because of technology and science that the military leaders have come to exercise greater influence in American government and industry than ever before in peace time. These leaders will remain in a powerful position so long as the accelerated rate of scientific advance (which today does not necessarily imply Historical Progress) renders military strategy and equipment obsolete even before it is finally agreed upon.

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The scientists, on their side, have also done well. Poorly equipped laboratories were once as standard as poor art studios; research jobs used to be scarce and pay poorly. Between 1930 and 1953, according to estimates by the National Science Foundation and others, there has been a fifteen-fold real increase in expenditures for research and development, and in the same period, about a five-fold increase in the number of employed scientists. There has been much flattering publicity and a new respect from important people. Technical advisory boards are everywhere in government today; politicians conceal their typical American prejudices against Ph.D.'s. A generation ago the very few scientifically trained men who hit the big time, like David Sarnoff and Herbert Hoover, ceased to be scientists and became business executives and politicians. Today, scientists like Vannevar Bush can reach official positions of influence *as scientists.*

Under military patronage, science is flourishing as never before. The volume of current research and the rate at which progress is being made on hundreds of scientific problems would have been unthinkable if scientists had remained on the typical pre-war university research budget; or on the unsubsidized payrolls of private industry, that is, dependent on the consumer market. The material published per month in technical journals has at least doubled since 1938. Science is in a golden age; not only physics and electronics, which are of greatest interest to the military, but chemistry and biology also are advancing so fast and on so many fronts that the scientists themselves have trouble keeping abreast of developments related to their work.

Most scientists have been surprised at the harmony with which scientists have been working, directly and indirectly, for and under the military. Three fears had been expressed with particular frequency:

(1) Supervision of research by military men will interfere with intelligent prosecution of the work.

(2) Pure research will be slighted and all the emphasis placed on military problems and equipment.

(3) Military secrecy and security classifications will prevent publication: free interchange of scientific information is essential to the development of science.

These three fears have not proved of major significance, although the general opinion held among liberals and radicals is otherwise.

Factory Organization in the Laboratory

The first of these fears—the military mind in the laboratory—has not materialized because, instead of trying to introduce military discipline or military-like organization in the laboratories, the military has applied modern production methods. Until the last quarter of the 19th century, research was generally conducted on a private basis; almost as soon as the universities established their own laboratories, however, the bulk of important research became associated with them.

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By the time the first World War broke out, important work could no longer be looked for from individual scientists functioning on their own. Lord Rayleigh's work and Einstein's three great papers of 1905 represent almost the last major scientific achievements unsubsidized by university, industry, or government agency. "Back when I was a student," writes the eldery physicist Léon Brillouin, "there was little question of organized research. The terms seemed even contradictory."

World War II required an enormous expansion of research and development which has since hardly abated. Industry was encouraged, by liberal financial inducements, enormously to expand its research facilities and engineering offices. The universities were persuaded, by somewhat less liberal use of the same kind of inducement, to sign research contracts or to set up research institutes. The government greatly enlarged its own research facilities, but a major portion of government sponsored research is done by private corporations.

Research is concerned with ideas, and with measurements designed to support or disprove ideas; it thus appeals to people who like to use their imaginations. Such people felt that the military might carry its distrust of unconfined imagination into the laboratory. But the military approached the matter in a businesslike way: it accelerated specialization. The modern laboratory is not run by Army officers, nor by businessmen, but by the practitioners of a booming new profession, one might almost say a new science: research administration. A technical problem is broken down and parceled out. Initially, it might be posed as a research problem; then, if theoretical results and/or an experimental model look promising, the problem is turned over to an engineering group for redesign into a pre-production model. The theoretical men are meanwhile assigned other work, often the investigation of possibilities turned up by their earlier work. In this way, more people can be used on a project at the same time, and each person is kept at the kind of work for which he is particularly qualified.

One consequence of the increased division of labor has been the discovery that much, though not all, first grade work can be done with second grade talent. (This is a device the Europeans, who build their research projects around star performers, are just beginning to learn.) Research has been transformed from an individual effort to what the economist Sumner Slichter aptly calls an "industry of discovery."

Another consequence is that research has become increasingly confounded with "politics," i.e., corridor intrigue, with greater emphasis on reports, memos, conferences (administrators tend to believe that thinking is a social process), "personality," and the art of promotion ("empire-building").

A third consequence has been an increased awareness of advertising possibilities. Publication is often the chief purpose of a project, as of a journey by a Richard Halliburton or John Gunther. Before the research is even begun, plans are completed for the publication of re-

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sults. (One can be sure that in such cases there will be plenty of important-sounding "results.") This custom was formerly unusual in the physical sciences, and generally secret, but many of today's men of science, with their businesslike attitude, see nothing shameful in such practice, nor in the companion practice of publishing the same results in several different places.

Still another consequence is the significant increase in *respected* phoniness within scientific organizations and publications. Examples are partcularly easy to find in cybernetics and in operations research. The latter is hitting the big time on its own. The Army, Navy, and Air Force each have their well-financed operations research establishments; the High Brass are fond of implementing their feuds and budget proposals with reports larded with mathematics and technical terms. Business executives, too, have begun to find such "scientizing" a useful means for accumulating prestige.

Meanwhile private industry has been watching its new government-subsidized research sections at work and has begun to see commercial possibilities in long term as well as short term research investment. Some of the "luxury" investigations carried out under government contracts produced information that was useful in the manufacture of civilian commodities. To take the best publicized example: electric power generated by nuclear reactors would be as far in the future as inter-planetary commuting if the utility companies did not have the Manhattan Project and the Atomic Energy Commission laying the scientific groundwork, footing the bill, and pushing the construction. The idea that goals can be set and reached by research teams has replaced the old concept of research "as a kind of exotic garden to be cultivated in the hope of producing an occasional rare fruit."

However, there is a limit to the kind of scientific work which can be rationalized. Really fundamental advances cannot be planned or scheduled; they usually involve a challenge, or overthrow, of accepted theories. The prevailing philosophy that accomplishments in basic research are proportional to the magnitude of well-planned financial investment does not recognize this limit. Many scientists, however, have gone along with the prevailing philosophy; instead of pointing out over-rationalizations of research, as in certain "crash programs," for example, they have adopted the same accountant type of reasoning.

The Purity of Pure Research

The integration of scientific research into the basic framework of our economic structure has had an effect on the scientists' own view of science, not because they recognize the integration but because they do *not* recognize it. The scientists' ingestion of a factory-like concept of scientific work lies behind the accepted differentiation between pure and applied science. After all, the existence of an immediate or useful goal does not, in and of itself, impair the fundamental character of an investigation. The essential difference between pure research

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and the other kind lies in the values and attitudes of the researcher. There are those who are interested in the ferry ride, and those whose interest is limited to getting across. To the engineer it matters little if different types of problems are solved with completely different techniques and concepts; but the pure scientist loves to discern unity in diversity, to see the different problems as special cases subsumed under a more general theory. Pure scientists are, or used to be, philosophers in disguise. (They are more likely to have a student past which now leads to security clearance problems, while engineering students formed a politically conservative group even during the Thirties.) Almost every paragraph of a technical article shows whether the author wants to get to the bottom of a difficulty instead of merely around it, whether he loves neatness in his theoretical housekeeping, whether he seeks the most general formulation, whether he is interested in how far a new idea can be applied before it loses its validity. Putting the shoe on the other foot, it should be recognized that the *absence* of any desire to produce something useful in "the outside world" is far from a guarantee that an investigation is pure, fundamental, or worth-while.

The recent report of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) on social aspects of science (New York *Times,* December 31, 1956) states that about ninety per cent of the funds allotted for research by Federal agencies is for "applied research and development rather than basic science." This badly distorted figure is obtained by classifying research as applied whenever the end in view is practical. The trouble with applied science is *not* that it is applied, i.e., that there is an application waiting for the result, but that too often it is not science at all but only a shrewd compromise between imitation, trial and error, and "brute force" engineering.

It is not practicality that pure science needs to be kept pure from. The real danger is to the purity of the scientists. Science, which has contributed mightily to the cult of the expert, finds its disciples pressured into becoming experts who are motivated not by deep curiosity but by the desire to be technically competent; here, rather than in the proportions of budget allotments, is the threat to pure science.

The economic pressure on scientists to become experts is clear from a comparison of salaries within and without the academic world. In medical science, to take another example, basic research requires talent of the highest sort, but the typical income of the research physicians is far below that of most practicing physicians. More subtle is the social pressure exerted by scientists on each other. The pure researcher is affectionately labeled a "genius" by his colleagues, but authority, real prestige, and the general feeling that they deserve the highest salaries belong to the Chief Engineer, Director of Research, and Project Leader.

As for research itself, the plain fact is that more of it is being done on basic problems and general theory than ever before. To check this statement one must look, not at what liberal scientists claim in their public statements, but at the articles published each month in the lead-

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ing scientific journals and at programs of the annual society meetings.

It is true that military and industrial preferences have affected the directions in which research is oriented. Medical instrumentation lags because there is not enough money in it; a device to permit the blind to read books set in ordinary type has so far suffered the same fate. Important work in sociology, psychology, and biology is probably being held up. This trend, however, is a subtle one for three reasons. First, the interests of the military are much broader than anticipated; the Navy, for example, supported a research project on the social organization of insects. Second, military men have often been willing to take the scientists' word for it that basic research provides the foundation on which later practical developments will be based, even when one cannot predict which foundations will be useful for which practical developments. They have been much impressed with the fact that the theory of relativity provided a theoretical basis for the atomic bomb. The man who pays the piper has been big-hearted about calling the tune, especially since so many tunes develop into hit songs. Third, the scientists themselves have aided and abetted the new emphases. Here, in their acceptance of a factory-like conception of scientific work, lies the secret of the felicity of the Amazing Marriage: the scientists have been led, not bludgeoned, into new ways; and if science is being misled, it is seduction, not rape.

Controlled Information and People

In both contemporary America and Russia, groups which are considered important are placed under surveillance. Scientists have become important. The security program has helped to set scientists apart from the humanity which they are pledged to serve.

Every time a classified drawing or memo is mislaid, a cold hand touches the hearts of those who might be held accountable. And who has worked in an office or laboratory in which nothing is ever mislaid? In patrolled and guarded Fort Monmouth, long before McCarthy showed up, security officials had the habit of going through desks at night to see if classified documents had been left "unsecured," outside the special vaults or padlocked files. The scientific spirit of inquiry! And then there are the casualties of the security program, the colleagues who suddenly clean out their desks and are seen no more. One hears occasionally that so-and-so, unable to get work in a laboratory, has gone in the radio business and is not doing badly (financially, that is). There are hollow jokes about his making more money now than before, about the FBI really doing him a favor, etc. The search for the nature of nature goes on, but is it quite as before?

The following is quoted from clearance form DD 48-1 issued by the Department of Defense to be filled out by civilians working for companies which have been awarded classified contracts. Even janitors must fill it out, since they have access to classified information, viz. the waste-baskets. Particularly to be noted is the "flavor," the almost tan-

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gible hostility, the joy which attaches, not to finding a man honorable, but to finding something with which to impugn his honor.

> (a) I am not now, and I have never been, a *member,* and I am not now, and I never have been, affiliated or associated with, any of the organizations listed below, as an *agent, official* or *employee.*
>
> (b) I do not, and have not engaged in any of the following activities of the organizations listed below.
>
> Attendance or participation in any organizational, social, or other activities of said organizations or of any projects sponsored by them; the sale, gift, or distribution of any written, printed, or other matter, prepared, reproduced, or published by them or any of their agents or instrumentality.
>
> (c) I am not now knowingly associating with, nor have I knowingly associated with any individuals, including relatives, who are or have been members of the organizations listed in paragraphs I and II below.
>
> (d) I understand that if any statement knowingly made by me is found to be incorrect, incomplete, or misleading in any important particular, I may be subject to prosecution and punishment under the appropriate laws of the United States.
>
> (e) I understand the meaning of the statements contained in this certification, and that misrepresentation (*by omission or concealment, or by misleading, false or partial answers*) of the certificate may constitute grounds for removal or other appropriate action.
>
> (f) I understand that failure to execute all, or portions, of this certificate may serve as a basis for denial of clearance for access to classified Department of Defense information.

Below, the signer is instructed to give "a full detailed statement... including dates, places," etc. and to "list the individuals and the organizations." Farther down, is the Attorney General's list of more than 250 organizations, some of them long extinct, considered "as having interests in conflict with those of the United States." Denial of clearance results in the person being black-listed. This is not a matter of a citizen claiming the right to work for the government or on classified projects. It is simply a fact that nearly all research or development opportunities, especially in physics and electrical engineering, require clearance whether the work is on classified projects or not.

It is customary for scientists to poke fun at the stupidities and injustices of the security program, to point out that it does not make sense as a program to prevent espionage and sabotage, but only as a program to control and intimidate people; yet most scientists accept the program as part of the price of having "arrived." How would it look, and who would hire you, if you refused to fill out clearance forms?

The majority of scientists feel that J. R. Oppenheimer should have been given clearance by the Atomic Energy Commission; the scientists cheered when Edward Condon was introduced to a large convention of physicists as "the 'weakest link in our security system' who turned out to be a very strong link indeed"; they enjoy songs like Tom Lehrer's, and "Take Away Your Million Dollars"; they are angered by the State Department's visa policies which keep foreign scientists from visiting the United States; they are concerned, in a general way, with the misuse to which scientific discovery is being put. But they are quiet and leaderless. An their conventions and conferences, in their publications,

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from the governing boards of their organizations, one sees and hears almost nothing of dissent. From time to time they propose that the government study its own security regulations and reform them, but that is about as ferocious as the battle-cry ever becomes. Taken as a whole, the adaptation of the scientific community to the new ways has been remarkably painless, and the scientists surprisingly docile.

Unfortunately the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* is not an exception, although it is a magazine written by scientists crusading for (a) the right of the public to know the truth about atomic weapons, and (b) the need for scientists to influence national military policy. As for (a), the already well-known truths about radioactive fall-out, radii of total destruction, and possible long-term genetic effects, are quite sufficient. As for (b), when the Bulletin first appeared 11 years ago it campaigned for a liberal policy on atomic weapon control; today, its original proposals having unhappily become obsolete, its policies on the issues with which it concerns itself are so moderate, even conservative, that it refutes its own purpose, i.e., one can see that if the Federation of American Scientists (which publishes the Bulletin) were given a decisive voice, little would change in American policy.

There has, however, been considerable complaint against the suppression of scientific information. Complaints are justified, but the significance of the censorship is exaggerated. To a certain extent there is a contradiction in saying, as the AAAS report does for example, that on the one hand science is being impeded by the censorship of work sponsored by government agencies, and on the other hand, that these same agencies are not sponsoring basic research. Sooner or later, it would seem, all the fundamental advances do find their way into literature.

Much valuable work is kept unpublished, and there is duplication that could be avoided, but in spite of this, more than half the papers published in the ever thicker and more numerous periodicals are the result of work paid for, directly or indirectly, by a military or other government agency. The Radiation Laboratories at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where was developed under military sponsorship much of the electronics theory, especially radar, embodied in World War II equipment, published after the war 27 volumes summarizing its work. The Atomic Energy Commission is still issuing volumes of an even larger series describing the chemistry, physics, and instrumentation developed under its auspices. One of the standard clauses in government research contracts is that complete technical reports must be submitted; the Armed Services Technical Information Agency (ASTIA) maintains a large-scale photostating service in Dayton, Ohio, which sends photostats of requested reports to other laboratories doing work for the government. A great many of these reports are unclassified and can be obtained by almost anyone. The real damage of the security system lies not so much in censorship of findings as in what it is doing to the relationship between the scientists and their fellow citizens.

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The Future of the Scientific Community

The Amazing Marriage confronts the scientific community with a political problem: Do scientists approve of the use to which their efforts are being put? For those who cannot answer affirmatively, there is a second problem: Can a man wash his hands of responsibility ("It is society, not the scientists, who misuse the new discoveries") for the probable consequences of his work?

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the scientific spirit grew as part of a new tradition of cultural freedom. That tradition, for reasons which cannot be dealt with here, has largely been exhausted, with the consequence that the flourishing of science and the extension of democracy are today almost completely independent processes. The asocial attitudes of scientists have had little effect on the quality of science itself because the cultural prerequisites for science no longer include democracy. Independent thinking and interchange of information are essential to scientists, but neither the thinking nor the information need rise above the technical level; they need not include morals or tolerance or other necessities of social betterment. The liberal tradition still holds to the belief that science and freedom must stand or fall together, and this may be true in the long run, while the facts of life show that competent men of science can be totalitarians, bigots, and scoundrels. There is no necessary reason why such scientists must always be a minority. The fact that the Nazis were short-sighted enough to drive many of the finest scientists out of Germany does not prove that science cannot exist and advance under a totalitarian regime any more than the Amazing Marriage proves that scientists accept a military way of thinking. Just as the fruits of science can be used for the benefit of, or injury to, mankind, so the spirit of scientific investigation can include a love for or a distrust of mankind, or neither. Perhaps there would be a closer correspondence between the moral and logical orientations of science if human beings were as consistent as Sidney Hook implies when he holds that Communists cannot think independently.

Science is sometimes mistaken for a very broad, all-inclusive world viewpoint; actually it is a narrow and often restricting way of looking at the world. Scientific work is not of much help in developing a sense of humor or a sense of beauty unless a man is inclined to develop them anyway. The tradition of cultural freedom is generally brought into science from outside; it is likely to be the result of extra-scientific interests of leading scientists. It can and will be eliminated from science if leading scientists lack an ethical and political attachment to it.

The Americans with their liberal tradition took it for granted that scientific work in Russia was on a level with the Soviet conceptions of democracy; there has been a rude awakening in the last few years, perhaps the biggest eye-opener being the Russian reports to the Geneva conference on atomic energy. There has been a rush to set up translating services—Russian to English—so that Russian contributions would be available to American scientists. The Russians have always

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kept up on the technical literature of America and western Europe; they understand that scientific concepts are dangerous in a quite different way from democratic concepts.

The dangerous potentialities of science are recognized in a general way by everyone, but American scientists do not often show awareness of particular dangers. An exception was the situation which developed during last fall's presidential election campaign when many scientists and groups of scientists (73 at Argonne, 62 at Brookhaven, 11 at Columbia, etc.) issued statements opposing, or asking further study of, any new H-bomb tests.

Most spokesmen for the scientific community, however, being "responsible leaders," seek to dull such awareness. A particularly clear example appeared in *Physics Today* in an article entitled "The Responsibilities of Physicists for the Future," by Professor George R. Harrison, Dean of Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology:

> The layman needs to know that one cannot pick and choose among the truths uncovered by science, but must take them as they come and use them as one can... there are really intelligent people who feel that Fermi and his colleagues would have done well, when they first uncovered the "terrible" truths of nuclear energy, to have quickly averted their gaze, thrown a blanket over their apparatus, and quietly sunk the discovery under the waters of Lake Michigan... It is, of course, difficult to explain to a mother who feels that her entire family is likely to be wiped out by an atomic bomb, and would not be if the bomb had not been invented, that man must for the sake of his own spirit seek to uncover whatever truth he can...

Although government agencies, and especially the military, are able to pick and choose among truths, i.e., to decide in advance what research they will support and what they do not wish to encourage, the scientists themselves are here denied the right or possibility of being able to pick and choose. Not every line of scientific investigation appears equally likely to be fruitful, and not every fruitful line equally likely to be beneficial. Though scientific investigations are not aimless, scientists are, in effect, advised by Dean Harrison to leave long range aiming to their sponsors.

Dean Harrison implies that the atomic bomb was the immediate product of the work of Fermi and his colleagues at Chicago. Actually, it was several years and gigantic research establishments later, and after the President had over-ruled objections, that atomic bombs were detonated upon Japanese civilians. Between the few pioneering scientists and Hiroshima lay many more scientists, many millions of dollars, and a number of top-level political and military *decisions.*

The explanation which Dean Harrison urges be given to the rightfully fearful mother must be essentially political, rather than in fields of the scientists' special competence. It may or may not be true that the cause of world peace is furthered by intensive research on various kinds of missiles and nuclear weapons. (Dean Harrison writes: "It is

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the responsibility of every scientist to use his skills to some extent for the benefit of the government that makes possible the continued existence of the secluded laboratories in which he likes to work." The irony of the word "secluded" is probably unconscious, as is the appropriateness of the same remark from the mouth of a Soviet leader.) To accept the major line of official American defense policy uncritically is hardly scientific. Something more than a recital of the aggressive potentialities of Russian totalitarianism would seem to be needed to explain how the dedication of science to the welfare of mankind can take the form of perfecting methods to destroy it.

Scientists who are working on reagents especially dangerous to mankind have special responsibilities; thus, if a chemist produces a dangerous reagent in the laboratory, he is not expected to destroy it, but he can justly be expected to insist on special precautions. If he does not, if he cannot see that his responsibility extends beyond his creation of dangerous things, then it is the scientist rather than the products of his work who is the greater menace. However, the scientist's responsibilities are special only in the sense that they are peculiar to his function; in the larger sense, everyone has the same obligation to examine his own feelings and beliefs and to accept responsibility for the likely consequences of his work. This holds for the salesman and the Marine as much as for the scientist.

The most ominous portent for science today does not come from government control through subsidization and security regulations, but from the limited horizons of scientists themselves. The scientists speak of Human Betterment, Labor-Saving Devices, abolition of malnutrition and disease, Leisure and Culture for All, One World, etc., yet are willing to devote their best efforts to perfecting ways to destroy populations. We call it prostitution when a gifted musician or writer turns out high-grade trash for motion picture companies, TV soap opera, or the like. What shall we say of the gifted scientist who seeks more efficient ways of distributing trash, or who turns out, not trash but deadly poison, for uses in which he does not believe?

For over a century our society has nurtured itself on the legend that the better world of the future was first and foremost a problem in engineering. The history of our times gives the lie to that legend. The most urgent problems of our time have turned out to be political. Scientists, exponents par excellence of the reasonable and factual approach to problems, whether in engineering or in politics, have been promoted to influential status, but the competence of the leadership of our society has not improved. And instead of higher standards of morality being brought to their sponsors by the promoted scientists, it is the moral standards of the scientific commmnity which have changed.

Scientists are trained to be as keen and insensitive as hunting dogs. The social problems involved in automation, as well as those involved in nuclear and bacteriological weapons, are considered "outside our field." They are as unaware of the over-riding importance of the qual-

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ity of television programs and commercials, compared to the quality of reception, as they are to their own role in making the problems more acute. Like all experts in our compartmentalized culture, the scientist sees his first loyalty to his colleagues rather than to his fellow humans. *Professional ethics have become for individuals what cartels and trusts are for corporations.* Even professional humor has become ominous: calling a military missile "The Peacemaker" or the hydrogen bomb "The Super-Duper" is cute in a horrible way, like boys playing cowboys-and-Indians with loaded fire-arms.

Scientists once had the reputation of being fascinated with truth and beauty rather than careers. The public thought of scientists as dedicated men, like poets. The scientists' traditional interests and predilections were not only *non*-military, but often *anti*-military. Today Brillouin is fearful that scientific curiosity will dissapear and scientists will all become experts and bureaucrats. Einstein wrote, "Many take to science out of a joyful sense of superior intellectual power; science is their own special sport to which they look for vivid experience and the satisfaction of ambition." Modesty, it is true, seems less esteemed among scientists than formerly. Historically, the scientific spirit rose above the Church and above politics, neither of which were of its own making. But scientists do not seem able to rise above the vulgar materialism of our times; the danger is more generic. If the scientists continue to think of themselves as scientists first and citizens afterward, they cannot resist the present trends, but are fated to become an important source of strength for reactionary groups who can afford to subsidize them. The role of science in Russia looks ominously like the future toward which American science may be heading.

The most encouraging fact about American science today is that the majority of the most competent scientists remain in the universities despite the lower salaries. This, and the occasional individual protests against the Amazing Marriage, are not, however, sufficient to start or sustain the needed chain reaction within the scientific community. A Hippocratic Oath for all scientists, a declaration that scientists will act according to their own views instead of taking their morals from those whose liquor they drink—these become meaningful only if scientists organize and intervene on the political scene in their true role of intellectual pioneers, which is to say, with deeper political insight than our political leaders reveal today. The scientists cannot do this without placing their salaries, their prestige, and their Amazing Marriage in jeopardy. If society is to use its scientists more wisely than it does today, at least some of the leadership in the necessary political struggles must be forthcoming from the scientists themselves. Today's popular prejudice against scientists, even though the reasons given are often ill-founded, arises from true insight. Scientists cannot reverse the popular judgment by explaining their present activities, but only by changing them. Paradoxically, the scientists can win the respect to which their talents entitle them only by sacrificing their present respectability.

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COMMUNICATIONS Continued from page 338

with the raw material of revolutionary movements which have a mystique centered around a drive for power." Does that mean that ambitious Africans are ready to lead revolutionary movements? If so, it will not be denied by anyone who knows the territories. That revolution, he says warningly, "will almost of necessity take on the bloody face of a Mau Mau and the idea of democratic self-government will go down the drain." Does he imagine that any ordered self-respecting community will or should have the decisions about the form of its Government made by a "bloody-faced Mau Mau"?

I must confess that I have also never heard of the Martin L. Kilson who "analyzes in scholarly detail" the origins and causes of the Mau Mau rebellion. I should not describe his dozen pages in that way. But anyone who will believe that Colonel Ewart Grogan is "a Colonial official in East Africa" would, I suppose, believe anything. In the same paragraph the analyst asserts that "compulsory labor has been continually practiced in Kenya since 1919." He also makes the equally wild allegation that the "kipande seeks to make sure the African appears on European plantations when he is scheduled to be there." He sees Mau Mau not as a tribal conspiracy but as a rebellion justified by the failure of the Government to redress grievances. So Mau Mau "took to the field of battle." Is there one non-European in Kenya, missionary, merchant, official, or farmer, to whom that phrase commends itself? And is there one who will endorse the statement that "Colonial rule by definition implies force as an instrument of rule?" British Colonial rule has been beneficent, not brutal.

A Reply

The mode of thinking—or, rather of reacting—of the Colonial Colonel Blimp is sufficiently revealed in this extract from Mr. Joelson's journal to make it worthy of a few comments. One key to his mode of reacting is found in Mr. Joelson's claim that the majority of Europeans have a "real affection for the African." What a pleasant surprise! How nice for the African! And how very ungrateful the African has been! But Mr. Joelson is quite right; the European settler does in fact have a real affection for the African —in his proper place as an unspoiled "boy," and primitive. But what may not be so obvious to those of the settler's milieu is that affection is a means of capturing the other, making him obligated to the giver of affection and thus tying him to a slave-relationship more complete than any legal one could ever be. When the recipient of affection repudiates the tie then he is to blame; the giver of affection is blameless. And where such a subject-object relationship exists within a framework of legal and cultural inequality, is derision far behind? If the settler was not fundamentally derisive concerning his dearly beloved African he would take him seriously—give him rights.

It is important to recognize that this claim of affection is the basis of the power and position of the British settler. Without this affection the rule of Britain could not be beneficent; with this affection it must be beneficent. How can a master who has affection not be beneficent? (At the worst he can make mistakes, and these are easily rectified.) It is only the bad master—the one

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without affection—who is brutal. Thus the claim to *like* the African immediately and completely repudiates any argument against white rule.

The fallacy is too apparent to need explaining. But this much should be said: it does not matter today whether the British settler likes the African or not. The African does not ask to be liked. He wants not affection but power. He does not even care if the white man's claim is valid—that white rule is beneficent. He still wants power. And this reflection is what hurts the Colonial Colonel Blimp so deeply. Many of the British settlers have gone to Africa to find again the position of social dominance and prestige which they were losing at home; and when they find in Africa too that their dominance is doomed—that the desire for equality is stronger than the desire for affection—he feels indeed that man in general and the "black" man in particular is ungrateful and hence stupid. Is democracy going to win *everywhere*?

THERE IS ANOTHER bedrock assumption to the reaction of the British settler. That is the claim to represent *white* civilization repeated over and over again in speeches of white Rhodesians and Kenyans. They seem to cherish this civilization as some vestal maiden which once removed from their hands will not only lose its virtue but its very life. Civilization is white; the white is civilization. The tie is absolute. And being absolute it lands the settler in a terrible dilemma. There is no way out but rule by the white man. Supposing a liberal mind—a mind which is willing to give up its own particular privileges and even make a place for the "black"—what can he do? He has tied civilization to a race and he has to pay the price. When he establishes a "qualitative" franchise—what a phrase!—he tries to span the gulf between black and white by saying that a black man who attains a certain standard of civilization can vote. But how can a black man attain this standard if civilization is white by definition? Only through the courtesy of the white man. And courtesy no more than affection is a sound basis for policy in Africa today. Perhaps a compromise which ignores the dilemma can be patched up; one hopes so. But sooner or later the settler will have to face the problem and decide. Civilization is either white and the black cannot participate; or civilization is civilization and the black can participate on the basis of equality. One or the other. Not both.

Such is the settler—with his stock of late-Victorian ideas. One sometimes wonders what all the fuss is about. The real settler—the man in his land—is so few. He contributes nothing, economically or any other way, to the white civilization he so deeply cherishes. Quite the contrary, he has done more to harm it than he will ever know. One could ignore him if he were not so pathetic and so dangerous in his pathos.

For the settlers are pathetic. Their claim not to be "bad" is a just one. They even have a case. But because they are so involved in a nightmare of their own making, a nightmare composed of fears and hates growing out of naivete and pride, they can only froth at the mouth. They have trapped themselves; they know it subconsciously and they know what the trap means.

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I HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED to refute Mr. Joelson's allegations one by one; it is too easy and too tiresome. Besides, he so obviously resents the fact that Americans know enough to criticize his empire that no rebuttal will have any effect on his opinions. But for the record: where have the British not resisted African aspirations? It is correct to say that a state conquers its independence (the Sudan) even if it does not bash in the heads of the British. I see no evidence in my article that I think the Mau Mau is a tribe. What has the ability of the African to understand my phrases to do with the problems of Africa? (I am not a propagandist, like Mr. Joelson.) There are Africans looking for power as Mr. Joelson seems to have finally realized, but what he does not realize is that the power is seen as an end in itself. I resent Mr. Joelson's libelous implication that I advocate rule by Mau Mau. Mr. Joelson had better argue with the UN about the problems of compulsory labor in Kenya. What is one of the functions of *Kipande* if not to control labor? Does Mr. Joelson think that the refusal of the Kenya government to give a constitutional role to the African had nothing to do with the rise of Mau Mau? There is nothing in Mr. Kilson's article which describes this particular rebellion and its forms as justified; surely Mr. Joelson knows the difference between authentic and justified? The beneficence of British rule in Africa has escaped many persons including both Britishers and Africans. Finally, one must give Mr. Joelson a point. Colonel Grogan is not in fact a Colonial official; he is instead a large landowner, one of the wealthiest men in Kenya, and an old-time leader of the reactionary forces in Kenya. In short a Colonial Colonel Blimp.

A MR. WILLIAM J. NEWMAN

2. NOTES ON NATIONAL COMMUNISM

George Eckstein

At the end of his sober appraisal of the new developments in Eastern Europe (Spring 1957, DISSENT) Irving Howe welcomes the possibility "that the need for reworking the ideas of democratic socialism is felt not only among socialists in the West but also among new friends in the East." With this as a starting point, a few additional remarks may be useful. I believe we can get the entire string of events in the right perspective if we view them as manifestations of a deep urge toward a more just social setup which seeks its course among and over any obstacles that are being raised in its path. (Undoubtedly, an enlightened Western policy could, by judicious economic aid and cultural exchanges, gradually widen the area of maneuver for hard-pressed satellite countries.) In the process, the very pressures exerted by political, geographic and economic factors will force intellectuals and political thinkers of these countries to develop some new political ideas and perhaps new forms of social organization. Much of it may eventually turn out to be

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ephemeral sophistication and improvization in answer to temporary situations (the Gomulka-Wyszinski pact is a case in point), but some of it is likely to enrich permanently socialist thought and practice.

The West, and notably the U.S., is rather far removed from this stimulating experience. An enduring prosperity, engineered by a capitalism that has learned to manipulate the economy, has emptied socialist sails and dulled political thinking in general. Hence while in the 30s and 40s, spurred on by the experience of Fascism and Stalinism, western socialist and social thought produced some valuable new insights and even institutions, the trend may well go the other way, and in the next decade fruitful new developments may come from a no longer stagnant East.

It is also interesting to observe how much more deeply western European intellectuals seem to have been stirred by these new developments than their American counterparts. The possibility of a self-satisfied U.S. isolated intellectually from *both* parts of Europe is by no means unreal.

IRVING HOWE has rightly emphasized the fact that a working class with considerable socialist traditions still existed in Budapest and Warsaw. Nevertheless, while this undoubtedly added decisive weight to the revolutionary movement, all accounts show that the initiative came largely from the intellectuals, the "communist" intellectuals, whose discussions, once the heavy lid was off, rapidly became the rallying point of all the latent revolutionary urges. This is no accident. One of the essential features of totalitarianism is the continuous split between myth and reality by which it forces its subjects to live. The pressure of such a state of things weighs most heavily on the intellectuals and artists who by their very function must be articulate where others can be silent and thereby dull their inner conflicts. Once Khrushchev's speech provided a small opening, there was no stopping this elemental human urge toward self-integrity, and many reports show the tremendous exhilaration of at last being able to search for and tell the truth. This very concrete need of "living with oneself" rather than an abstract love of liberty provided the principal fuel for the upheavals and also explains the ready and overwhelming response in the population at large.

If this is true, then it must equally apply to Russia proper. And if the reports on the unrest and malaise among the young Russian elite, on the questions raised openly about the Polish and Hungarian events in factory and student meetings—if these and similar reports are a true indication of the state of the Russian mind, or at least of an important sector, then indeed the process of fermentation has gone much further than we dare hope. Of course, the situation in Russia differs in some essential points from that in the satellite countries: no national solidarity to fuse and focus the disparate tendencies of revolt; no remnants of socialist tradition among a working class grown up and shaped under 25 years of the Stalinist machine; perhaps also a less acute memory of better times. The ways in which the urge toward self-realization will express itself will therefore be different, more varied and perhaps more devious. With the intellectuals, artists and scientists it may go toward more

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freedom of discussion and expression; with the student youth toward depolitization and less puritanism; with the factory manager toward more local responsibility; with the workers toward direct economic action bypassing the statified unions; with the peasants toward an enlargement of the "private" market sector. Whether and how these trends will coalesce, how long the Khrushchevs will be able to stem or divert the tide, is hard to tell. The Army can be expected to reflect some of these tendencies and to respond to them. And since there is no foreign oppressor to turn against, it is most likely that as the fermentation progresses, it will show itself in more frequent and sharper conflicts at the top.

When the workers of East Berlin went on strike in June 1953, a direct echo was heard a few months later when the inmates of the Arctic labor camps followed their example. Partly through the fault of a timid Western policy, the iron curtain is still a fairly effective barrier; but it is impossible to insulate the Russian people from the virus at work in the satellite nations, and this virus will find an increasingly favorable "culture" in Russia.

IT IS WORTH noting that all these developments, in and out of Russia, can be expected to leave the socialization of industry largely intact, while bringing more democratization and decentralization to the economy, and gradually enlarging the free market sector in the field of distribution, as more consumer goods become available. A radical and rapid change can be expected in agriculture: here the return to private landholding and/or cultivation, combined with some form of cooperative marketing, is very likely, even in Russia. The economic failure of collectivization from any viewpoint except that of a war economy is too evident, the memory of individual agrarian production too fresh. This is by no means premature speculation: Gomulka is said to have requested from the U.S. a million tons of wheat to provide a lever to control grain prices during the period of decollectivization which could then take place next year. One can only guess what tremendous effects such a change would work in the social and political fabric of countries where a majority of the population still is employed in agriculture.

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BOOKS

Class and State in a Total Society

THE NEW CLASS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM, by Milovan Djilas. Praeger, New York. 1957. 214 pp. $3.95.

Readers of DISSENT are, or should be, already familiar with the thesis of this important book. It is that the Communist revolution has resulted in the total control of the state (which is bigger than society) by the party bureaucracy which by every test itself constitutes a new class. This class, itself without internal democracy, exercises such powers over the economy and over the minds of men as no other class or military dictatorship has been able to establish. Djilas, himself a principal author of Yugoslav's national communism, declares that "National Communism per se is contradictory. Its nature is the same as that of Soviet Communism, but it aspires to detach itself into something of its own, nationally. In reality, National Communism is Communism in decline."

Djilas' sound general thesis is lucidly developed. His argument contains many quotable sentences. But the great importance of the book does not lie in what it says—others have said as much—but in the fact that Djilas says it. In itself the book (as its jacket proclaims) "is *the* Anti-Communist Manifesto," written by a political theorist trained in the Marxist dialectic. But what a theorist is Djilas: a dedicated revolutionist from his youth up, a hero not only in his own Yugoslavia but of the whole Communist world; Tito's well beloved comrade; theoretician, and heir apparent, now a prisoner in Tito's jail! There have been other men who have eloquently recanted their earlier Communist faith. But none of Djilas' position in the movement and few if any with his objectivity, faith in democratic socialism and hope for mankind.

IN HIS PREFACE he says: "I have tried to detach myself from my personal problems by not submitting to them. My circumstances are, at best, uncertain and I am therefore compelled to express my personal observations and experiences hastily; a more detailed examination of my personal situation might some day supplement and perhaps even change some of my conclusions." In this sort of detachment Djilas has succeeded extraordinarily. His book has little of the autobiographical; he uses occasional illustrations from Yugoslavian history to illustrate a point or to distinguish Tito's national communism from Moscow's, but he is not writing history. His wish—as he tells us in his preface—is to present "a picture of the Communist

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world, not to philosophize about it" or to trace his own evolution toward democratic socialism. If the picture developed into a sort of anti-communist manifesto, that was unavoidable. He acknowledges noble ideas which communism still "accepts in word" and you will find on pages 152 and 153 an eloquent—and in its context, pathetic—eulogy of early communism before it "tasted the fruits of power."

Djilas' hope for the future lies in his faith that "the world will change and will go in the direction in which it has been moving and must go on —toward greater unity, progress and freedom!" Specifically he looks to great change in communism or break-up of communism. "Completely dominant, the ruling class has begun to abandon and lose the ideology, the dogma which brought it to power. The class has begun to split up into factions .... Because it had to reverence Stalin's methods, the ruling class will not be able to preserve its dogma. The methods were actually only the expression of that dogma, and, indeed, of the practice on which the dogma was based." This idea of the split in the all-powerful class—which Stalin kept unified by terror—Djilas does not develop.

I FOUND MYSELF more than once wishing—unreasonably, I grant—that Mr. Djilas had chosen to give us a little more inside history of the outer and inner conflicts which he has experienced. I should also have liked him to give fuller explanation of various "inevitabilities" in which he believes. Thus, some sort of socialism he thinks was inevitable everywhere "to facilitate the industrial revolution and make possible improvement and expansion." Communism in industrially backward countries with no experience in democracy, with all its shortcomings, filled "the need that made revolution inevitable—industrial transformation on the basis of modern technology." I should have liked a clearer reconciliation of this faith with some of Djilas' criticisms.

But it is unfair to criticize this admirable book for not doing in detail what its author clearly did not intend to do. Rather we should do all in our power to aid the circulation of *The New Class* wherever the Communist propaganda apparatus is active. And that's a large order. Meanwhile, we might show our profound gratitude to the author by arousing a public opinion to demand his release by dictator Tito who boasts that he is no Stalin.* Reports from a reliable source say that Djilas suffers gravely from a bad rheumatism in his unheated cell. Is it not America's business to protest to a dictator whom she has so greatly aided in his struggle for a certain independence from Moscow, in the name of the freedom we profess to cherish?

NORMAN THOMAS

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* We think it appropriate to add here a letter which appeared in *The New Leader*.—Ed.:

"The excellence of Milovan Djilas' book, *The New Class*, the manuscript of which had to be smuggled out of Yugoslavia, should again arouse widespread American interest in his fate. From an absolutely reliable source, I learn that his family and friends doubt if he can live through another winter in the jail where he is confined for the crime of writing an article for *The New Leader* and criticizing dictatorship.

"I see from the newspapers that Tito, having accepted aid from the United States, has now worked out a deal for economic aid with the Soviet Union. It is probably true that reasons of public policy compel us to bid against Russia for this dictator's favor. Probably his gov-

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What Price Work?

WORK AND ITS DISCONTENTS—THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY IN AMERICA, by Daniel Bell. Beacon Press. 56 pp. $1.25.
THE YOUNG WORKER OF TODAY—A NEW TYPE, by Karl Bednarik. Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. 146 pp. $2.50.

Daniel Bell, the labor editor of Fortune and a former editor of The *New Leader,* modestly calls his little essay "notes on work . . . [tied together] by a mood, and some questions." Indeed, had he elaborated on all the ideas with which these "notes" are crammed, he might have written a full-fledged "philosophy of labor." The concentration of his thesis into a sequence of brilliantly antithetical statements rewards the reader with elegant fireworks which vainly try to conceal the profundity of the intellectual effort underneath. Nor, for that matter, does graceful presentation ever interfere with one reader's awareness that Mr. Bell actually is handling dynamite.

For his "questions" attack the basic myth of our society—that the value of work, its cost to society, is measured by its "efficiency," its cost to the user. Erich Fromm has recently dealt with the social and human cost of industrial labor which cost accountants fail to include in their calculations. The reverse of this efficiency cult, says Bell, is the cult of leisure as a conditioned protest reflex. "Conspicuous consumption was the badge of a rising middle class, conspicuous loafing is the hostile gesture of a tired working class"; workers try to escape from the monotony of their job by arbitrary changes of pace; and they dream of the glamors of leisure in terms of non-work instead of meaningful work. Management recognizes the problem which its purely technological reasoning has created for the worker, but instead of abandoning its approach, which is so intimately wedded to the whole social-economic system of industrial capitalism, it substitutes "human relations" and "satisfactions of human associations in the plant" for the satisfaction of work itself.

William F. Whyte of Cornell and William H. Whyte of *Fortune* have told the same story in greater detail and partly with more biting satire, but Bell has placed it in the right context: without naming Marx explicitly, he has indeed brought the famous fifth chapter of *Das Kapital* up to date, showing how "communication

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ernment sins less than Moscow against fundamental human dignity and rights, but I hate this process of competitive bidding for the favor of a dictator. At the very least, we American citizens and taxpayers should make plain our opinion of the man and the government which keep Milovan Djilas in jail because he has dared to think out loud—and brilliantly—in criticism of Communism and praise for democratic socialism.

"I should suggest a flood of letters and postcards to the Yugoslav Ambassador Leo Mates in Washington, urging Djilas' release. (Carbon copies of such letters might well be sent to our own State Department. Certainly it can use unofficial, if not official, influence in this case.) In the name of humanity, he should at the very least be given an opportunity to seek sanctuary outside the land which he has loved and sought to serve. Tito might at least allow his old friend and comrade a chance to live rather than to die in an unheated prison."

NORMAN THOMAS

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and participation" as well as other "psychological gimmicks" of manipulation and accommodation help to perpetuate the system. Management consultants transform a problem of inner conflict into an administrative problem; but—and this Marx neither knew nor expected—alternating between the fallacies which Russell calls "misplaced concretization" and "misplaced abstraction," they have substituted "human situation" for "economic man" and psychology for the profit motive. (Bell suggests, without saying so, that the profit motive still is the sacred root of industry as far as management is concerned; the end of economic man has never been proclaimed in earnest for anyone but workers).

However, "economic man" today is no longer driven to work by hunger and cold, but by advertising and the standard of living. Unimpressed by the propaganda of "Americanism," refrigerators and concomitant instalment debts, Bell finds the basic law of capitalistic enterprise unchanged by ever-shortening work days, ever-lengthening hours of play or even the final prospect of eliminating all "Work" (in the sense of manual contact with reality) through automation. "Efficiency" still is measured as a price-cost ratio. He chastizes self-misstyled "socialists" whose vision of Utopia is just a highly efficient capitalism without capitalists, and others who vainly try to cope with the basic difficulty through such schemes as "workers' participation in management." Neither of these panaceas restore intellectual pride and physical pleasure to the work process. And while some panaceas may give the workers something else to enjoy instead, none replaces the capitalistic concept of cost accounting by a human and socialist concept of work as means of self-fulfilment. Automation, while opening for the first time an opportunity to do away with the drudgery of labor, at the same time deprives the switch-pullers and adjusters of all opportunities to find satisfaction in their work. Hobbies pitifully recreate work attitudes which the worker may cultivate no longer in the factory.

BELL'S ESSAY should be read in conjunction with William H. Whyte's picturesque account of *The Organization Man* which dwells in greater detail on the conflict between the Protestant work ethic and the "Social Ethics" of our communications age. Bell does not discuss their relationship in terms of conflict but rather as the discrepancy between the true morality of the industrial age and its ideological "derivation"; he is entirely on the side of Protestants, as of course was Marx. Work, he postulates with Fromm, ought to be a source of creative pleasure, and his indictment of industrial society, including classical capitalism as well as the Webb-Lenin variety of socialism, is just this —that it no longer affords the worker this kind of satisfaction, destroying in the process his best human possibilities.

I should like to qualify Bell's analysis here in three directions. With the increasing importance of the service industries and the decreasing number of production workers, the opportunities for personally "interesting" work are widening and monotonous routine tends to be the fate of fewer people. Secondly, our sensitivity has become more refined, and

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our greater awareness of the discontent may be just that, or may be due only in part to an actual increase in soullessness; our grandparents certainly took more drudgery for granted. Finally, Bell seems to under-estimate the actual amount of satisfaction and pride which many factory workers still derive from "a job well done," from their ability to function properly, to invent short-cuts, to understand the processes of their machinery and to learn about the field of which their work is a part; in the large-scale new industries workers are required to study continuously, and the vogue of going to night-schools is intimately related to the new job situations. It is true that pride no longer refers to the end-product or any material object, but to the skills, the processes and the functions which must be mastered in the act of producing; the joyful experience of workmanship need not find a material embodiment in the created object; it can be the experience of mastering the process. Inasmuch as true creativeness is a free, playful and non-utilitarian expense of energy, this pleasure may even be purer than that of the artisan beholding his handiwork. It is by no means easy to persuade garage attendants and file clerks that they are alienated.

But man the creator of his natural environment now is being superseded by man the creator of his social environment. Sense of achievement may be denied to the manual worker (excepting the chambermaid and the hairdresser), but is often reported by people functioning in communication—from entertaining to public relations, despite Spectorsky and Kronenberger, and from teaching to social work. The rules of the game are different from those of old-style handicraft, and notably so is the emphasis on "group" work. Bell persuasively urges that such work is less concerned with reality than, say, whittling at a stick is. Indeed, the reality of a social worker often is a faked world—but it happens to be the make-believe which weaves the cloth of values by which we live.

Conceding further that fewer people than before may have an opportunity to deal with reality in any, even the widest sense, a second question remains unanswered: why should production be the basic experience which "colors" all other perception? This assumption applied to the majority of mankind at the time of Marx and may still apply to all countries less developed than most industrialized parts of the United States and Western Europe. But if Bellamy's technological utopia comes true through automation, and all work necessary for the maintenance of a luxurious standard of living actually can be done by a few years' "Labor service" for each citizen (as Marx undoubtedly thought)—then indeed all experience of "work" would be confined to school, training and those few service years (I forget which Utopian had invented an "electronic rat" to clean the sewers, so that argument is disposed of happily).

It might be desirable to have manual production as the basis for our social ethics, but that is neither necesary nor likely in the coming age. We had better face the fact that children now grow up in a world of miracles: the mechanics of the pot-belly stove are easy to understand; what happens in electric kitchen appliances cannot be explained in terms of sense perceptions. Coming generations will

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have to learn functional thinking before they can shape the outside world, but their immediate experience will be of people and of play. The Protestant ethic was useful to the worker whose concern was the mastery of Nature; that question being solved, the Social Ethics of our day fits the worker's concern with others and with his quest for a meaningful life outside working hours. The negative, horrid or ludicrous features of this new ethic may be apparent first; and they may be doubly painful to an observer who has inherited from his Protestant teachers such a wealth of effective tools of social analysis. From his point of view, all the later developments are at best regrettable decadence, at their worst mere ideological veils of a still horrible reality.

Yet writers like Whyte and Riesman, who view this development not as decay but as a conflict of two ethics, may be closer to the Marxian method, which treated the capitalistic work ethic as the ideology of a new society. Mr. Bell is no less disturbed by the discrepancy between the declaratory and the practical ethics of our society than Marx was about his. But his criticism is not related to the social ethics as Marx's criticism was to the Puritan ethics. He deplores the man in the grey flannel suit instead of probing for the *rationale* of his attitudes.

To UNDERSTAND how today's "young worker" functions and relates himself to his social world, is the ambition of a book by Karl Bednarik which has acquired rapid fame in Europe where its references are understood, and is quoted even in the sociological literature of this country which, ever since Riesman, has covered similar ground again and again. The interest of this rambling comment on a social worker's experience with postwar youth is almost entirely biographical—an ex-member of the once famous Viennese Socialist Youth Movement, Bednarik was disappointed when he found out that the class-conscious young worker, as defined in Marxist phraseology, "has no metaphysical existence" but is interested in movies, fashion, spectator sports and motorcycles. Ignoring earlier observations to the same effect—from "the incomprehension of the masses" in the German labor version of the "Marseillaise" to Durckheim's "anomic type" —he freely contributes his own which occasionally are shrewd.

More often they are of a curiously personal, impressionistic nature, such as "I know a young worker who orders his skis from Norway"; considering that a modern skiing outfit costs the equivalent of a month's wages in Vienna, Bednarik boldly concludes that these workers revel in luxuries. Another "tries to dress like the Duke of Windsor"—on what salary, may I ask? This is exactly the fallacy against which Bell vainly tries to caution modern sociologists: substituting Puritan sermons on "mass culture" for economic analysis! It is all the fault of the high standard of living; "without that, there can be no break with the old burgher-virtues" (my translation; the one supplied is poor). Socialist youth in Vienna were so much nicer when they wore sandals and were interested in folk dancing. "The average man forty years ago was morally closer to the old pre-technique man than to the youth of today." Even sturdy peasants no longer smoke

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virtuous pipes in Alpine backwood sheds but parade flippant cigarettes while riding on tractors!

How true! But it is equally true that in Bednarik we meet again our old friend the ethical Protestant yearning for the good old times. The difference is that Bednarik's idea of not boring us like the others is to be-culturize and to be-metaphysicize us. He hardly ever allows a reader to compare his observations with others, but hurries him from "recently I came across a couple of drunks" to generalizations which are German meta-sociology at its worst, and proceeds to the immediate construction of a new metaphysical type. He manages to raise practically all important questions of the post-war labor situation by way of allusion and parenthesis, without ever picking up a tool to handle them. His abstractions are as brilliant as they are misplaced. This reviewer would gladly subscribe to a number of them if they but followed from their premises. Even in their absolutism some of them may be eye-openers for many a Marxian dogmatist who was not around when Henrik de Man said the same things more convincingly.

Bednarik finds that scientific socialism drew its emotional strength from its vulgarized form which was a "saviour religion . . . Utopian faith in progress was the people's opium." Since the ideological "heaven" crumbled, the workers withdraw into the make-believe Paradise of the back garden. "As the pursuit of a social Utopia was the hall-mark of the old-style worker, so individual illusion is the hall-mark of the new type." No longer is capitalism the enemy, nor is class solidarity the protective shield; both have been absorbed into the hateful jungle of a boss-ridden mass society. The aim is neither to fight it nor to reform its abuses, but to evade involvement in it by tactics of noncommittal conformism and to escape from it to a dancing joint. Fulfilment for the worker no longer is dependent on the well-being of his class but on individual preferences, and is achieved not through his productive job attitudes but at best in his leisure hours.

Moreover, the few good results that may come from these developments are pregnant with danger; for at the end of all this emaciation of human substance there lies the cold revolution of totalitarian democracy, the substitution of social techniques for democratic processes. Again, this may be true; but the poverty of the analysis which was supposed to lead up to these conclusions is revealed in the remedy which Bednarik suggests, and I quote: "Think how it would be if every man who lives in the spirit—we call them intellectuals or cultured men—struck up an acquaintance with just one worker"; or to borrow from Lenin: *Alle Macht den Studienraeten!* And the final sentence of the pamphlet: "It is a question of carrying social contacts on the vertical plane, of making individuals 'at zero' [Bednarik's term for the moral situation, the metaphysical significance of which at least one reader failed to understand] into persons. The young worker must be discovered as a person, he must be able to discover himself as a person; then and only then will he be able to overcome the dangers of the new type." If Bednarik's complaint is the lack of frustration in the young worker, he has provided the same for at least one intellectual.

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Even so, the question which Bednarik raises (or rather lowers to the level of Ortega y Gasset) is the same which Bell discusses more profoundly. If the basic human experience were to shift from the productive to the consuming attitudes, and our relatedness to man and nature were no longer determined by our working behavior, then indeed some traditional foundations of socialist ethics might be doomed together with the traditional values of the capitalist society. No doubt, Puritan asceticism provided strong moral support for the socialist criticism of Capital, and even for the imagery of a socialist philosophy. But it never was the only, and not even the most important support of its kind; its possible loss need not produce a crisis of socialist thought, but may force socialists to consider or to reconsider the hierarchy of their values. Since a book review is not the place to develop a theory, it is necessary to state alternative interpretations aphoristically.

Most work no longer is meaningful in the sense of satisfying a physical and intellectual need for creativeness; it no longer fits into the natural life rhythm of the worker. It neither extends his personality into the outside world nor enriches the person by imbedding him in the outside world. The worker's humanity asserts itself in attempts to make the work more interesting, to "loaf on the job," to cheat the system, to extend leisure time and to tinker with hobbies. Whenever he has an opportunity, the worker lapses into "play"—as the barber snipping his shears idly in the air, for instance. The more "play" a manipulation allows, the less fatiguing it is. This playful character of work, i.e., the spontaneous expressiveness of the act of working, has too often been overlooked. Attention always was focused on such sources of satisfaction as pride of achievement, recognition by others of a "job well done," the pleasure of "working together" or the competitive spirit of racing against other groups, insight into the usefulness or necessity of the task, understanding of the full production process, participation in the planning and other factors which give "meaning" to the work and endow the worker with the feeling that his effort "makes sense." Yet, this sense may be either true or false, or even completely phony. Romantic notions of "productiveness," "creativity," "meaning," "sacrifice," "group spirit," "togetherness" then may become hackneyed and trite, or even mechanical, as Whyte has so eloquently shown in his sarcastic discussion of "togetherness." The original values to which these words refer are intensely human, but their perverted use in the context of a given society may tend to de-humanize them. Any conception which originally expressed the protest of man against the institutions may be institutionalized and become an instrument of suppression.

How do we know that such a point has been reached? I submit that two criteria are incorruptible judges of the situation—spontaneity and meaning. If work ceases to be the free assertion of the person's capabilities and if it no longer seems to "make sense" to the individual, then one of two things will happen. Either the values of the group ethics are turned against the institutions in a desperate effort to restore eroded dignity, or the values

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will be rejected wholesale. The morality of the socialist movement vainly tried to uphold the values of industrial society; it was unable to return spontaneity and meaningfulness to the crippled and frustrated humans who have to adjust to objective conditions of work. The reaction now seems to be a shift away from the hollow, craven morality of the industrial society.

The emphasis on "play" in this turnabout movement points to an effort to recapture precisely those two decisive factors of human dignity and fullness: spontaneity and meaning—of sorts, I will admit; but I am not concerned here with the cultural significance and quality of the protest movement, but with the fact that it is a protest of highest intensity. Even the abominable rock 'n roll craze betrays more vigor and primitive originality than the schmalz and crooning escapades of the more "adjusted," though crippled denizens of an integrated producers' group. In fact, it bursts into the "bang" which may save this society from dying "with a whimper." The irresponsible Li'l Abner is to exurbia what the ingenuous "noble savage" was to the ancien régime.

I suppose we have to have amorality if we ever expect to get a new morality. The producer attitude is not the only possible basis of socialist virtues; if it ever was, it interpreted work as derived from play; if it ever will be again, it must return to work the attributes of spontaneity and meaning. Should it fail to rediscover these qualities, the human need for them will become manifest in other ways. The present evasion of the cultural protest into rock 'n roll and consumer satisfactions certainly is as unhealthy as the conditions which caused it; moreover it mimics certain attitudes of play instead of liberating real playfulness. But we should not condemn it for the wrong reasons. Not because it fails to confirm yesterday's illusions but because it threatens to deprive us of all illusions does the present hold so little future.

HENRI RABASSEIRE

Towards Dynamic Barbarism

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH, by Paul A. Baran. Monthly Review Press, N.Y. 1957. $5.00.

Professor Baran, says the dust jacket, "is probably the only Marxian social scientist teaching at a large American University." It ain't necessarily so; but that the *Monthly Review* editors should believe it is quite revealing. The book purports to be a Marxist analysis of the conditions of economic growth in modern capitalist and underdeveloped countries; but in fact it is a crude propagandist's brief for the "Russian way." So tremendous is the gap between this book and the careful scholarship of Marxian writers of an earlier generation—the Bauers, Hilferdings, Luxemburgs, and Bukharins, all of whom attempted to extend the range of Marxian analysis through

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a theoretical mastery of new facts and developments which had not been considered by Marx and his immediate disciples—that one might indeed believe, were one to take the blurb seriously, that we have come to the end of Marxian scholarship, its final decay into a lifeless Byzantinism. But this, of course, is not really so. What the *Monthly Review* calls Marxism is only a very special version of Stalinoid obscurantism.

Mr. Baran's main thesis is easy to summarize: monopoly capital, controlling the destiny of imperialist countries, is hostile to economic developments in underdeveloped countries, and the ruling classes in the United States and elsewhere are bitterly opposed to the industrialization of the colonial and semi-colonial world. Hence the only chance for underdeveloped countries is to join the "socialist countries" which will give them economic assistance and will teach them the techniques of rapid industrialization that have been applied in Russia, China and the European satellites.

In reading this book one acquires a sense of claustrophobia. In this closed universe of discourse one again and again reads quotations from the Fathers, one hears the pious mumblings of the True Believer as he reels off the beads of the Marxist rosary, but one finds no sense of reality, nor awareness, moreover, of the vast non-Marxist literature on the subject. In recent years a number of study centers have been established both here and abroad for the special purpose of investigating underdeveloped countries. A vast specialized literature has grown up; yet one looks in vain for any evidence that Professor Baran has ever consulted it. No doubt a fair number of pro-imperialist apologists operate in the groves of academe, but only a self-induced paranoia can seriously maintain that there are *only* apologists.

To mention a few examples: the foremost British expert in this area, W. Arthur Lewis, whose *Theory of Economic Growth* and other books have become minor classics, happens to be an active member of the British Labor Party, yet he isn't even mentioned by Baran. Professor Bert Hoselitz of the University of Chicago, one of the best American experts in the area and certainly no apologist for imperialism, is likewise not mentioned; a journal he edits that is especially devoted to problems of underdeveloped areas has escaped Prof. Baran's notice.

Yet this is really not surprising. Baran lives in a Manichean universe in which there are only Bourgeois Science—Bad, and Marxist (really Stalinoid) science—Good. Hence there is no need to really concern oneself with, even to become aware of, the recent products of Western thought. This may be good demonology, but is it Marxism? Or science?

WITHIN THE SPAN OF A BRIEF review one can hardly discuss adequately the many fantastic assertions of Professor Baran's book. A single example will suffice. Professor Baran contends that most observers to the contrary notwithstanding, the main obstacle to the development of underdeveloped countries is *not* a shortage of capital, but the way in which potential economic surplus is utilized. Were it not, he claims, for the excessive consumption of the upper classes, unproductive hoardings, and the maintenance of a

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vast bureaucracy and military establishment, as well as the withdrawals of foreign capital, the underdeveloped countries could attain high, indeed very high, rates of growth. Now this is an utterly absurd notion, especially if it is applied indiscriminately to all underdeveloped countries. There may indeed be a measure of truth in it for such oil producing countries as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, but it is nonsense if applied to, say, Libya or India, Ghana or Nigeria or for that matter Puerto Rico.

Specialists in the field have attempted in recent years to distinguish between the very dissimilar social and economic structures of various underdeveloped regions; they have distinguished between underpopulated and overpopulated countries, between countries with poor natural resources and richly endowed countries; they have discussed social obstacles to rapid industrialization as well as those obstacles that are rooted in cultural tradition; they have considered relations between increasing birthrates, increasing consumption and economic growth. Baran shows supreme disregard for all of this. Just soak the rich, he seems to be saying, and things will get moving along.

Or almost—for there is one supremely revealing admission in the book. Quoting from a study by Professor Mason of Harvard in which the author makes the point that extraordinarily rapid rates of increase of national income can be attained by totalitarian regimes "exercising the weapons of terror ... squeezing standards of living ... that no democratic state could possibly accomplish," Baran objects that such terror, though deplorable, represents the inevitable birth pangs of a new society, and that such squeezing of living standards has affected "primarily, if not solely" the ruling classes. This lets the cat out of the bag. Baran isn't really so naive as to assume that "tomorrows that sing" can be reached simply by soaking the rich. Terror will be needed, other social strata will have to be put through the wringer, especially the peasants. It is in light of this that we understand his criticism of the slowness of economic growth in India today. Neither the Congress Party nor the Indian Socialists are willing to sacrifice the peasants on the altar of industrialization; they accept slower rates of growth so as not to be forced to employ the weapons of terror. For Baran and his kind, they are merely petty bourgeois reactionary dreamers. Industrialization ueber Alles! Such disregard for the lives, the cultures, the traditions, the moral conditions of the majority of mankind who live today in underdeveloped countries is indeed the mark of the totalitarian spirit.

In his preface, written after the 20th Congress of the Russian CP and the Polish and Hungarian events, Baran suddenly discovers that "socialism in backward and underdeveloped countries has a powerful tendency to become a backward and underdeveloped socialism." Quite an admission, but clearly only an afterthought. Had he had the intellectual and moral courage to pursue this train of thought, Baran might have arrived at the conclusion that the applications of his program must lead not to a backward socialism in underdeveloped countries but to a dynamic barbarism.

LEWIS COSER

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How They Destroyed a Myth

THE EAST GERMAN RISING, by Stefan Brant. Thames & Hudson, London, 202 pp. 18 shillings.

The East Berlin uprising of June 17, 1953 was the first massive challenge totalitarianism met from within. It utterly destroyed the myth of the unity of state and society under Stalinism. Led by the workers, an entire society rose against its oppressors, thundering its demand for freedom and asserting its humanity. The uprising was defeated only by the intervention of the Russian army; its leadership was destroyed or dispersed. But its social and intellectual roots have not been and cannot be eradicated.

The East German Rising is, unfortunately, a much abridged translation of the original *Der Aufstand* (Stuttgart: Steingrueben Verlag, 1955). It is, in the main, a detailed account of what happened during the three days beginning June 16, 1953 in the industrial centers of Berlin and East Germany. The pattern of the events was everywhere the same. The news of the downing of tools by the East Berlin workers and their march upon the government and party centers led to similar movements in all the other industrial districts of the Russian zone. The strike actions, whose aims did not at first go beyond the modest demand for reductions in work norms, underwent a rapid and irresistible transformation into a revolutionary uprising with objectives of the broadest political significance. The workers had no alternative to resorting to the streets since they, like the rest of East German society, had been deprived of all genuinely representative institutions. Once they did go to the streets, however, they were faced with the baffling problem of improvising such institutions for themselves. There was a clearly felt realization that they must present a political alternative to the regime. Wherever the demonstrations reached this point before the arrival of Russian tanks, a provisional leadership was elected by acclamation. This leadership was to deal with the regime in the spirit of the mandate it received from the people assembled in the central squares.

How, in the face of years of repression and deprivation, of the corruption of the workers' ranks by differential wage and bonus scales, of the presence of a corps of informers, of the demoralizing influence of the Communist Party, of the virtual absence of organized opposition groups—how was such an uprising possible? Brant shows very well how the "new course," initiated after Stalin's death, disoriented the East German Communist Party. Having previously considered itself to be infallible, the party now suddenly had to admit that it could make "mistakes." It thus laid itself open to criticism. The crisis in which the regime found itself as a consequence of its ruinous economic policies and of the consternation in the party ranks (many of the minor functionaries joined in the uprising) due to Moscow's "new course" was a necessary condition of the uprising—but it did *not* "cause" it. Brant does a good job in recounting what he calls the "pre-

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history" of the uprising; he fails, however, to investigate the equally important process of the crystallization of the workers' political opposition. He attributes their solidarity to their community of experience in the shops, but this does not explain their political cohesiveness. The evidence Brant himself presents shows the decisive role played by socialist and trade union traditions and ideology throughout all the stages of the uprising, reflected in its slogans, program and manner of organization at the point at which a leadership emerged. There is, to my mind, no other way of explaining the cohesiveness of action, and the similarity of the forms the uprising took throughout the Russian zone.

A discussion of the East German uprising remains of the greatest relevance. For this uprising poses the question as to the political forms and the social content of resistance to totalitarian regimes, and the conditions of success for such resistance. The importance of Brant's work arises from the material it provides for a discussion of this question. H. BRAND

Middle East in Conflict

SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST; edited by Sidney N. Fisher. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y. 282 pp. plus xvi. $5.00.

This collection of essays and studies on the Middle East was brought together by its editor with a novel purpose in mind. The people of this area of the world are struggling to adjust to new conditions; their loyalties conflict as they strive to find new paths. To describe and illuminate this clash, what could be more helpful than to discuss these people as social beings, each pursuing his particular role against a changing background. Thus, individual studies deal with traditional figures of the Middle East: the Nomads and their function; the Villager who constitutes the vast majority of the population; the Israeli farmer, a new and modern factor; the Industrial Worker and his activity; the Bazaar Merchant and his share in the Middle Eastern economic life; the class of modern Entrepreneurs and, associated with them, economic planners; the Army Officer, center of political activity; the Intellectual in the Westernized and Islamic versions; the Minority groups, forming an intricate network; the Immigrant in Israel and his counterpart, the Arab Refugee.

These are the principal topics handled in this book. The situation of each class or group is described and analyzed, its conflicting interests are brought into focus. In addition, introductory and concluding essays examine overall trends and the larger problems that have brought this area of the world into current importance. If the editor's approach and the vision of his book is commendable for its imaginative sweep, we cannot always say the same for the individual studies. Some are excellent and highly informative; many are marred by dullness of concept and style and a faulty handling of materials. Still, this seems to be a pioneering work of its type in a little known field. S. P.

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LETTERS

"Income Revolution"

Editors:

May I be permitted a comment on the exchange between Gabriel Kolko and Henry Pachter concerning the "Income Revolution" in America? [DISSENT, Summer 1957].

In general, I sympathize with Kolko's views on this matter, but it seems to me that on one important point he has been somewhat less than fair to—or has failed to understand—Pachter's argument. Pachter has asserted that some of the poverty cited by Kolko is due to "special circumstances," i.e., the discrimination suffered by racial and other minorities, rather than to the workings of the capitalist system. Kolko replied by noting sarcastically that "Mr. Pachter is heartened . . ." by this fact, though he then proceeded to offer a more serious rebuttal.

I think Kolko has failed to see the importance of Pachter's point. For if a considerable part of the remaining American poverty is due to "special [political] circumstances" such as discrimination against against Negroes, then it is at least conceivable that by means of a political struggle against such discrimination the poverty that it produces could also be eliminated—and all within the framework of the capitalist system. Whether this is true or not, is another matter; but it raises an important topic which Kolko in his generally excellent presentation has simply failed to cope with.

New York ARTHUR GORDON

In Search of Answers

Editors:

Being one of the generation who are "untouched and even bored by the rhetoric of the thirties, yet repelled and frightened by the realities of the fifties," I was particularly moved by [Lewis Coser's] article in the Spring '56 DISSENT.

I read this article when it first appeared, but I must admit that only now, a year later, has it really struck me.

As is the case with so many young people, I have been deeply engaged in this question of "What should we do" and "How is it possible to disengage oneself?"

I am very aware—having been through it once—of the dangers of the quasi-religious solution of mortgaging the present to the future, as the various radical movements in the U.S. seem to have done. I sympathize most heartily with those who foresaw a brave new world in 1930 and have lived to see only the same old battered world.

However, perhaps because I never experienced this particular disillusionment, there may be hope for the future. I still feel very strongly that the only hope for the radical, the intellectual, the artist lies in the growth and movement of the American working class.

To me, born in 1934, the tales of Wobblies, sit-downs, and the organization of the CIO are tales of high drama and romance; and one of the sad things about the fifties is that few such things seem to be going on.

But despite this apparent lack of large movements—I still maintain that in the working class—in Montgomery and Local 212—in the deepest elements of the population—is the future of mankind. I guess I am a believer in the "perfectability of mankind."

The crisis, as you pointed out, is total. And it seems to me the fight must be total. I don't see how you can separate the struggle for civil and intellectual liberties from the struggle for industrial democracy. You can't have one without the other. Indeed, without industrial democracy I don't see how there can be civil and intellectual liberty. That is why I feel that what is happening on the production line at GM is perhaps more important than what is happening in the classroom at Columbia.

The idea that "sometime and in some places it is a tremendously significant act to stay sane and to stay alive" is certainly true, and ultimately I suppose it's all any of us will ever accomplish.

Yet even while admitting this, it seems just too damnned bleak to be a way of life. In the very teeth of this negative truth, there must be at least a *search* for a positive thought, a positive action, a positive faith.

Balboa, Calif. JOANNE FORMAN

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Miscellany

Less Profile, More Courage

ALL POLITICIANS these days run for office scared. It's harder and harder to get elected. But now we have the sight of a politician "running scared" for *nomination* to office! And three years to go!

What's he scared about? Senator John Kennedy (D., Mass.) can't miss out on the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960 any more than he can fail to be elected in November of 1960. Slow up, Senator; you're in.

Sure there'll be knock-down, drag-out battles at both party conventions, but if the leaders would just consider the facts they'd spare the man a lot of agony. Kennedy has everything:

Personality: Handsome good looks, somewhat on the lean and bony side; struggled up through illness too (war wounds, operation, spine). A little dark; a touch of the youthful tragic; a note on the mournful. And that curling, overhanging hair . . . Wonderful, wonderful!

Good education, intellectual (not too much; no egghead; one book, popular)—doesn't overdo it like the last one who ran; splendid manners, charm and poise. Fine family man in every sense—from a fine family, building a fine family—fine wife, bit of the foreign exotic about her; French origin, a photographer. Photogenic couple. And that younger brother—driving out those vicious racketeers; hero-worships his older brother. Don't forget father in the background, quiet, no ostentation, wealth.

Who can lose with this? Oh, but he's a Catholic; shades of Al Smith. Bigotry and prejudice. One moment, please!

Politics: The Democrats. How do we gest back that solid FDR big city New Deal vote? The Irish, the Italians, the newest lot of them, the Puerto Ricans. How do we reunite our party as a national party, with an appeal to the lower classes, the minority groups? Another Anglo-Saxon old stock aristocrat shaking hands every Sunday on the church steps? Out of the question! Who better than a Catholic?

And the warring party factions and sections? Shades of Jacksonian democracy! Build that western and southwestern alliance. Get those Southern Democrats into line. But wait a minute; John did that already. His Civil Rights vote had Lyndon Johnson whistling "Yankee Doodle"; "Sir, here's one Texan who'll be damn proud to second your nomination for President of these United States." Labor? That Northern Liberal crowd? Show your aristocratic side to the first John; they'll crawl to you. A smile and a promise will be enough for the second; they'll fawn. Let them pick the Vice-Presidency. The Negroes? Well, that is a bother. But, then, maybe the Southern wing will keep them out of the booths. And in the North? That independence for Algeria speech should help here; Africa for the Africans and down with colonialism. Besides, FDR's ethnic minority-industrial voting groups won't put us across anymore; we're after that moderate vote.

Campaign. "Nixon" vs. Nixon; Democrat vs. Republican. Can't lose here. Our Nixon is sincere; theirs smells of opportunism. Our Nixon is dignified, never cried over his doggie. And who'd trust theirs? Isn't the ingrate all set to crawl out from under his own father if need be? Let down a sick man because he can't run for president anymore. We'll back our "Nixon" in out-promising and out-maneuvering Dick; not so slick, but Madison Avenue can't win in '60.

Prediction: 1960 will be the most demagogic campaign since the days of Teddy Roosevelt and the Bull Moosers; we'll smother in radical rhetoric.

That's it. Can't be otherwise. P. S.

Bay Area Readers, Note!

Editors:

There are from time to time meetings and discussion groups in San Francisco with the readers of DISSENT, *Liberation* and the *Socialist Call*. If any one in San Francisco and the Bay area would care to be put on the mailing list, please send name to: Erma Arnstein, 2111 Franklin St., San Francisco 9. Phone: Tuxedo 5-3232. E. A.

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